Scripture and Reason

Why Be An Expressivist?

2007-12-15T13:06:00.000-08:00

I have often taken it to be a norm of philosophical inquiry that one should assume that one's fellow philosophers come to their positions for rational reasons and would reject them if given good reason to do so. One adds to that statement the ceteris paribus clause. Sometimes evidence tells us otherwise. Philosophers are not always rational. But do we have any reason to believe that the expressivist is in this camp? Given the current state of metaethics, there is no good reason to take this position.

I will start by talking about someone who is honest about his beliefs and the evidence. This someone is willing to follow the evidence wherever it leads (unlike Dawkins), and is well informed about the current state of metaethics. This someone chooses to believe in expressivism and rejects accounts of morality that are realist in nature. He is aware that others disagree and may even be somewhat familiar with the current debates in the philosophy of religion. He is not a theist. My point is that such people as this exist.

This person is an expressivist for three reasons. The first reason is naturalism. Given naturalism expressivism is the best explanation of morality. However, this person is not going to rest the entire case on a vindication of naturalism. He also claims that expressivism is the best explanation given all of our current theories of morality, regardless of whether that theory is natural. Finally, he claims that expressivism is simpler because there is no need for the extra ontology of moral realism. Let's examine these claims one at a time.

The claim that naturalism supports expressivism is something I will agree with and ignore. First off, naturalism is not a part of metaethics. It is either an epistemological belief or a metaphysical belief. Second, and more importantly, one is rarely given the reasons for believing that naturalism is true. It is presupposed in much of modern philosophy and little evidence is given to support it. Therefore, I will simply reject it and claim that my rejection is as justified as the modern acceptance of said doctrine is.

The second reason concerns the belief that expressivism is the best explanation of morality. One simply takes all current theories of morality and compares them. I will only consider varieties of moral realism. These varieties come in two forms: naturalist and non-naturalist. There are only two versions of non-naturalism: the Platonic theory and divine command theory. Naturally, both of these are implausible. The Platonic theory supposes that the moral facts are in Platonic heaven. This belief means that our knowledge of moral facts is mysterious at best. The motivation behind morality is unexplained and the rationality of morality is also unexplained. Finally, the content of the moral facts is also unexplained. The divine command theory is not any better. It suffers from the Euthyphro dilemma. It also fails to explain why some things are wrong or right even though God has not commanded that they be done or not done. Finally, it fails to explain the connection between God's commanding something and it being right. So non-natural realism is implausible.

Naturalist realism is also implausible. One cannot analytically identify any moral fact with a natural fact. For we could meaningfully ask whether or not the supposed fact "being happy" really was good. So any identity must be a synthetic identity. All of the proposed examples of synthetic identities have severe problems with them. Therefore, naturalist realism is also implausible. Therefore, realism is implausible.

Expressivism is not as implausible as these options. It ties moral motivation to conative states such as desires, commands and commitments. It explains moral reasoning by analogy with the reasoning we employ with such conative states. It also supplies an explanation for the commonalities and the differences in moral approaches by noting that most human beings want the same sorts of things. Since morals are not beliefs, there is no need to explain moral facts. Since morals are identical with our own conative states, our knowledge of them can also be explained. Although there are some problems with expressivism, realism has more problems.

The final reason is simplicity. We want a moral theory to avoid relativism, account for our moral practices and reasoning, and explain the various features of moral discourse. Since expressivism does all of this without moral facts, there is no need for a realism that does have moral facts. Therefore, expressivism is a simpler theory.

Given the point that these assertions can be rather easily defended in the current literature of moral theory, my hypothetical expressivist seems rather real. So unless we have a particular reason to doubt the rationality of a particular expressivist, we should count the expressivist as a rational philosopher. If we wish to defend realism, then we will need to develop a moral theory that is better than the ones currently available. We also need to point out reasons that an expressivist theory cannot account for morality. Until then, expressivism is not only a rational position but also the best explanation for morality in current metaethics.

Goodness as a Comparative Term

2007-12-03T14:29:00.000-08:00

I have reached the point at which looking further into the issue of moral boundaries will not progress without a better understanding of normative terms. One of these terms is goodness. Sometimes we use this term in a comparative sense. This may be done without verbally indicating that a comparison is being performed, or with such a comparison. In all cases of comparison, an ideal is being compared with the object.

Some examples are in order. Consider the statement "this is a good piece of meat". What is meant is not that a piece of meat is morally good, but that the piece of meat is reasonably similar to the ideal piece of meat. In context, we may be speaking in terms of health, taste or some combination of those. If we are speaking of taste, then we are simply claiming that the meat tastes the way that we like meat to taste. If we are speaking of health, then we are claiming that the meat is good for our health. Consider a second example: "this construction company is better than the one that built my house". In this case the product or skills of the construction company is being compared with a second company. One is more similar to the ideal construction company than the other, and their products are more similar to the ideal than the other.

In these examples one can understand what is going on. A comparative use of the normative term good takes some act, process or object and claims that it is similar to the ideal act, process of object. This has a few interesting results. The first one is that the concept of goodness is not actually being used in some kind of moral sense. All that it means is similarity. The second one is that much of the work is being done by the ideal object, act or process. This means that every comparative use of goodness only requires the use of similarity and an ideal. What has been applied to goodness can also be applied to badness with the same result. The next step is to investigate the nature of the ideal.

Naturalism and First Philosophy: Logic & Rationality

2007-12-02T09:54:00.001-08:00

I pointed out in an earlier post that the naturalist can still deny the necessity of first philosophy by claiming that the principle of non-contradiction is a component of something else (such as rational thought). This something else would then be justified on the basis of pragmatic value or experience. This is the final move available to the naturalist. This forces the naturalist to ground rationality by design, accident or necessity.

The idea that the principle of non-contradiction is a component of rational thought is surely true. In fact, to the extent that one denies the principle in practice one is no longer thinking rationally. So the principle of non-contradiction is a necessary condition of rationality - both practically and theoretically. However, one would not want to claim that the principle is a sufficient condition. The belief that the President is an alien because the voices told me is irrational. Yet is not contradictory.

Once again one can note that rationality can be justified pragmatically in one of two ways. Either one can claim that one's experience grounds one's belief in one's rationality or that one's rationality is grounded in the circumstances of its origin. Since rationality is a practice, it cannot be grounded unless it works correctly. I am assuming that one is rational if and only if one's thinking processes that are aimed at the truth function in a way consistent with their aim, and that at least some of one's thinking processes do aim at the truth. Now our rationality can be grounded in historical circumstances only if these circumstances caused our rationality to be truth aimed. One's experience cannot ground rationality itself, it can only justify beliefs in one's own rationality. Since that is a different claim, I will focus on the actual ground of rationality rather than our belief that we are rational.

To point out the grounding problem in a different way, consider it as the question of why it is that our thinking processes that are aimed at the truth function in a consistent manner, and why we have such processes. These are two different ways of looking at the same problem. Since the naturalist believes that science (or empirical investigation) must provide the answer to this question. Therefore, if naturalism is true then empirical investigation will be able to discover both why we have thinking processes that are aimed at the truth and why these processes are consistent. Since empirical investigation is done using rational methods, the results obtained are meaningful only if they were obtained by a rational method. That means that empirical investigation cannot ground rationality. It can only tell us (at most) what occurred in order to give us the rational processes we do have.

Since no empirical investigation has been done on the matter, one must proceed hypothetically. There are several different ways that rationality could be grounded. It could be grounded as the aim of a particular process. In that case, rationality would be designed as such. It could be grounded as the product of particular process in which rationality was an accidental by-product. This would be the case in which rationality was not designed but was made. It could also be grounded in necessity. This is the case in which rationality is eternal and so are our processes. These separate options must each be addressed before naturalism gives way to first philosophy.

Kant and the Logic of Morality

2007-12-01T10:08:00.000-08:00

There are some people, such as my professor, who do not believe that intuition is useful for philosophy. I am not completely sure what he believes about it, but I do believe that one cannot avoid the use of some sort of intuition in morality. If I have to use it, then I might as well use it right. So why shouldn't philosophers deal with intuition? As I understand it, the only way to avoid this line of reasoning is to adopt the belief that intuition can be avoided. Now one may not be able to completely avoid it, but perhaps a certain area - such as ethics - can be done without it. If this is possible then one is left with the idea facts and logical reasoning are sufficient to know what the right thing to do is. Kant tried to do this and failed.

Kant believed that some act was morally permissible only if it could be successfully universalized. We start off with a maxim. I do something in order to achieve some result. For example, I lie about my identity because I wish to deceive someone. One takes this maxim and pretends that everyone does it. So everyone lies about their identity in order to deceive someone. Now we ask whether or not I could succeed with my action if everyone was doing it. Well, if everyone lied about their identity, then no one would believe anyone's claim about their own identity. So I would not succeed (in such a world) in my aim. Therefore, lying about my identity is immoral.

Now this procedure does get the right answer quite a bit of the time. The problem come from the fact that no limit is placed on how general a maxim is allowed to be. Consider this new maxim: I become a philosophy professor in order to fulfill a desire of mine. Can such a maxim be universalized? Imagine a world in which everyone is a philosophy professor. This would not work - we need to eat after all. So according to Kant, it is immoral to be a philosophy professor. Since this can be extended to absolutely every vocation, it is immoral to have any vocation at all! This is absurd.* Without some kind of restriction of what maxims are appropriate, this procedure does not determine what is right or wrong.

Kant could say (but I am not sure whether he does or not), that the maxim has to be as general as possible. Here is the most generally possible statement: I act because I choose to. On Kant's criteria, this is morally permissible. Nonetheless, not every kind of act is morally permissible - we all know this. So at the most general level, Kant's method fails to give unconditional permission to do something. So Kant cannot be as general as possible with his maxims.

When one looks at the philosophy professor example, one believes that it is perfectly permissible to be a philosophy professor, all other things being equal. However, it is not permissible to be in an immoral vocation such as the drug dealer or assassin. So Kant's moral view would have to say that being an assassin was wrong, but being a philosopher is not. If we use his method without restricting this maxims, this does not happen. If we do restrict his maxims in some particular fashion, then Kant has a different problem.

Kant wishes to say that one only needs the facts and reason to arrive at moral prohibitions. However, the facts do not determine how to restrict the maxims. They only determine whether a universalized maxim is successful. So reason must do so if Kant's method is to succeed. But it is far from clear how one would do this. Kant already has reason supporting the method of universalization. He claims that the usage of morality in our speech shows that all moral claims have that property. In other words, universalization is a part of moral judgments just by being moral judgments. Unless he were to make a similar - and quite implausible - claim about a particular restriction of maxims, then Kant's method fails to give us moral claims.

There is a lesson in all of this. First, one should start with what was right about what Kant said. Surely there is something to the universal character of morality. It is supposed to apply everywhere and to everyone under every possible circumstance. However, it is quite doubtful that one can get moral claims without starting with some kind of moral principles, beliefs or characters. Kant's attempt to show otherwise only illustrates this.

* This illustration and its point were taken from a lecture with the above mentioned philosophy professor.

Looking at Morality: Discovering the Boundaries

2007-11-30T07:15:00.000-08:00

I suggested that the best way to discover the exact domain of moral statements is to distinguish them from law, etiquette, art, skills and other disciplines. So now the question is which disciplines to compare morality with? The best strategy is probably to look at each of the allegedly common characteristics of morality and ask which other areas of discourse also have these common characteristics. Working from these areas of discourse,

One of the first areas I noticed was the prescriptive. Morality gives us commands. So do the areas of law and etiquette. As far as I can think of, no other domain of discourse gives us commands. A second area I noticed was that of action-guiding. Morality guides our behavior. Law and etiquette also guide our behavior. A third area is that of rationality and descriptiveness. These are very large areas to look at, as they contain science, some law and etiquette, ordinary beliefs and practices, etc. So by looking at the general characteristics of these domains of discourse one finds that three areas share them: morality, law and etiquette.

The next thing to do is to ask what these domains all have in common apart from what has already been mentioned. One of the things one notices is certain kinds of language such as "should", "ought", "good", "bad" and other evaluative and normative terms. Another thing that one notices is that failure to abide by the rules has consequences ranging from bodily harm to societal disapproval. One also notices that breaking the rules is usually comes with some negative feelings such as guilt or regret, and one is apt to try and hide one's behavior or justify it to others. As far as I know, these are the common areas between these three areas of discourse.

Not all of our behavior is found to fall under an area of discourse. Looking generally, do any other practices show these features? I think that the answer is yes. Normative language is used in skills (such as construction, art and technological innovation). It is also used in discourses and arguments (ie. that is a bad argument, you ought to use this inference rather than that one, etc). These areas also have consequences ranging from bodily harm to societal disapproval from breaking their norms. Consider what happens when you build a bad bridge (but assume that you are not morally at fault), or what happens when you advance a bad argument. These situations can even cause the same kind of emotions and reactions as moral or legal situations can.

These four areas: three domains of discourse and two general areas are the only ones in which these general features occur. Rational oughts such as an ought to believe or practical one can both be treated as as discourse oughts. Self-interest can be treated as an issue of practical rationality either actually or hypothetically. I am not aware of any other examples.

A Look at Morality

2007-11-29T11:52:00.000-08:00

I have spent some time thinking about morality. I am just about finished a class on metaethics (the study of what morality is), and I am familiar with other areas of ethics as well. One problem that has jumped out at me is that everyone assumes that what they mean when they talk about morality is the same as what everyone else means. Since that is rarely true, some disagreements are hidden by verbal agreement. However, these thinker do tend to agree that certain statements are definitely moral ones. (Such as "lying is wrong", "we ought to keep our promises" and so on.) So how do we decide what morality is about?

First I think that it would be good to point out common features of moral thinking that are commonly agreed to be there. First, moral thinking tends to be prescriptive. Moral commands are not descriptions. They are imperatives. Morality tends to guide our actions. This action-guiding of morality is not just in exceptional circumstances but often. Morality is usually considered to override our wants and preferences. We are not allowed to steal simply because it would be fun or because we would like to have the new toys without buying them. Finally, morality is both rational and descriptive. We disagree about moral claims, reason about moral claims and these claims include descriptions - that is right or he is bad.

Once we have these basic features, we can look at the problem. Nearly every point above has been disputed by some philosopher. The majority (near majority?) of current work in metaethics assumes that there are no true moral descriptions. Also, some disagree over whether other non-moral areas have some of these properties. Examples include etiquette, art, self interest, law, etc. Others insist that these areas only have moral properties because they are based to some degree in moral thought. Finally, it is not as if there is any agreement on what sort of moral theory is right or what methods are the right ones to find the right theory.

It seems that we must start somewhere. I suggest that we start with a few guidelines. First, we should say that ordinary moral decisions and practices are usually rational. All other things being equal, if one theory says that people are less rational than another theory, the first theory is less likely to be true. Second, we should preserve as much common sense morality as possible. All other things being equal, a theory that preserves our common sense is better than one that does not. Third, we should explain why morality includes the things that it does and excludes others. Fourth, our theory should explain what morality is and why it has the properties that it does. Finally, our theory should explain why rival theories exist and why they believe what they do.

Given these sort of principles, I think that we must start with what absolutely everyone agrees with. This is the idea that ethics is not the same thing as etiquette, art, law or any other area. The proper question is why it is a different area. Once that question is answered, one is well on the way to answering what the domain of morality is.

Naturalism and First Philosophy: Logic As Practice

2007-11-26T11:50:00.000-08:00

The last post pointed out that naturalism (of the epistemic variety) assumes that first philosophy is unnecessary. I used the example of the principle of non-contradiction as a counter-example to this claim. I pointed out that naturalists have at least three responses to this claim, and refuted the first response. At this point the naturalist could claim that the principle of non-contradiction is not a belief. If this response is successful, then the naturalist has successfully defended her theory from my attack.

The naturalist might believe that the principle of non-contradiction is a proposition describing the behavior of human being when believing. No one believes contradictions. She could extend this even farther. Quine describes his two principles as pragmatic principles, not beliefs or rationally based principles. If the principle is not a belief, then she could explain adherence to it in pragmatic terms. We behave in this way because believing contradictory things decreases survival value. Since it is not a belief, there is no need to provide a justification for it.

The question to ask is this: do people ever believe that the principle of non-contradiction is true? If anyone does, then the question of justification enters again, and naturalism is defeated. So someone who believes that principle is not a belief must also believe that the principle is neither true nor false. Anyone who claims to believe the principle is either mistaken (because they actually do not believe it) or ignorant.

There are implications for that kind of belief. First, not all instances of P & not-P can be false. If they were, then the principle of non-contradiction would be true. So there is a severe problem. It gets worse, for there is no rational reason to object to any instance of P & not-P. If I claim that the moon is both white and not-white, how could you object apart from claiming the truth of the principle of non-contradiction? All of this demonstrates that if we are to accept the idea that the principle of non-contradiction is neither true nor false, then all of our rational thinking would vanish. Therefore, the principle of non-contradiction must be true. Since the principle is either true or false, one can believe it. Therefore, the second strategy against accepting an example of first philosophy has been refuted.

There is a final strategy available to the naturalist. She could claim that the principle of non-contradiction is a component of something (such as rational thought) that has pragmatic value, or that is not a belief, or is in some way is justified by experience. That possibility is for later.

Naturalism and First Philosophy: Logic & Usefulness

2007-11-25T12:12:00.000-08:00

From what I can currently understand, naturalism is dominant among current philosophers. Naturalism excludes any consideration of first philosophy. First philosophy is the philosophy that we engage in prior to any scientific or generally empirical understanding. It is sometimes, perhaps usually, associated with justifying the scientific method or science in general. My first reaction to this is that there is nothing wrong with first philosophy, and it looks to be necessary. A consideration of the logical principle of non-contradiction and it justification by usefulness contributes towards showing that this is true.

Consider the realm of logic. Aside from various formal logics, and the standard treatment of fallacies, there are basic principles of logic. One of these is the principle of non-contradiction: it is not the case that P & not-P. For example, it is not the case that I exist and I do not exist. This principle was first formalized by Aristotle. It is part of first philosophy for two reasons: no empirical evidence supports this, and no empirical evidence can defeat it (contra Quine). Therefore, there is a first philosophy because certain logical principles are a part of it. Since these logical principles are also necessary for any kind of thinking, first philosophy is also necessary.

The naturalist could claim that our belief in logic is justified by its usefulness. Without it, we would be unable to think correctly or behave well. This principle was useful in our survival. Let's suppose that we grant this. We can understand the usefulness claim in two ways. One is a justifiying way: I am justified in believing the principle of non-contradiction because it is justified by my experiences of the world. The other is historical: I came to believe in the principle because of its survival value. The historical reading does not justify my belief. All it does is explain why I have it. So I can still ask what justifies my belief in it. If we use the justifying reading, then we are left with a question: just how are my experiences of the world supposed to justify the principle of non-contradiction?

When I come to the world I do not take any experience as being a possible defeater for the principle of non-contradiction. If went outside and saw that the moon was bright green, I would not conclude that the moon is both white and not-white (green). I would conclude that the appearance of the moon is now green, but was previously white. Those who believe in the doctrines of the Trinity or Incarnation do not believe that there is no sense to be had in the doctrine. They believe that they do not understand all of it, and cannot. Neither case is a violation of the law of non-contradiction. Therefore, as far as I know, there is no experience that either defeats or supports my belief in the principle. I am highly attached to the claim and would give up anything else to preserve it.

Now we move into the territory of Quine. He claimed that our web of beliefs were all revisable in principle - including our logical beliefs. However, we must revise as little as possible, and make the changes as simple as possible in order to preserve coherence. It is fairly easy to point out given Quine's principles of belief revision, the principle of non-contradiction is not revisable. First, the very principles he gives assume that the principle is true. What determines how much revision and how many changes are necessary is found by determining what set of beliefs can be held without contradiction. Second, no possible change could ever be sufficient to alter this principle. Let's suppose that you denied the principle. By doing this, you are adding the contradictory of every belief in your web to your web. You also add every other belief and its contradictory to your web. So now your web of belief contains every possible belief and its contradictory. It is as large as possible. But that violates Quine's first principle - make as little revision as possible. Any other set of beliefs would be smaller, therefore, one should never reject this belief. Therefore, the principle of non-contradiction is not revisable - even in principle - on Quine's system. Since Quine's system is the only one to provide a way to revise our logical beliefs, there are no systems that successfully show that belief in the principle of non-contradiction is revisable by anything at all.

These considerations defeat the naturalist who attempts justify the principle of non-contradiction using its usefulness as the reason. The naturalist does have other options. She could attempt to justify it by rationality, or could deny that the principle is a belief. I will examine these options some other time. Apart from the success of those other options, the naturalist will be unable to reject at least some of the traditional first philosophy.

Libertarian Freedom in the Fall

2007-07-24T10:14:00.000-07:00

I suppose that among the various theological arguments for libertarian freedom, this one is unique. It begins with a set of theological beliefs about the original unfallen state of human beings and deduces that human beings have (at least then) libertarian freedom. Simply, we begin with the fact that human beings were created by God alone. We were created good. We made a choice to do evil. Therefore that choice requires libertarian freedom.

This first points are matters of orthodoxy. According to Genesis, human beings were created good (Gen 1:31). There was no evil, sin or any inclination to do either. Adam and Eve made a choice to do evil (Gen 3:1-7, Ro 5:12, 1 Tim 2:14). So whatever we conclude, denying one of these points is not an option. This alone does not give us libertarian freedom. We need to examine what it means to do evil.

Suppose that I know that X'ing is evil. I also know that it is possible for me to do X in my current situation. Suppose that I believe that some of my desires will be at least partially fulfilled by X'ing. So far, I have done no wrong. But the moment that I form an intention to do X, I am now sinning. Unless outside factors stop me, I will do X. But now we ask what caused me to form an intention to do X? How would one answer this in the case of Adam and Eve?

One could suggest that it was entirely due to a particular set of beliefs and desires that each person formed such an intention. If so, then are the desires evil? Did one deliberately ignore other beliefs? Was there any evil or sin in this previous state? If one says yes to any of these questions, then I one just repeats the causation question. What caused that desire: deliberate ignorance or evil desires? I would continue to follow this pattern until I was told either that the previous state was good, or that the current state was not caused by the previous one. So suppose that one were to state that this previous state was good rather than evil.

So Adam and Eve's intention to sin was caused by a good set of beliefs and desires. But then how did they sin? Their desires were good and they were not deliberately ignoring anything. So we have to conclude that they were either mistaken or insane. Neither of these options is possible given the information we have. Since God created them good, they were complete. They were functioning correctly and insanity is a matter of not functioning correctly. So insanity is not an option. Since they were told that they were not to eat of the tree, and they knew only good and authority from God, there was no way for them to make an honest mistake. So their intention to sin could not be caused by a good set of beliefs and desires either.

The remaining option is to suggest that their intention to sin was caused by something else. It could not be their condition or their character. Both of those were good. Neither could it be any part of their environment as that was also good. One is left with the suggestion that some external agent caused them to do so. We wouldn't accuse God of giving them an evil intention, so perhaps we are accusing the serpent? The very narrative of Genesis rules this idea out. So do the later statements in the epistles. So what option but libertarian freedom is left at this point?

I wish to briefly mention one argument that might be used at this point. One might simply declare that this matter is a mystery, and we do not understand how Adam and Eve were able to sin given their creation. This is not an option. First of all, the Bible does not commit us to a denial of libertarian freedom. Second, this is a matter of an explicit contradiction. Appealing to mystery in this case is mere hand-waving. I will say that this is my first attempt to deal with this argument properly. I do not consider Calvin's now rejected answer to this, nor do I consider anyone else.

What is Tritheism?

2007-07-23T11:39:00.000-07:00

Tritheism is the belief that there are three gods. It is one way to deny trinitarianism. So I am not looking for the simple understanding of what tritheism is. I am trying to understand what it means to say that there are three gods. How is that to be distinguished from the claim of trinitarians that there are three persons, but one God?

One way to do this is by looking at some examples of multiple gods in various religions. Many forms of polytheism have deities that are born from other deities. These are cases of (at least) two different gods. So are deities that come into existence before or after other deities. There are also cases of deities that cease to exist before or after of deities. In all of these cases, multiple gods are in view. Polytheism does not contain more creative examples of multiple deities, but dualism does. In the form of dualism I am familiar with, one god is good and the other god is evil. Both are without beginning or end. Yet there are two gods rather than one. Some principle must underlie these cases, but what is it?

Looking at the polytheist example, one notices that if one divine person come into existence or ceases to exist at a different time than the other divine person, then there are two gods. Apart from the issue that any non-eternal being can't really be divine, let's look just at the numbering issue. in any case in which there are two individuals, one of which ceases to exist or begins to exist before the other, the two individuals are distinct beings. This is an example of a general principle. In the dualist example, we know that there two beings because they have incompatible properties. The same being cannot be continuously an advocate of good and a continuous advocate of evil at the same time. The temporal example is also an example of incompatible properties. So we could say that two individuals are distinct beings only if they have incompatible properties.

This will not be enough though. How do we know if two individuals lack incompatible properties? A further analysis of distinct beings is necessary. Let's suppose that two eternal and apparently compatible beings existed. The next question is to ask whether one of them could have existed without the other. If so, then the two individuals are also two distinct beings. So in general, for any two individuals, if one could exist without the other, then those two individuals are two different beings. If the two individuals are the same being, then one's existence is also the existence of the other.

If the trinitarian believes in one God, then she believes that the existence of the Son is the same existence as the Father and the Holy Spirit. She also believe that all three lack incompatible properties. With these understandings in place, it is impossible for anyone to believe in three gods. Tritheism is avoided. In that case, tritheism can be defined quite simply: there are three divine individuals and the existence of each individual is a different existence from the others.

Four Errors of (Modern) Philosophers

2007-07-22T03:34:00.000-07:00

When we read philosophical writings, we aim to learn from what we read. Sometimes these writers point out errors in the work of other philosophers. These errors often tend to be the opposite of the errors that the particular philosopher falls into. As I think about it now, there are four errors that modern philosophers tend to fall into. These errors come in pairs, just like Aristotle's vices.

One of these errors is commonly found in 'scientific' philosophers. These are the philosophers who think of philosophy as a building block, defense or conceptual analysis of science itself. They often try to avoid metaphysics, deeper epistemology, and anything that carries the least scent of religion. Science is understood to be the ultimate human inquiry. The methods of science are the methods of knowledge. Science, as well as any discipline informed by its methods, are capable of discovering all knowledge in the universe given enough time. Nothing is hidden from human beings. We really can know everything! This is the error. No formal method can tell us everything, and some knowledge really is out of the reach of human beings.

The error opposite to this one is well recognized by 'scientific' philosophers themselves. It is commonly presented by mystical, ideological and religious philosophers for various reasons. These philosophers reject human reason(ing) because of various circumstances in the world. Perhaps reason is a human construct, it does not apply in the divine realm, it is irredeemably biased by power, or it does not address human concerns. Whatever the reason may be, human reason is rejected in favor of action. Yet these various philosophers attempt to use reason to support their own ideas! If it had such problems, then their reasoning shows that they should not use reason to justify their position. Their devaluing of reason is their error.

Sometimes, the discussion in academic philosophy can become so focussed and detailed that it is difficult to relate to the central issues of philosophy or the concerns of human beings. Many philosophers engage in minor disputes that eat up all of their time, while spending no time relating such disputes to the wider philosophical picture. This creates a divide between various philosophical areas. Connections between the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of religion are not explored. Neither are connections between other areas of philosophy. There is no systematic picture of philosophical thought. This error is the most common and therefore the one least likely to be recognized.

The opposite of that error is a focus on the central issues of philosophy and the concerns of human beings to the exclusion of those matters of detail necessary to them. The few philosophers who fall into this error recognize the current error in philosophy. The best solution is for the central matters to receive our time, and side issues are simply irrelevant. This position sounds quite silly. Matters of detail are necessary to solve any important matter. What we must avoid is turning a major issue into a minor one, or a minor one into a major one!

I do not mean to suggest that these are the only errors of modern philosophy, or even the most important ones. But I do think that they are common and important. The answer to these errors lies in recognizing them when they appear and seeking a middle ground between two extremes - just like the virtues of Aristotle.

The Moral Argument and Necessary Goodness

2007-07-02T13:50:00.000-07:00

As Christians, we believe that God is good, not merely contingently but necessarily. Thomas Morris, in his book The Logic of God Incarnate, suggests that no biblical or philosophical argument for that position is successful. Rather than believing that God is necessarily good by reasons, we believe it by intuition. We believe that God is the greatest being and necessary goodness is greater than contingent goodness. Yet Morris is wrong. There is an argument for the necessary goodness of God.

Morris' first mistake was to take good and evil as commonly understood properties of actions and characters without giving a description of what good and evil were. Oddly enough, this is also a common mistake in arguments about the problem of evil. Some opinions about good and evil are quite different from others. Nonetheless, he appears to be working with the idea that good is necessarily so, while also being objective and real.

His second mistake is to ignore any argument for the existence of God that depends on moral categories. These arguments are arguing for the existence of a being that has special moral properties. So if they argued for the existence of a being that was necessarily morally good, then one would have a very good start on an argument that God was necessarily morally good!

Combining these two points leads us directly to the argument that Morris ignored. This is the moral argument. If good is necessary, objective and real (as Morris assumes) then where else could morality exist other than in God? Now is good is the same as God, then God is necessarily morally good. So now we have the argument. God is necessarily morally good because he is the ground of morality.

The Trinitarian Doctrine

2007-06-23T08:22:00.000-07:00

My series of posts related to paradox have been using the trinity as an example of a paradox. So this is a good point to clarify what this doctrine is. It is also a good point to distinguish between two different sets of claims regarding the trinity. One set of claims is the actual propositions that make up the trinitarian doctrine. The other set is those claims that enable us to both recognize trinitarian doctrine and indirectly believe it.

One first starts with what trinitarians actually believe about the doctrine of the trinity. First off, all trinitarians are monotheists. They all believe in exactly one God. Therefore they deny any form of polytheism. Second, all trinitarians believe that the historical person of Jesus is God, and that he is God is the same sense that the Holy Spirit and the Father are God. This means that all three are equally God. Therefore they deny any diminishing of the divine status of Jesus or the Holy Spirit. Third, all trinitarians believe that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are distinct. Each one has a property that the other does not have, and each one is a person. (Both terms were defined by the trinitarian controversies.) These three points define the center of trinitarian doctrine. (I am ignoring the doctrine of procession because some trinitarians reject it.)

Any doctrine of the trinity will be a set of propositions that is the truth-maker of the above positions while not entailing any contradiction. Yet the three points above are not the actual doctrine of the trinity. Consider the Father, Jesus and God. According to the first point, there is one God. According to the second point, the Father and Jesus are both equally God. According to the final point, the Father and Jesus are distinct and have different properties. So the simplest reading of these points generates a contradiction. That means that the three points are not first-order propositions. They must be second-order propositions about unmentioned first-order propositions instead. One does not discuss the meaning of propositions, only whether they are true or false. One discusses the meaning of sentences.

So what are those three points? They are the way to recognize the actual doctrine of the trinity. Since these three points are true of the trinitarian doctrine, they are necessary to recognize that doctrine. Any doctrine these points are true of would be trinitarian, so these points are also sufficient. Therefore, these points are both sufficient and required to recognize trinitarian doctrine and to believe it indirectly.

Sentences and Propositions

2007-06-22T17:18:00.000-07:00

At this point, clarity on the nature of both sentences and propositions is required. One cannot speak with clarity on matters of belief (direct or otherwise) while the concepts used to explain it are vague!

The first thing to become aware of is the nature of signs. I am using this word generally to refer to any mark, image, sound or other feature perceived through the senses that represents something. So traffic lights, pictures and words are all signs. Morse code, binary digits, bumps on a CD, and smoke signals are also signs. Signs may represent another sensory feature. This occurs in the case of pictures and recordings of various kinds. Signs may also represent a command: street signs and lights. They may also represent ideas. It is these last kind of signs that we are interested in, for they are the ones that are also known as sentences.

Sentences may be in any language, may be in any medium, and may be written, spoken, demonstrated (sign language) and so on. The unifying feature of sentences is that they express thoughts or ideas. But not every idea is one that can be either true or false. Some sentences are questions, others are commands and still others are declarative sentences. Those sentences that can meaningfully be called either true or false are the bearers of propositions.

A propositions is any thought that can meaningfully be called either true or false. Many sentences may express the same proposition. For example "Snow is white" and "La neige est blanche" (French) both express the proposition that snow is white.

These points apply to belief in a very simple way. One believes propositions, and only propositions. One cannot believe sentences, nor can one believe signs in general. These is because the object of belief is a thought, and belief comes down to whether the thought is thought to be either true or false.

Appearing to Contradict?

2007-06-19T16:18:00.000-07:00

In a previous post, I have made use of the idea that some propositions appear to contradict one another. In another post I implied that any appearance of contradiction is identical to an actual contradiction. These two ideas can be explained by explaining what an apparent contradiction is and how it is different from an actual contradiction.

An actual contradiction is simple. A and not-A is a contradiction. Any set of propositions that generate that are also contradictory. So is any set of propositions conjoined with a logically necessary truth, or a conceptually necessary truth. For example, the propositions this square is red all over and this square is green all over form a contradictory set because it is a conceptually necessary truth that no square can be red all and green all over at the same time.

An apparent contradiction cannot be any set of first-order propositions. Any such set would either be contradictory, or it would be consistent. The appearance of contradiction in such a set would be the same as the reality.

Because of this, an apparent contradiction must contain second-order propositions. Not only this, but at least some of them must be about which proposition a certain sentence expresses. Let's consider the example of the doctrine of the Trinity. Any such doctrine states the sentence that "God is one". It also states that "God is three". Any first analysis of these sentences takes them to be stating the propositions God is one unit and God is three units. These propositions form a contradictory set along with the logically necessary truth if something is one unit then it is not three units. So if the doctrine of the Trinity is not a contradiction, then those sentences cannot express the propositions that they appear at first to express. Yet this is a second-order proposition about what propositions are actually expressed by a sentence! In fact, any Trinitarian believer believes that the "is" of the first sentence, and the "is" of the second are not the same relation. This does not tell us what the Trinitarian doctrine is, but what it is not. It is also the second-order proposition used in order to avoid having two sentences express contradictory propositions.

An apparent contradiction is not a contradiction at all. It is a set of sentences that appear to express a set of contradictory propositions, but are believed to express a different set of propositions instead. Without the second-order belief, one would be believing in a contradiction.

On Contradictions, Direct Belief and Tillian Paradoxes

2007-06-14T15:39:00.000-07:00

In my previous post I laid out a brief case that Tillian paradoxes cannot be believed directly. In the midst of that argument, I made the assertion that one cannot directly believe a contradiction. Although true as a simple summary, there are some distinctions that need to be made. Under some circumstances it is possible to directly believe a contradiction, and under others it is not. The key difference is immediate awareness of the conflicting propositions.

Let's imagine a situation in which a person believes these four propositions: my computer was not operating at noon, there are only two computers in the house, a computer was in use at noon in the house and the other computer was not at use at noon. The conjunction of these four propositions generates a contradiction. Since these are all propositions, this is a case of direct belief. So all that remains is to imagine a situation in which someone would have all of these beliefs at the same time. Let's suppose that I know that my computer is off and the other computer is only used by others while they are there. I know that there are only two computers in the house because that is all that I see, and I know that the others in the house were away at noon. I later receive an e-mail that indicates that it was sent from an address used by the others in the house. As I think about it, I realize that it could not have been sent unless someone was at home. But until I think about it, I am directly believing a set of contradictory propositions.

Now try to imagine believing a simple contradiction of any kind, such as the sky is blue and the sky is not blue. I can't. I imagine something else: some of the sky is blue and some is not, or the sky is blue at one time and not at another, or I first believe one and then the other. None of these count as believing a simple contradiction. Neither can one believe a set of contradictory propositions while being immediate aware of all of them. Consider the previous example. Once I became aware that the e-mail was sent and focus my awareness on this fact, I believe that someone was home using the other computer. Focusing my awareness on that proposition leads to the belief that the other computer was in use at noon. Yet that is the contradictory of the belief I previously held!

These examples show that immediate awareness is sufficient to dispel any direct belief in contradictory propositions. They also show that lacking such awareness allows for the possibility of such beliefs existing directly. So precision requires that I restate my earlier point on Tillian paradoxes. They cannot be believed directly while bringing such propositions into the immediate awareness. One can believe them directly without doing so.

Believing in the Trinity vs. 'Paradoxing' the Trinity

2007-06-12T14:40:00.000-07:00

Is a paradoxical doctrine of the trinity compatible with believing that same doctrine? The answer to that question is the same as the answer to paradox in general. It depends on what one means by paradox.

First off, there are two different ways that one can believe a doctrine. One way is to believe in it directly, by believing a proposition or series of propositions that express that doctrine. Another is to believe indirectly. This way of believing does so not by believing a proposition, but a person or group of people. We believe that the doctrine of the trinity, that those people believe, is true. We trust that these people believe some set of propositions or believe some others who do.

Secondly, there are at least three different senses of the word paradox. One sense is that of contradiction. I am going to ignore that one because it is not compatible with belief in the trinity. The other two senses are different ways of understanding merely apparent contradiction. In one sense, there can be no demonstration that the set of propositions that appear to contradict do not actually contradict one another. In practice, this position is the same as the one I rejected. I am calling this kind of paradox the Tillian paradox. In the other sense, there can be a demonstration that the set of propositions do not contradict one another. I am calling this kind of paradox the Thomist paradox.

Combining these points shows that any Tillian paradox cannot be directly believed, and any such paradox refers to nothing. In the realm of belief, the Tillian paradox is identical to a contradiction. Since one cannot directly believe any contradictions, one cannot directly believe a Tillian paradox. But this creates a problem. For the only way to believe a Tillian paradox is to believe it indirectly. Let's suppose that such a paradox is called X. So I believe X because I believe the doctrine that these other people believe. But then why do these other people believe? They must believe indirectly as well. Since this is an infinite regress, X does not refer to any propositions at all! But in that case, Tillian paradoxes do not successfully reference any paradox of belief at all.

So what does this mean in the end? It means that any attempt to understand theology in a Tillian sense of paradox is doomed to fall into an epistemological abyss. And that includes the doctrine of the trinity.

Four Different Kinds of 'Christian'

2007-05-30T14:09:00.000-07:00

I believe that those who self-identify as Christian can be placed into four different groups. These groups are general: many different kinds of believers can be found in them. Two of these groups believe that Christianity is a kind of universal unattached to history. The other two groups believe that Christianity is a particular that is uniquely historical. These four groups could be called the mystical, moral, cultural and messianic.

Mystical Christians believe that the real essence of what it means to be Christian is found in some kind of mystical union with the divine (God). This mystical union cannot be expressed in words. There is no human language, whether natural or artificial, capable of truthfully conveying what occurs in this mystical union. This view has one essential characteristic. It locates the center of Christianity in a mystical, non-discursive experience.

Moral Christians believe that the real essence of what it means to be a Christian is found in a right moral behavior and thought. This kind of Christian could believe that this moral behavior is found most completely in Christianity, equally in all religions, or just better than most in Christianity. This moral behavior is able to be copied by all, or perhaps only those who are properly enlightened. The only essential characteristic of this view is that the center of Christianity is right morality: both in thought and behavior.

Cultural Christians believe that the real essence of what it means to be a Christian is found in a particular accident of history unique to that individual that associates him with certain beliefs of the time. These need only be moral, mystical or historical beliefs that people of that circumstance associate with Christianity. These circumstances could be racial, political, national or familial. They could be the belief of one's parents, the church one attends, or the moral opinions one espouses. These Christians rarely reflect on their beliefs about the nature of Christianity. When they do, they often think of themselves as being Christians in a lesser sense. The one essential characteristic of this view is that Christianity is an element of culture just like any other cultural element.

Messianic Christians believe that the real essence of what it means to be a Christian is found in the particular history of Jesus of Nazareth understood as the Lord. These Christians disagree with each other over many things, are from many denominations, and include both liberals and conservatives. The one essential characteristic of this view is that the belief that Jesus (of history) is Lord is essential and central to being Christian.

I have been unable to think of a particular view that cannot be subsumed under one of these four. If these are all of the views, then it is only fair to say that I am a Messianic Christian. I should mention a few things though. None of these views entail pluralism, nor do any deny it. It is also possible to believe elements of more than one view. However, it is not possible to believe more than one view.

Links and Reading

2007-04-29T12:07:00.000-07:00

Just recently I have begun a serious reading of Newman's work Idea of a University. It is a serious reflection of what a university is and how various disciplines are related to one another. It was written in the 1850's, so a lot of his starting points are quite different from ours. It clearly shows how different modern thought is now from the thought of his time.

William Lane Craig also has his own website. He is a Christian philosopher who works in the areas of time, uniqueness of Christ and Molinism. He also does apologetics work related to the Christian faith.

There are also a few links that I have found to be particularly good recently. One is on three different ways of professing a creedal claim. Another is on the claim that evil people are annihilated instead of being eternally punished. There is a good post on the knowability paradox.

Open Theism: Reasons for Libertarian Freedom

2007-04-22T12:37:00.000-07:00

We can understand some of the philosophical undercurrents in open theism by examining their arguments for libertarian freedom. In order to do that we first have to be aware of what these arguments are. So here are the arguments presented in this outline.

One reason, presented by Sanders, is that certain biblical language is nullified unless libertarian freedom is true. This includes God's grief over sin, changing his mind, responding to our prayers, entering into genuine dialog and reciprocal relations with human beings. Since the biblical language is not nullified (the Bible is our authority), libertarian freedom exists.

Another reason is that libertarian freedom is necessary for genuine, loving relationships. We cannot enter into them unless we are capable of doing other than what the other person intends (even if that person is God). Not only this, but loving another is not possible unless we have libertarian freedom.

A third reason is that libertarian freedom is necessary for our thought to be rational. This reason is pulled from philosophical reasons. Open theists endorse it, but they did not originate it.

A fourth reason is that libertarian freedom is necessary for us to be held morally responsible in a way that makes a difference. It is also key to understanding sin. Without libertarian freedom we could not have sinned, nor could we have rebelled against God's plan.

A fifth reason is that libertarian freedom is necessary to maintain the Biblical belief that God has always stood in opposition to sin. This is particularly apparent in the case of Adam and Eve. Under compatibilism, God could have prevented Adam from sinning without removing his freedom, but that option is not open under libertarian freedom.

There may be more reasons, but it is useful to note that open theists place a special emphasis on loving relationships, biblical language and God's opposition to sin. So these particular arguments for libertarian freedom need closer examination. It would also be prudent to examine the place of libertarian freedom in open theism as well as their beliefs on freedom in heaven. But that is for another time.

Open Theism: Resources

2007-04-21T16:52:00.000-07:00

One of the topics I have been thinking about recently is open theism (also known as free will theism). Since it is unwise to critique a position without providing their beliefs, here are some resources on that position. That should provide anyone with enough information to accurately portray the openness view when critiquing it.

Why I Believe in Libertarian Freedom

2007-04-14T14:51:00.000-07:00

I have been thinking that giving my reasons for believing in the libertarian theory of free will can only help in the dialog on this topic. From the comments that I have read, many compatibilist Christians do not really know why libertarian Christians believe as they do. I do not claim to represent the majority in all respects, but I think my reasons are characteristic of those Christians who are libertarians. I have (as far as I can remember) alway held to these beliefs. My reasons have changed as I have matured, so I am only going to give the reasons I have now.

My first reason comes directly from Christian belief. Adam and Eve fell from a state of innocence by their own choice. This is referred to as the "original sin". They were created good by God, had a sinful condition after and fell by their own free choice. These are all points of orthodox Christianity. Since this is true, we must find an explanation of freedom that does not violate them when it is consistent. Libertarianism is the only option. I am not proving anything here, I am merely stating my opinion. This same dilemma for other forms of freedom is also found in the fall of Satan.

My second reason also comes from Christian belief. Libertarianism is a consistent and meaningful theory at least in the case of God. We believe that God could have created nothing, could have not send redemption, and could have decided not to give any other grace to human beings. Since these are also points of orthodox Christianity, denying them is not an option. Libertarian freedom for God is required for orthodox Christianity.

My third reason is the connection between moral responsibility and freedom. This is a reason I share with non-Christian adherents of libertarianism. If I am responsible, then I am the source of that act. But if I am its source, then the act is free in a libertarian sense. Once again, I am merely stating my opinion, I am not giving an argument.

My fourth reason has to do with information. I do not believe that any combination of law and chance is capable of generating information. I believe this on the basis of the work of William Dembski. If true, then every case of information generation is also a case of the exercise of libertarian freedom. I find it quite implausible to account for all information in the world by God's direct intervention, so this is also an argument for libertarian freedom in human beings.

These are basically my reasons. My reasons do NOT start of as arguments for freedom and then further arguments for having a libertarian freedom. I believe in freedom because I believe in libertarian freedom. These reasons are not all philosophical: two are theological and one is mathematical/philosophical. It would be helpful to note that these reasons are not feelings, nor are they based on feelings. I have not given my arguments, but only a very brief summary of the arguments. I do not mention such arguments as 'freedom to choose God' because I believe they do not fit with the Bible as a whole and suffer other problems as well. Other than that, these arguments are independent. You would have to refute all of them in order to change my mind on this issue. No one I have read has come close to refuting one of them (and I have read Calvin).

Understanding "Fundamentalist" Religion

2007-03-24T12:11:00.000-07:00

I was reading a post by the Maverick Philosopher and stumbled across a series of statements that I found interesting. Ignoring the various interpretive elements and the truth of both scientific and biblical statements, I focussed on the understanding of "fundamentalist" religion expressed by them. These statements express a misunderstanding of the beliefs of a significant portion of religious believers.

This quote will demonstrate some of what I mean:

Now the Bible story has it that there were these two original human parents, and they came directly into existence by divine agency with God pictured as a Big Man who makes Adam and Eve (Adam out of dust, Eve out of a rib of Adam) in the Big Man's image and likeness.

Now it seems crystal clear to me that this story cannot be taken literally: God is a not a Big Man; image and likeness has nothing to do with physical image and likeness; The human race is not unevolved.

One may wonder whether this kind of literal reading is done and believed by anyone at all, but apart from further comment it could be a statement about how no one reads this text that way to begin with.

Of course, I am not saying that man as spiritual subject can be understood naturalistically. My point is that to read the Bible materialistically is to block out its spiritual message. So perhaps one could say that fundamentalists and their atheist opponents are strange bedfellows in the bed of materialism.

One might be able to say such things if "fundamentalists" of that sort really were a significant portion of the Christian population. More on this later.

But science affirms common descent while fundie religion denies it. Here there is conflict and fundie religion has to give way.

Let's stipulate that if one is a Christian and denies common descent based on one's religious beliefs that one is a fundamentalist. Taking this definition, are the previous quotes really the beliefs of fundamentalists? A simple look would show that this is not true. These fundamentalists do not believe that God is a Big Man, nor do they believe that the Genesis story teaches that we are made in the physical image of God.

Here are some quotes that demonstrate this:

Man in the image of God; what does this mean in practical terms? It cannot refer to bodily, biological form since God is a Spirit and man is earthly. - Creation 4(1):21–29
March 1981

Creationists are often accused of believing that the whole Bible should be taken literally. This is not so! Rather, the key to a correct understanding of any part of the Bible is to ascertain the intention of the author of the portion or book under discussion. - Creation 16(1):38–41 December 1993

When God created man in His own image,⁷ He purposed that mankind (both man and woman) would resemble God in certain ways, and share certain of the divine prerogatives. - Creation ex nihilo 16(4):42–45 September 1994

These quotes are just a sample of what can be found on the internet. So at least a significant portion of fundamentalists do not read the Bible literally, do not believe in a Big Man and do not believe that man is made in the physical image of God. On its own, this does not show that fundamentalists are believing rationally but it does show that they do not believe in the way that they are commonly depicted. These fundamentalists would agree with the meaning, but not the wording, of the thoughts in this post on the image of God.

One might think that these comments about a set of statements in the comments of a post are a bit much. I mention them because this characterization of fundamentalists is quite common. If one wishes to argue against fundamentalists actual beliefs or characterize them accurately, then I have no problem. This is not one of those times.

An Argument for Determinism

2007-01-20T12:20:00.000-08:00

I was reading Jeremy's blog and noticed that he had a post up on arguments for determinism. He had two arguments: one theological and one "scientific". I only wish to deal with the theological argument at this point. The theological argument supposes that God has absolute control over creation. This absolute control is believed to require determinism. The problem is motivating this position. Why should we believe that God has this kind of control? What kind of arguments would we need to show this?

It is worth pointing out that the absolute control conceived of is not merely a strong form of control. One could accept the position of Molinism and believe that God can exercise detailed control over every aspect of the world. If one did that, then one could not believe in determinism at all. So one must believe that God exercises some form of control that is even stronger. Perhaps he could cause the choices of free beings to line up with his will. Since Molinism does not allow this, this would result in a stronger view of control. It is also the only way to have a stronger view of control than Molinism.

So now that we know what kind of control is required, we have to wonder what could convince us that God has this kind of control. Perhaps we could quote a Bible verse. But the Bible does not say anything that requires this form of control to be true. It would have to say that God efficiently caused the free choice of someone to be what he wanted. You cannot find that, or any set of verses that require such a view as that to be true. Perhaps a theology would require this form of control. It is hard to see how it could without being ad hoc. At best, it could claim that God's perfection requires absolute control of creation. I don't find such a claim intuitively appealing. As long as I have strong control, all of my intuitions are satisfied. So why should I believe that God's perfection requires absolute control?

Perhaps we could advance the argument that God is the most powerful being possible. Since a God with absolute control is more powerful than a God with merely strong control, God has absolute control. The response is very simple. Apart from a proof that freedom is compatible with determinism, there is no good reason to believe that absolute control is even possible. In that case, a God with strong control is the most powerful being possible.

All of this has assumed that the person who believes in absolute control also avoids attacking Molinism directly. However, this is an option. He could argue that Molinism is irreparably inconsistent. The intuitions that supported strong control should now support absolute control. So far, this is a good argument. But consider the fact that I also have intuitions and arguments for incompatiblism. Since we both believe in free will, I would have to ask whether the evidence for absolute control really does outweigh that for incompatibilism. I am not sure that it does. An argument for absolute control would have to take this into account and give an appropriate argument.

No matter how one tries to advance determinism theologically, one is required to give an account that shows the superiority of theological arguments for God's stronger control over universe to the philosophical arguments for incompatiblism. One also has to either refute Molinism, or demonstrate that freedom is compatible with determinism. Quite a bit of work for a argument that tries to demonstrate determinism!

Good Trinity Blog

2007-01-20T12:08:00.000-08:00

I was looking around the internet and noticed a good blog that I had seen before. This blog is solely about the Christian doctrine of the trinity. It has good articles with some good comments. The writer is a philosophy professor who has written about the doctrine before. As you might expect, he approaches it from a philosophical point of view.

The Incarnation and Naming

2006-12-14T14:42:00.000-08:00

I read an article on the incarnation quite a while ago. It was written by a Christian philosopher and attempted to show some philosophical problems with the incarnation. These problems are serious enough that their solution should be a top priority to any Christian philosopher. If no solution can be found, then the doctrine of the incarnation is unintelligible. This would mean that the Christian faith itself is false. All of this is to point out the seriousness of the article I am discussing. That said, I believe that I know what the flaw in the argument is. Before I can move to that, I need to explain how naming is connected to the doctrine of the Incarnation.

The doctrine of the Incarnation is the doctrine that the second person of the Trinity - God the Son assumed human form in its entirety without losing any part of his divine nature. Another way of putting this doctrine is to say that the historical human being named Jesus is the same person as God the Son. Now it is quite clear what we are referring to when we say "God the Son". Our trinitarian doctrine comes before the doctrine of the incarnation. It is the reference of the name "Jesus" that is the problem.

This problem of what is referenced by the name Jesus is the same problem as what it referenced by any personal name - "Bob", "Bill Smith", and so on. What precisely does this name refer to? One could suggest that it refers to the body alone. So when we say "Bill" we are really talking about the physical body in front of us. This option is favored by some physicalists. But it is not an option open to us. Another option is to suggest that "Bill" refers to both the body and the soul together. This option also fails. These two options fail for the same reason. After death, but before resurrection, there would be no "Bill". So the same would be true for Jesus. Yet the orthodox understanding of the incarnation requires that Jesus do things (such as descend into hell, or vanquish Satan) in this very time period. So this cannot work. Nor can the name "Jesus" refer to his soul alone. This would create modal problems when applied to the doctrine of the incarnation and improperly divides the soul from the body when they are together. Of course, "Jesus" cannot refer to his divine nature either! Obviously the people of Jesus' time - and those afterword - did not think that explaining who Jesus was would show that he was divine.

Summarizing then, "Jesus" does not refer to a part of human nature or a human nature as a whole. Neither does it refer in whole or in part to divine nature. The name "Jesus" refers to the person of Jesus. "Jesus" refers to Jesus himself. The same is also true for all other personal names. The name refers to the person but not the nature.

I am not doing to deal with objections, nor am I going to show why this can be true without begging the question, or why other referents for "Jesus" fail in detail. That I can do later. All I wish to do is show the main oprions and the one that I have chosen. The why of this I will also share later.

Incest is morally permissible...

2006-12-13T14:24:00.000-08:00

...if homosexual activity is. This argument does not work in reverse, nor do I endorse either activity. My argument is very simple: If some homosexual activity is morally permissible, then the some forms of incest are permissible. Any argument that establishs homosexuality activity as legitimate will also establish incest as legitimate. Any argument that denies legitimacy to incest will also deny it homosexual activity.

I have heard it said that the government ought to stay out of the way of what happens between two consenting adults. If applied to homosexual activity, this means that the government should not punish it. If applied to incest, this argument means the same. So if two adults who happen to be siblings are in a consenting sexual relationship, the law could not forbid this without interfering in the behaviour of consenting adults. So either this is a bad argument for homosexual activity or it is a good one for incestuous activity.

I have also heard it said that the government ought to allow people as much freedom as possible to pursue their individual ideas of the good life. A part of a homosexual's idea of the good life is homosexual activity. A part of some other people's idea of a good life is incest. If it is possible to allow a homosexual to pursue their idea of a good life, then there is no good reason to forbid someone who practices incest from pursuing their idea of the good life.

At this point two objections come to mind. One is the biological argument, and the other one is emotional 'argument'. The biological argument points out that the children of close relatives have genetic problems. This suggests that that one should not have children with a close relative. But unless having children is connected with a moral sexuality, then it does not show that incestuous sex is wrong. If homosexual behaviour is permisslble, then there is no such link. Therefore, this argument shows nothing. The emotional argument is in even worse shape. I find both behaviours very disgusting, but that is not a real argument. Besides, if it was, then it could also be used against homosexual activity.

All of this is a bit quick, but I strongly doubt that anyone could find a good argument against this. Any such argument would need to both permit homosexual activity and deny incestuous activity without being ad hoc. Of course, I doubt that any homosexual activist openly supports incest! But the logic of their own arguments requires that they do.

Is this a heaven and hell issue?

2006-10-09T14:12:00.000-07:00

Lately I have heard this sort of response offered quite frequently by a particular person within my church. I suggested that seeker-sensitive churches were not God's design and that this was an important issue. In response, this person asked that question: "Is this a heaven and hell issue?" By this he was asking whether the wrong opinion on the topic would result in the person ending up in hell. Although this question does have a serious concern behind it; it approaches theological concerns in the wrong manner and with the wrong assumptions.

The serious concern behind the question is a question of emphasis and application. Sometimes a person will focus all of their attention on minor issues to the exclusion of the central issues of the Christian faith. This does not mean serious thought on minor issues is wrong. It just means that our discussion of minor issues can't overwhelm the major ones. Other times a person will use discussion of an issue, whether major or minor, as a substitute for doing what is required. For example, someone will discuss the urgency of evangelism instead of speaking to an friend about an issue that may lead to evangelism. These concerns are serious, but in the context of your average Christian they are unfounded.

To ask whether a topic is a "heaven or hell issue" wrongly assumes that the goal of the Christian faith is to get as many people as possible into heaven and out of hell. It further assumes that the most efficient way to accomplish this is by discussing only what is relevant to that task. The second assumption is not one that I am concerned about. The first assumption is simply wrong. It is a gross misunderstanding of the Christian faith. The goal of the Christian faith is to worship God and to serve him fully. While we are yet on a fallen earth part of that service is following the Great Commission. This Commission asks the Church to make disciples of all nations. Making disciples is not complete with a response to an altar call! That is only the beginning. And even if it were, that would still not be the goal of the Christian life.

Asking whether a topic is a "heaven or hell issue" also approaches theological concerns in the wrong manner. We do not approach God and ask him to skip all of the unimportant stuff so that we can get to the part that really matters. We do not approach the Bible that way either. Since theology is simply a systemic understanding of God and his word, we cannot approach it that way either. Instead, we approach him to learn, to shape out understanding and to alter our lives. Approaching in the other manner simply exchanges knowledge for ignorance and wisdom for foolishness.

Rather than asking whether an issue is a "heaven or hell issue", ask how it is connected to the major issues of the faith. Ask how our understanding of this issue will alter our behaviour. This asks with the right approach and with the right assumptions. It also addresses the substantial concerns behind the horribly bad question of "is this a heaven or hell issue?"

A Response from a Philosopher

2006-05-30T18:25:00.000-07:00

As I was reading through my friend's recent entry on his blog, I thought that a few comments were in order. He is writing on the topic of the usage of the Word of God - the Bible in church. It is worth reading, so read it. I strongly agree with the main content, I just have a few comments, particularly because I was indirectly singled out under the name "analytic" and "philosopher".

I think what my friend is trying to say is that Bible believing churches should spend the focus of their Bible studies and sermons on the message (reception) of the text rather than the truth of the text. We should spend more time understanding what the Bible is saying than trying to prove that what it says is true. With this I agree. Unfortunately, I think that he has engaged in some exaggeration to make his point. He states that "the method of historical criticism is what kills the life of the Church". Now, perhaps a diet of only historical criticism would do that, but historical criticism itself does not. (I am assuming that historical criticism relates to the practice of proving the truth of the text.) If one's faith in the text is already strong, then one has no personal need for historical criticism. But most in the church do not have a faith that strong. Otherwise, there would be no need to respond to the claims in the Da Vinci Code!

My friend suggests that this use of Biblical defense results from feeling threatened by liberal scholarship. I would suggest otherwise. Most people in the pew have never heard anything of liberal scholarship. He also suggests that the church spends too much time debating with secular critics. Again, I would suggest otherwise. Most pastors spend no time at all debating directly with secular critics. The concern of pastors who do defend the Bible in sermons and Bible studies is over the faith of those inside the church. When the Da Vinci Code came out, many ordinary evangelical believers doubted their faith. Since the Da Vinci Code contained very bad arguments and transparently false "facts", how much more will their faith be shaken by real scrutiny?

Let's suppose that a pastor of an average evangelical congregation decided to only preach the message of the text. Now let's examine the result this has on the congregation. There will be a small number who do not doubt their faith because they understand why the objections against it do not work. There will be a moderate number of people who do not doubt their faith because of their experiences. These two groups of people will find their faith strengthened and feel as if the life of the church is greatly increased. The rest of the congregation of believers will doubt their faith. The message will be relevant, but it will feel disconnected from their life. Because they do not trust the message, they will be less inclined to act on it. They will also disconnect the pastor's messages from the other messages and routines they have. This is not the only problem. Those who believe because of their experiences will not be able to transmit the faith without a similar experience. Their children will believe out of tradition rather than trust. That is precisely what happened to North American believers in the 50's and 60's.

I think that there is one final point. Our period in history is unique in a way that has little parallel in the ancient world. Anyone can access information on any subject quite easily. We are also given many messages throughout the day. So objections to the faith that were addressed to few then must be addressed to many now. Even if this were not true, we should remember that the ancients took time to refute every objection that took root in society - both inside and outside the church. We would do well to focus on the message of the Bible, but never forget to continually establish its truth and defend it against objections.

I'm Back...

2006-05-30T18:09:00.000-07:00

So, this is my first post in quite a while. This is just to let you know that I will be posting again. I am not sure how frequently I will be posting. Probably at least once a week. I will post on the same kind of topics as before. Other than that, do not have too many expectations. Well, that's it.

Geisler and Aquinas on Divine Timelessness

2005-09-22T20:38:00.000-07:00

I have begun reading through the second volume of Geisler's systematic theology. As I read into this work, I have noticed just how much Geisler depends on Aquinas' work. He endorses almost all of Aquinas' positions and uses many of the same arguments. One of these positions is the idea that God is outside of time. I used to hold that position, but do not believe it anymore. So I was curious as to how he would support his position. I found that one of his main arguments is God cannot have any kind of passive potencies, beings in time have passive potencies; therefore, God is not in time. This argument fails because it assumes that if God is in time, he is in time in the same sense that we are.

I agree that God does not possess any kind of passive potency. He cannot undergo changes in his substance. The argument that Geisler offers is also valid, yet I disagree with the conclusion. So it should be obvious that I disagree with the second premise. In fact, I hold that the second premise applies to everything but God. Every being except God has passive potencies because it is not pure actuality. Every being except God is also inside time. But Geisler needs to show that being in time entails that a being undergo substantial change. Geisler makes several theological arguments to show that beings in time undergo substantial change.

In his first argument Geisler claims that time itself is the measure of change. If nothing at all changed, then there would be no time at all. This means two different things. Since God cannot undergo substantial change, time did not exist apart from creation. Therefore, time arises from the work of creation. This also means that anything that is created exists in time because it undergoes a change in substance. However, God does not undergo any change in substance. So any change that God could undergo as a part of being in time will be the substantial changes that creation experiences in relation to him. That sort of change does not require passive potency. So this does not show that God is outside of time. One could take the argument that time is the measure of change to meant that time only occurs to those who undergo substantial change. If one did so, then the argument could not support the idea that God is outside of time. It would be a clear example of question-begging.

In his second argument Geisler claims that time limits beings. Since God has no limits, he must not be inside time. This argument assumes that the past and future exist in some sense, and then deduce that God would be limited if he only occupied the present. However, no argument is given for supposing that either the future or the past exist. Those who believe that God is temporal do not believe in the existence of the past or the future. Therefore, an argument is necessary. So this argument fails as well.

In his third argument Geisler states that God is pure act and since temporal beings have potentiality, God is not temporal. He believes that God is disanalogous to time, having no past or future like it does. However, he has not shown that temporal beings have potentiality. Neither has he demonstrated that time has a past or a future. Therefore, this argument also fails.

In his fourth argument Geisler states that since God is necessary he has no potential not to exist. What has no potential in its being cannot change. Since time involves change, God is timeless. This argument equivocates on the word "change". In the final premise, it includes both substantial and non-substantial change. In the second last premise, it includes substantial change. Therefore, this argument also fails.

Since none of these arguments succeed, Geisler must rely on his Biblical evidence and historical consensus to establish the idea that God is timeless. Although I believe in all of the doctrines that he is attempting to use to convince me, I hold that these doctrines are about God's substance. Therefore, they cannot prove that God is outside of time. All they do is establish that God cannot be in time in the same sense that we are - a conclusion that Geisler should appreciate.

Methodological Naturalism and Science Stoppers

2005-09-08T10:40:00.000-07:00

Part of the reason for believing in methodological naturalism (MN) is that appealing directly to God as the source of an action is a science stopper. Science cannot investigate how God did it, not can it investigate the nature of God. Both Plantinga and Michael Martin agree on these points. The question is whether these points are a solid justification for MN or not. These points are not a justification for MN because they are inconclusive.

Plantinga notes that even if denying MN is a science stopper, it does not mean that God did not act directly in that circumstance. If one follows the practice of MN, one will come to conclusions that one knows from other information to be false. So our practice of science will not be truth-seeking, but will only seek after certain kinds of explanations, even if we know that they are false. Martin does not explicitly disagree with this argument. What he does believe about it is unclear.

Plantinga also argues that empirical investigation may be able to establish cases in which God has acted directly. The scientist would simply rule out indirect explanations, leaving only direct ones. Martin does not believe that we can ever rule out indirect explanations. Therefore, there would be no empirical evidence for the direct action of God. The problem comes with exactly how Martin knows that indirect explanations cannot be ruled out. He claims this based entirely on a priori reasons such as the progress of science and theory revision. Such reasons only establish MN if metaphysical naturalism is true. He does not offer any mathematical or logical proof for such a conclusion. Apart from such a proof, one would need a posteriori reasons for believing that God's direct action cannot be established through science.

Martin does offer just this sort of a posteriori reason later on as a confirmation of his position. He says that the progress of science has replaced supernatural explanations with natural ones. Although this is true, it will not serve as an adequate reason. He would need to show that any direct action of God is similiar to those supernatural explanations that were later replaced. Merely pointing out that God's action is supernatural will not do that. Perhaps God's action on the world leaves a signal of intelligent design. Perhaps those supernatural explanations did not leave such a signal. Then they would not be similiar. Therefore, this does not confirm or support his position.

All of these points mean that MN cannot be justified on the basis of science stoppers without further argument. Michael Martin simply does not show that God's direct action is relevantly similiar to replaced supernatural explanations. Neither does he give a logical a priori argument for why God's direct actions cannot be detected through science. Apart from those sort of arguments, Plantinga's case against MN succeeds.

Geisler on General Revelation

2005-09-07T16:23:00.000-07:00

I have been reading Geisler's systematic theology recently. Compared to much modern theology, his work is extremely good. It is exactly what a systematic theology should look like. I am saying this so that you know that I do not disagree with everything that Geisler says. In fact, I agree with almost everything he says that I have read so far. However, his account of the relationship between the Bible and general revelation is flawed. There are three different problems with it. First of all, he gives no argument for the claim that science is the interpretation of general revelation. Second, he ignores the fact that general revelation requires an extra layer of interpretation in comparison with the Bible. Third, he does not consider the idea that sin may have distorted general revelation in a way that the Bible cannot be distorted.

The first point is quite important. There are two different positions on the content of general revelation. One of these positions is that general revelation is only about God and morality. Therefore, such scientific details as the composition of rocks, or the workings of animals are not a part of general revelation. Those details are general revelation only in the sense that they reveal a divine designer. The other position simply states that one is discovering God's truth through science. Such science (when correct) will disclose part of God's general revelation that was not understood before. In one position, general revelation has little content and scientific discoveries simply reinforce the same material. In the other position, science helps us discover new information about God's general revelation. Geisler's argument simply does not address this alternative view.

The second point is even more important than the first point. Let's suppose that science really is an interpretation of general revelation. Geisler later states that neither science nor one's interpretation of the Bible should be given precedence in a conflict between the two. Instead, one should pick the side that is more certain. This will only work if one of these does not suffer from some sort of epistemological disadvantage. Yet that scenario is exactly what he does not discuss. It is obvious that the Bible is verbal. Interpretation of the Bible proceeds by examining the text. In the case of nature, there is no text. One has to first set out some observations about the world, and then interpret those observations through a theory. This setting out of fact is not neutral, but is influenced by theory. Therefore, science has a layer of interpretation that Biblical interpretation does not have. An extra layer of interpretation means that science is epistemologically disadvantaged in any conflict with the Bible.

The third point is the most important one of all. The Bible is inerrant in the autographs. General revelation is also "inerrant" when the world was first created. These cases are not similiar. For we have a great confidence that our manuscripts are very close to the originals. We obtain this confidence through the scientia of textual criticism. Without the Biblical information, we do not know what part of general revelation has been altered by sin. I do not mean to claim that the moral code is unclear or a designer is not obvious. What I mean to claim is that we have diseases, death and evil designs. Such evil designs include poison, attack and defense structures and other classic examples of natural evil. Without the Bible, one can easily conclude that God is a designing, all-powerful and extremely evil intelligence.

I could add another example to interpretive problems in science vs Biblical interpretations, but for now this should be enough. Apart from a sustained argument against these sort of positions, one of Geisler's positions present in one of his preconditions has not been established. Any time that he discusses issues about the relationship of science and the Bible, one may not need to follow his conclusions. (This could affect his later arguments about scientific evidence for the age of the earth, for example.)

Science and Methodological Naturalism

2005-08-30T10:24:00.000-07:00

Part of the debate over ID involves the question of whether science is committed to methodological naturalism. Everyone agrees that science is not committed to atheism or to naturalism. Methodological naturalism is the method of investigating a subject that proceeds as if naturalism were true. There is more than one definition of naturalism, but for now I shall take it to be the conjuction of three ideas:

1) The universe is causally closed
2) The universe is ultimately physical
3) The universe is governed by some combination of laws and chance (this does not exclude those who deny the existence of laws or chance provided that they affirm one of them)

The denial of any one of these three ideas means that one is not a believer in naturalism. Since scientists say that methodological naturalism is not the same as naturalism, I will proceed by assuming that the reasons that commit one to methodological naturalism (MN) are good reasons even to those who do not believe in naturalism. Before I begin looking at the various arguments for MN, it would be helpful to mention the main players and their articles.

One the side of those who affirm MN, we have an article by Michael Martin, and various books such as God, the Devil and Darwin by Niall Shanks, Finding Darwin's God by Kenneth Miller and The Tower of Babel: Evidence against the New Creationism by Robert Pennock. These books do not agree (Shanks thinks that Miller is a creationist), but they do believe in MN and do try to defend it.

On the side of those who deny MN, we have an a three-part article by Plantinga, an article by Dembski, an article by Stephen Meyer and a post by Studi Galeleini. These articles do not all take the same perspective, and they are not all 0f the same quality or length. However, I do think that they include a broad perspective on the various reasons that there are to deny MN.

It would take a while to look at various arguments for and against MN, and I plan to do so in later posts. However, my focus in going to be on the sort of arguments present in the works I have already mentioned.

The Demarcation Problem, God and ID

2005-08-29T14:53:00.000-07:00

I have noticed that various debates about intelligent design assume that if ID theory does includes references to God then it cannot be scientific. Sometimes this is simply assumed, and sometimes it is argued for. These opponents usually agree that ID is not truly science. Perhaps it is philosophy, or perhaps it is pseudoscience, but it certainly cannot be science. All of the arguments I have currently heard for this position are not good, although some are better than others.

The common argument that I have heard is that science deals with the natural world, ID involves the supernatural in its theories; therefore, ID is not science. Although this is false (ID does not refer to the supernatural), this argument is indefensible. If we take the "natural world" to be referring to the the world that we can access with our senses, this argument claims that any sort of theory that invokes a supernatural being as an explanation for features of the natural world is not scientific. The problem is that "science" should also be understood in the natural sense, as referring to the systematic understanding of the natural world. In that case, the argument turns out to be a denial of full-fledged theism. The claim that science deals with the natural world is a claim that our systematic understanding of the world must be mediated by the senses. One cannot move from that premise to the conclusion that no supernatural entities may appear in science. One needs an extra premise: that there is no empirical evidence for supernatural entities. Yet that is precisely what is in dispute. So on a common understanding of "science" and "natural world", this argument begs the question against ID. The other understanding of "natural world" takes "dealing with the natural world" to mean that science must use methodological naturalism. Since this is also in dispute, this understanding also begs the question against ID. So this argument is a failure.

Another argument I have heard is that science deals with efficient causes but not final causes. Since ID deals with final causes, it is not a part of science. One should first be aware that this does not mean that God immediately leaves science. For example, if particular efficient causes (miracles) are best explained by God's existence, then science includes God quite directly. Not only this, but final causes can't leave science as easily as one might think. When science asks questions about the function of something (ie. appendix), it is investigating final causes as Aristotle understood them. Science does investigate such things, and quite frequently. Therefore, such a distinction will not be able to demarcate science from non-science.

I have also heard mere assertions that God is not a part of the natural world and therefore cannot be a part of a scientific theory. This does not amount to an argument. It is a theological assertion cloaking itself as part of philosophy. If God truly is the sustainer and creator of this world, then he is a part of the world in a way that nothing and no one else is. Therefore, this argument begs the question against theists.

All of these arguments fail, and I have yet to see one that has a good chance of succeeding. Perhaps this is part of the reason that these arguments are convincing less people as time proceeds. There is no common ground that can be appealed to in order to rule ID out of science. So unless the advocates of the anti-ID position wish to encourage fellow believers, perhaps they should move on to better arguments.

Duhemian and Augustinian Science

2005-08-26T15:15:00.000-07:00

There is a distinction that Plantinga created between two types of activities that describe themselves as science. One of them is "Duhemian science" and the other is "Augustinian science". There are a number of positions on the nature of the scientific activity that become clear when this distinction is used.

According to Plantinga, Duhemian science is a type of science that is independent of one's metaphysical and religious commitments. By this Plantinga does not mean to exclude all metaphysical and religious views. He only wishes to exclude those that are not universally shared. Now Plantinga is not sure on whether Duhemian science will use methodological naturalism. He says that "perhaps we should speak of 'methodological neutralism', or maybe 'metaphysical neutralism'". The point is that all of the knowledge gained from this sort of science would be public and rely on universally shared beliefs.

Plantinga also believes in Augustinian science. This is the sort of science that investigates the natural world with some sort of metaphysical or religious commitments. These commitments may be Christian, Buddhist, Islamic or secular humanist, but the point is that they are commitments formed from an area outside of science itself. This kind of science would investigate the questions that presuppose some kind or commitment, or perhaps they would investigate certain questions to find out more information. This kind of science is only available to those of a particular group.

These distinctions make it easier to characterize four different positions on religious or metaphysical commitment in science. One of these positions is that only Duhemian science is actually science. This is the position shared by everyone who denies that ID is science, yet affirms that evolutionary theory is science. They either believe that Duhemian science includes methodological naturalism, or believe that methodological naturalism has been vindicated in some way by scientific activity. A second position is the one shared by ID advocates. They differ amoung themselves as to whether Augustinian science is science, but agree that their position is part of Duhemian science. They also believe that methodological naturalism is not a part of Duhemian science, but that it is methodologically neutral instead. A third position is held by those who advocate biblical creationism. They believe that Duhemian science is restricted to non-historical areas of science that deal with repeatable experiments. This Duhemian science is expects that the universe holds to order and rules, but does not need a commitment to either methodological naturalism or methodological neutralism. Their Augustinian science is based on the Christian faith, and it investigates historical and non-repeatable events in the natural world. The fourth and final position is that of the presuppositionalists within a tiny section of the Reformed camp and the postmodernists. These people believe that there is no Duhemian science. Every science is Augustinian, and attempts to do Duhemian science are merely attempts to do Augustinian science while hiding one's commitments. Each of these views is made clear by the distinction that Plantinga created.

Each of the views differs on the nature of science. They differ on whether methodological naturalism is a part of Duhemian science and even on whether there can be such a science. They also differ on what domain Augustinian science has and on whether it exists or not. What these differences do make clear is that positions within the creation-evolution discussion are tied to particular views of the scientific enterprise. These debates are not about the facts alone, but also about philosophical views of what science is.

Barna Polls, Hick and the "Christian" West

2005-08-25T11:09:00.000-07:00

There are some who speak of a moral problem within evangelical Christianity. There are others who speak about the problems with believing that the Christian west is superior to other civilizations. So what do Ron Sider and John Hick have in common? They both rely on a combination of polls and intuition to reach their claims about Christians. Yet one's intuition is not always reliable, and there are no proper polls to measure such things.

It should be obvious that one cannot rely on the intuitions in order to gather percentages. One should rely on revelation, or on a properly done poll. Hick's intuition tells him that 98%-99% of people follow the religion of their parents. A logical look at history tells us that his figures are not correct. He is not the only person do this either. It may seem reasonable to suggest that most people believe in evolution, but this is not the case either. Polls taken show that only 10% of people believe in evolutionary theory completely. On these sorts of issues, there is no good reason to believe that intuition is reliable.

However, Sider and Hick are likely also thinking of various polls that have been taken to measure Christian practice. These polls do not actually do that. The only measure of evangelical Christianity is the Barna poll. An evangelical is defined as "born again; say their faith is very important in their life today; believe they have a personal responsibility to share their religious beliefs about Christ with non-Christians; believe that Satan exists; believe that the eternal salvation is possible only through grace, not works; believe that Jesus Christ lived a sinless life on earth; and describe God as the all-knowing , all-powerful, perfect deity who created the universe and still rules it today". Barna defines the category "born-again" as someone who has made a "commitment to Jesus Christ" that is still important in their life today and believes that when they die they will "go to heaven because I have confessed my sins and have accepted Jesus Christ as my savior". The remainder of Christians come under the label "notional Christian". The label "born-again" is not a current label. Although some who are older do describe themselves as "born-again" it is a useless category. It is possible to be an evangelical and believe that everyone will be saved, Jesus was just a man, Christianity is just like other religions, and the Trinity is false. Such a person is clearly not a Christian at all. Barna has simply applied the evangelical label to the dominant characteristics of those who claim to be evangelical. Not only this, but Barna does not include such things as prayer, Bible reading and accountability to the list of evangelical characteristics. What Barna thinks is an evangelical is not an evangelical at all.

Barna cannot reliably measure Christian or evangelical Christian characteristics and there is no other current polling system that does measure them. Since intuition and polls are the only way that these numbers could be known, they are not known. Therefore, Hick and Sider cannot make comments about the behahior of "evangelical" Christians that have any strong connection to the behavior of those who follow the historical Christianity of the apostles.

ID and Naturalism

2005-08-24T15:43:00.000-07:00

A comment on a earlier post caused me to think about the relationship of ID (intelligent design) and naturalism. Many of those who expouse ID say that if it is presented in a science classroom it should not be presented as a philosophical or a theological enterprise. Instead, it should be promoted as a scientific research program. AS long as this is followed, ID is compatible with naturalism.

This sounds shocking because many of the backers behind ID do not believe in naturalism and do not believe that it should constrain science. Nevertheless, as long as ID is a scientific enterprise, it does not conflict with naturalism. As a scientific enterprise, ID is the investigation of intelligently designed things. As a scientific enterprise, ID does not entertain thoughts about the nature or identity of the designer. So there is no scientific reason to suppose that the designer is not embodied. Perhaps the designer is an alien. Perhaps this alien created our universe. ID as a scientific enterprise cannot deny this.

At this point I can imagine an objection: But no ID theorist really believes that! True, but irrelevant. There are people who take the scientific evidence for a beginning of the universe to mean that God created it. Not everyone is convinced by this sort of argument. However, this form of argument is exactly the same as the design argument from evidence inside ID theory. The cosmological (kalam) argument begins with a scientific or metaphysical data of a beginning to the universe and deduces that there must be a first cause. The design argument begins with the evidence of ID and argues that there must be an unembodied designer. The evidence of ID and a beginning to the universe are equally consistent with naturalism in a scientific context. It is only when we move outside that narrow context that these facts may no longer be consistent with naturalism.

So although the scientific project of ID is consistent with anti-naturalism, it is also consistent with naturalism. In fact, there are many metaphysical theories of the universe and causation that it is compatible with. There is a sense in which ID is not consistent with naturalism, but that sense is not a scientific sense. It is the sense of seeking out the best explanation for intelligently designed features of our world.

Sola Scriptura: Understanding Sufficiency

2005-08-24T09:50:00.000-07:00

The content of Scripture is sufficient to equip the believer in faith and life. The believer is simply a person who is a Christian. The faith refers both to the practice of the Christian faith in prayer, Bible understanding, good works and other spiritual disciplines, and the beliefs that a Christian is supposed to hold. The life refers to every activity done by the believer, every thought and every vocation. By combining the two terms, one is referring to the totality of a believer's life. This implies that the gospel message is entirely contained in Scripture, Scripture contains all of the necessary teaching for faith and life, Scripture contains all of the information necessary to resolve any conflict in either belief or practice and Scripture can teach its own interpretation.

The gospel message is entirely contained within Scripture because Scripture is sufficient to equip the believer in faith, and the gospel message is necessary for faith. All of orthodoxy has held that Christians need the gospel message in order to be saved. It has also stated that they continue to need this gospel in the Christian life. Furthermore, they also need to make new disciples. New disciples need to be told the gospel, and the believer must understand the gospel in order to tell the disciple. Since all of these requirements are a part of being a faithful believer, the sufficiency of Scripture means that the gospel message in entirely contained within Scripture.

Living in faith requires teaching. This sort of teaching will include all of one's doctrinal commitments, as well as any principles and rules for living a moral life. Since such teaching is required to live a life of faith and the Bible is sufficient to equip one for the life of faith, the Bible contains all of such teaching. It is also necessary to disciple new believers by teaching them. Such is agreed by every orthodox person. Therefore, the Bible contains all such teaching information.

The Bible also contains all of the information necessary to resolve any conflict of belief or practice. Such conflicts occur in life, and since the Bible is sufficient to equip one for life and resolving conflicts is part of the Christian belief, the Bible is capable of equiping one to resolve such conflicts. Resolving conflict is always a good work. Since all good works are a part of the Christian faith, the Bible is sufficient to equip one to resolve conflicts of belief and of practice.

The Bible is also capable of teaching its own interpretation. Since scripture must provide plenty of information, Scripture would not be sufficient unless it also provided a means to obtain that information. If Scripture did not provide that, then we would have to obtain that means somewhere else. In that case, Scripture would not be sufficient, because another source would be necessary to obtain that information. Therefore, Scripture is capable of teaching its own interpretation.

All of these points demonstrate that many of the original implications of the creeds can be derived from sola scriptura. Scripture contains the gospel, all teaching for life and faith, everything necessary to resolve conflicts of faith and belief, and offers its own interpretation. This is not a demonstration that scripture is necessary, nor does it demonstrate that every part of Scripture serves some purpose. What it does demonstrate is that these things follow from accepting sola scriptura within orthodox Christian tradition.

Sola Scriptura: The Need for Clarity

2005-08-22T11:36:00.000-07:00

It is quite frequent for the Reformed to make or deny appeals to sola scriptura. These appeals are taken quite seriously, but they are not always believed. In fact, some appeal to sola scriptura in one instance to solve a problem that another person declares cannot be solved by sola scripture. This dilemma cannot be solved by mere appeal to sola scriptura. Rather, the doctrine must be clearly set out so that everyone knows what it means and when it applies.

Now some may claim that the doctrine of sola scriptura is already clear enough in the original creeds. There are no problems there, and certainly no need for further work to clear up the matter. Perhaps those who misuse sola scriptura are simply unwilling to believe the Bible. Perhaps they are simply not familiar with the original creeds. This may be true. Regardless of that, the original creeds still have problems with them. Consider the fact that one creed states that the Hebrew MT textual tradition is inerrant. That sort of claim is one that virtually every modern scholar would disagree with. Conservative scholars who believe in sola scriptura do not believe that it implies that sort of thing about the manuscript traditions. The creeds are also vague about the precise relationship of scripture and tradition. For example, just how are we to treat the creeds? Are we to believe in them unconditionally, or only conditionally? There is at least one creed on each side of this question. There are also questions that the creeds do not answer. These include the relationship of the sciences to the Bible, the place of philosophy in theology and the relationship of theology to the Bible. This should be enough to demonstrate that the creeds do not provide enough clarity to the issues involved.

At this point, someone may suggest that the commentary of the Reformers may offer some help with these sort of questions. Perhaps it does. It does not matter though. If the Reformers did offer such commentary, then it has not achieved the sort of status that would allow it to define sola scriptura. Furthermore, a simple seach cannot find anything on what the Reformers did mean by the term. Finally, the fact that the creeds do dispute the various implications of sola scriptura is a good indication that the Reformers themselves did not agree on the subject. So they will not be able to resolve this.

This leaves only one way to resolve these questions. One must investigate the implications of sola scriptura using the resources of the creeds. These implications cannot be obtained by purely historical means, nor can this project be avoided. These implications are not a new definition of scripture. They merely clear up the meaning of the sola scriptura that is already present in the creeds.

Learning From the Ontological Argument

2005-08-19T10:03:00.000-07:00

Philosophers generally agree that no version of the ontological argument is compelling. Although it may contain premises that are true and the argument is recognized to be valid by everyone, no atheist believes all of the premises. So as an argument, it can do very little. What the ontological argument can do is demonstrate the status of God's existence. It also shows that there are interesting implications for existence proofs related to Anselmian theism.

Plantinga has a modal ontological argument that is like this one: It is possible that God exists. It is part of God's nature that he exist necessarily. Therefore, God exists. This argument may sound like cheating, but it is a valid argument. Atheists must deny the first premise, since the second premise follows from the definition of God in Anselmian theism. So either God exists necessarily, or it is impossible for God to exist at all. This is agreed by everyone.

This has interesting consequences for proofs for or against the existence of God. Any time that an atheist is attempting to prove that God does not exist, he must assume that there is something about our world that conflicts with the very nature of God. Now he must point to something that is actual. It will not work to move from what he thinks is possible to a proof against God's existence. The reason for this comes from implications about necessary beings.

If God is a necessarily existent being and his nature is incompatible with the existence of something, then that something cannot exist. So if we find that something, then we know that God does not exist. But we cannot suppose that the something is possible merely because it is conceivable. For if God does exist, then it is not possible. Let's use an example. Suppose that a world in which an evil demon tortures babies forever is an evil that a good God could not allow to exist in any circumstances. Such a world is clearly conceivable, but it is not possible if God exists.

Nor can we suggest that the mere fact that we can conceive of such worlds should count against the existence of God. There are good reasons that the theist can give as to why such worlds are conceivable. She could suggest that the human mind is capable of thinking of contradictions and errors, so why is it not also capable of thinking of non-possible things? Such a response is surely plausible. In any case, the facts about what sort of thing we can conceive are facts about the actual world, and not facts about possible worlds. So even if that was a good argument, it would still be within the range of acceptable arguments.

Hick Again: Yet Another Bad Argument

2005-08-18T09:54:00.000-07:00

I found another one of Hick's arguments. This one shows a severe lack of understanding of Christian belief. I don't think that it is quite as bad as the previous two arguments, but it is certainly not very good. His argument is quite short, but seems to appear in more than one place in his work. This argument fails because Hick once again begs the question against the exclusivist.

His argument is as follows: "For me, what is at stake is whether it is realistic today to ignore the global context in which we live, and the fact that other religions, and I am thinking now particularly of Islam, turn human beings away from selfish self-concern to serve God, just as much as Christianity does." Now he may have two different arguments here. One of them might be the argument that our "global context" should cause us to question our exclusivism. The other argument might be the idea that since other religions turn people to God, we should abandon our exclusivism. I will deal with his argument as if it were two arguments, but he may only be advancing the second.

The first argument is nothing more than a fallacy. The fact that we live in a "global" context does not undermine exclusivism any more than being in a "scientific" age undermines miracles. This is nothing more than snobbery disguised as an argument. I could just as easily suggest that living in the age of the church, we know that atheism is false, or that the superiority of Christianity is revealed in our global context. Yet both of those arguments are also snobbery. Perhaps what Hick means to suggest by this is that Christian belief was suprised to encounter our present context. He does not use this argument, but it would be unsound. Christians have been involved in plenty of missionary work, they have viewed Christ as the Saviour of the entire world, and they have crossed ethnic, language and national barriers to do so. Christianity is not surprised to be in our context.

The second argument begs the question. Christian exclusivists do not believe that any Muslim is serving God by following Islam. They also do not think that Islam turns anyone away from selfishness. Neither do they believe that Islam helps anyone serve God, especially not as well as Christianity. Christian exclusivists believe that one can only serve God by following Christ. One can only be turned away from selfishness by the only salvation there is: the life in Christ. One can only be helped to serve God by the Holy Spirit, who works in that special way in Christian believers only. Now exclusivists do not deny that the Holy Spirit works in the non-believer, but such work is not intended to help the person serve God! It is primarily intended for person to believe and follow Christ so that he can be saved.

Since neither of these arguments work, it is quite obvious that Hick's arguments against exclusivism are a failure. Since all of these arguments have a common fallacy, there must be a reason. My suggestion is that these arguments are not intended for an exclusivist audience. They are intended for pluralists. Since many pluralists do not understand exclusivism, they are convinced that it is defeated by these arguments. Hick is not confronted by hordes of exclusivist critics because their attention is focused on inclusivism instead. His arguments make much more sense if they are viewed as deductions from his interpretation of religious beliefs. In that case, they should no longer be presented as reasons for believing in pluralism. Intead, he should present them as a pluralistic way of understanding religion.

Hick and Another Bad Argument for Pluralism

2005-08-17T10:57:00.000-07:00

You would think that Hick could at least try to understand the exclusivist position. Instead of doing this, he places two different arguments against it that are quite worthless. Yesterday I pointed out that his first argument was flawed because it contained a false premise, was irrelevant and begged the question. This argument fails to understand the exclusivist position.

Here is Hick's argument: "But the basic criticism of both Christian and Muslim exclusivism is that it denies by implication that God, the sole creator of the world and of all humanity, is loving, gracious and merciful, and that His love and mercy extend to all humankind. If God is the creator of the entire human race, is it credible that God would set up a system by which hundreds of millions of men, women and children, the majority of the human race, are destined through no fault of their own to eternal torment in hell? I say 'through no fault of their own' because it cannot be anyone's fault that they were born where they were instead of within what exclusivism regards as the one limited area of salvation." Now we can take this argument apart and see what Hick is saying.

1) The location of one's birth is not something one is responsible for
2) If exclusivism is true, then damnation depends on one's location of birth
3) Therefore, if exclusivism is true, then damnation depends on something that one is not responsible for
4) If God loves all of humanity, then damnation would not depend on something that one is not responsible for
5) Therefore, if exclusivism is true, then God does not love all of humanity
6) But God really does love all of humanity
7) Therefore, exclusivism is false

As you can see, Hick's argument depends on the assertion that a belief in exclusivism means that salvation will depend on where one is born. It is curious to note that Hick does not defend this absurd idea. Neither does he mention any exclusivist who believes it. He cannot mention any, because no exclusivist believes that. All exclusivists will say that people are damned because they are sinners. The location of their birth does not enter into the equation at all. So why does Hick think that exclusivism means that this sort of belief is true?

If you remember, the previous argument for pluralism argued that approximately 98% of people retain the religion of their youth. Although this is false, it is easy to see how this led to the belief that exclusivism means that you are saved based on location. After all, world-wide travel is a modern invention. However, even if this statistic were true, the exclusivist would not really need to believe that. All they need to believe is that one's location is not the reason for their damnation. Since they already believe that, the exclusivist position does not mean that damnation is a matter of location!

At this point, you may be wondering if I have avoided Hick's real argument. After all, the message of salvation does not reach everyone. There are some who are born and never hear it. The exclusivist believes that if you do not hear it, you cannot be saved. He believes that they are not damned for failing to respond to a message that they did not hear. Those who do not hear are damned because they are sinners. Maybe Hick intends to advance an argument about who recieves salvation. Maybe he does not. That is not the argument he is actually making. If he means to talk about salvation, then he cannot act as if damnation is unjust. If he does, then he is not advancing an argument about salvation.

The Implications of Sola Scriptura

2005-08-16T13:16:00.000-07:00

This will be the last of my posts discussing the historic elements of sola scriptura. I am not a historian, so my discussion is merely to inform the uninformed of what the basic issues are. The core of sola scriptura is taken to be both the sufficiency and authority of scripture. However, every creed implies that these are not terms to be understood in any sort of way. They imply something about interpretation, or about original documents, or tradition. Yet the creeds do not agree on what sola scriptura does imply. Neither do they explain why sola scriptura is supposed to imply what it does. Yet there may be a common element to what is believed to be implied by sola scriptura.

The Belgic and Westminster Confessions both state that the scriptures were not believed based on the testimony of others or the church, but on the testimony of the Holy Spirit and the evidence. The Belgic confession also says that the doctrine of the authority of scripture is great enough to break fellowship over, and higher than any tradition, creed or document of the fathers. The Second Helvetic Confession also places scripture above all creeds, councils, traditions and interpretations of the Fathers. This must be properly balanced with the understanding of the Solid Declaration of the Formula of Concord when it states that the creeds, writings and councils of the early church must be accepted because they were formed out of scripture.

Sola scriptura also affected how the Bible was to be properly interpreted and who could understand it. The Westminster confession stated that an ordinary person could through ordinary means understand enough of the Bible in order to be saved. This was not viewed as a statement about the clarity of the entire Bible. Because of these considerations, translation of the scriptures was viewed as an obligation on the church. The Second Helvetic Confession states that scripture was to be interpreted by the use of grammar and their occasion as well as other scriptures and our knowledge of God.

It is also interesting to note that the Belgic confession and the Westminster confession give a list of every book that is actually in the Bible. The Belgic confession even lists the Apocryphal books by name and excludes them from the canon. The Westminster confession points to the original language versions of the Old and New Testaments as being "immediately inspired". In a rather peculiar case, the Helvetica Consensus Formula declared that the vowel points of the Hebrew were inspired by God along with the rest of the MT, and that other manuscript traditions were wrong when they deviated from that.

By examining these creeds, one notices three sets of implications that were found by examining sola scriptura. One of these implications is why scripture is believed. It is not believed on the basis of the church recieving it, or on the fathers, or by another testimony of the church. It is believed because of the testimony of the Holy Spirit, and confirmed by evidence. This implication did not lead to discarding any of these testimonies, but only to placing them under scripture. Another implication was for the interpretation of scripture. Since the reformers rejected the teaching magisterium of the Roman Catholic church, they needed to indicate what replaced it. So the confessions give ordinary people understanding of the basic gospel message from scripture, and says that understanding can be reached through textual analysis and comparison with other scriptures. The final implication dealt with the range of scripture. This included lists of books, which documents were actually inspired and even a statement about the inspiration of manuscript traditions. Although the confessions are not united on the particular implications of sola scriptura in these areas, they do unite in saying that these areas are affected by the doctrine. The particular emphasis that they do state are also consistent with one another. But by further examination will one understand what the doctrine of sola scriptura does imply.

The Problem of Evil: Negating the Argument

2005-08-16T11:08:00.000-07:00

In an earlier set of posts I pointed out that one can use the existence of moral truths as a way to negate the problem of evil. This observation can be extended. There are some arguments for theism, and others for Christian theism in particular that negate the problem of evil entirely if they are successful. They are some forms of the ontological arguments and moral arguments for theism, and some arguments for the existence of divine revelation for Christian theism. This has implications for the success of the problem of evil as an argument.

If some forms of the ontological argument are successful, then God exists necessarily. That means that it is not even possible that God not exist. Therefore, the existence of evil is not a problem for the existence of God in any way. The only way it could be a problem is the existence of evil was logically incompatible with God's existence. Yet that argument has been dropped in modern philosophy of religion since the work of Plantinga. If other forms of the ontological argument are successful, then it is known with certainty that God exists. Since the problem of evil does not claim to know with certainty that God does not exist, but only establish some doubt, it is negated by those forms of the ontological argument as well. If the arguments from reason are counted as forms of the ontological argument, then they also negate the problem of evil. If not, then they count as another form of argument that negates the problem of evil. These forms of the argument from reason are the ones that state that some aspect of reason, the human reasoning process, rationality or some other object of the argument entail or rationally compel one to believe in God.

Some forms of the moral argument state that the existence of moral truths or the knowledge of them entail the existence of God. These forms of the moral argument negate the problem of evil. Since evil could be even be recognized or exist apart from the existence of God, it does not constitute a problem for God. These arguments also negate the problem of evil.

Arguments from revelation, whether to some (Bible) or to all (conscience and nature) can also be used to negate the problem of evil if one believes that this revelation entails the truth of Christian theism or the existence of the Christian God. These set of arguments can be particularized for any religion, but must remain specific to a particular religion.

These sets of arguments, if successful, negate the problem of evil. This also works in reverse. If the problem of evil is successful, then none of these arguments work. Why mention this? The problem of evil is often isolated from the rest of theistic and atheistic arguments. This observations shows that it is not really isolated. Because of the relationship with these other arguments, some implications result. If the problem of evil is more plausible than any of these arguments taken together in their own contexts, then the problem of evil is successful. If those previous arguments, taken together in their own contexts, are more plausible than the problem of evil, then the problem of evil is unsuccessful. One cannot declare the problem of evil successful apart from an examination of these other problems.

John Hick and a Worthless Argument for Pluralism

2005-08-16T10:27:00.000-07:00

Now it is hardly pointless to critize something that Hick has written decades ago without knowing that he still believes it. However, he has given this argument again, in February of 2005. His argument for pluralism is supposed to create a problem for the belief that one religion is the most true. Instead, his argument contains a false premise and is irrelevant and question-begging.

Hicks argument is this: "In the vast majority of cases throughout the world, probably 98% or so, the religion to which a person adheres (and also against which some rebel) depends on where they were born. Someone born into a Muslim family in a Muslim country, or indeed a Muslim family in a non-Muslim country, is very likely to become a Muslim. Someone born into a Christian family is equally likely to become a Christian. And the same is true of Jews, Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Taoists." He continues his argument as follows: "And the religion which has formed us from childhood naturally seems to us to be obviously true; it fits us and we fit it as usually none other can. It is true that there are individual conversions from one faith to another, but these are statistically insignificant in comparison with the massive transmission of faith from generation to generation within the same tradition."

I bit of thinking will tell you that this argument contains a false premise. Just about two thousand years ago, there were no Christians. In 500 AD there were no Muslims. About two and a half thousand years ago there were no Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs or Taoists. The only religions older than all of these are Judaism and tribal religions. So that means that the vast majority of people today belong to a religion that began at some point in history. So obviously just about every religion had to gain adherents through conversion. This is exactly the opposite of the point that Hick was trying to make, but it is nonetheless true. The fact that Christianity gained many adherents through non-violent conversion was historically viewed as an argument for the truth of Christianity. What he is describing is not even true in the present! Christianity and Islam are both gaining numerous adherents through conversion.

His argument is also irrelevant. There could be many explanations for the fact that many people retain their original religion. Perhaps they have not been exposed to the correct one yet. Perhaps they unwilling to follow the correct one when they hear it. Perhaps some other explanation is given. Without a specific explanation for this followed by an argument for the explanation, this argument is worthless even if it did contain true premises. In fact, without the explanation his argument sounds exactly like an appeal to majority. If the majority did follow their traditional religion, that does not mean anything more about their traditional religion.

His argument is also question-begging. He cannot start his argument by assuming that no one religion is most true. That is what the argument is trying to show. Obviously, if the idea that Christianity is not most true is assumed, then he is begging the question. This is exactly what he does. Christians believe that no one can be saved without hearing the gospel. They also believe that the sin of human beings and the influence of the devil blind people so that they cannot understand this gospel even if they do hear it. It is only an act of God that can unblind people to hear and understand the gospel. So the fact that most now remain in their traditional religion can be explained in two different ways. First, they have not heard the gospel. Any other religion that approached them would not have contained the truth of God and they would not have converted to it. Second, when some hear the gospel, they remain blinded and do not believe it. These considerations function quite well as a explanation for Hick's "data". The only reason he could have to ignore it is if he was assuming it was false. Since that would be question-begging, his argument is question-begging.

Now it should be obvious that Hick's argument is an abysmal failure. This does not say anything about the actual status of pluralism as a belief. What it does say is that pluralism needs a good argument, and this is not one of them. It is also wise to keep in mind that some philosophers miss problems in arguments for their own belief systems. It is also good to remember that numbers and percent signs do not transform unfounded speculation into statistical knowledge.

Sola Scriptura and the Reformed Tradition

2005-08-15T15:10:00.000-07:00

I intend to include Lutheran confessions under this heading as well as Reformed ones. These two sets of confessions define what it means to believe in sola scriptura. Within both of these traditions, sola scriptura was defined as a belief in the sufficiency and authority of scripture.

Various reformed confessions state the authority and sufficiency of Scripture. The Belgic confession (1561) states that "We receive all these books [the Bible], and these only, as holy and canonical, for the regulation, foundation, and confirmation of our faith". The Second Helvetic Confession states (1561/1566) states that "in this Holy Scripture, the universal Church of Christ has the most complete exposition of all that pertains to a saving faith". The Heidelberg Catechism (1563) does not explicitly mention sola scriptura. However, every part of the creed is referenced with Scripture, and no other references are present. Furthermore, revelation is connected only with "the Word", which refers to Scripture. The Westminster Confession states that "The whole counsel of God concerning all things necessary for His own glory, man's salvation, faith and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture". All of these confessions agree that Scripture is sufficient for issues of faith and life.

The Lutheran Confessions are no different. The Augsburg Confession (1530) states that they were "showing what manner of doctrine from the Holy Scriptures and the pure Word of God has been up to this time set forth in our lands, dukedoms, dominions, and cities, and taught in our churches". In Article XXI, it places scripture in opposition to the teaching of the Roman Catholic church. Since they are in opposition, scripture ought to be followed. The later development of Lutheran doctrine continued to follow this pattern. In the solid declaration of the formula of concord, it states that "Whereby All Dogmas should be Judged according to God's Word" as one of the headings. So the Lutherans are also in agreement of this.

Although some of these creeds contain some unusual affirmations, they all agree on a couple of points. First, they believe that the scriptures contain all of Christian doctrine, and practice and are sufficient for instructing one in one's life. Second, they believe that the scriptures are also the highest and ultimate authority in those same areas. These two areas of agreement have implications for one's beliefs about scripture, but those two beliefs form the core of sola scriptura. It is important to note that some of these confessions state that they agree with various early creeds, and others point out they are in agreement with the early fathers of the church. So these beliefs about scripture were never viewed as a source of conflict with the teaching of the church at large, but only with the Roman Catholic church in particular.

Ecumenicism: A Wrong Strategy

2005-08-12T13:20:00.000-07:00

Ecumenical dialog has usually attempted to work towards church unity. I am not speaking of inter-religious dialog. I am speaking of dialog between Christian churches alone. This work has been motivated by the perceived disunity of the Church. Not only are there hundreds of denominations, but some of them think that others are not even Christian. Then there is the tendency amoung the Reformed to demonize Catholics, while the "church growth" crowd sanctifies them. Meanwhile the Orthodox are left out of the picture, and the Fundamentalists are treated like a disease by all. Attempts at unity have attempted to find a lowest common denominator in both belief and practice. This solution will never work and should not be tried at all.

This solution will not work because it ignores the tradition that each denomination has already formed. The lowest common denominator of Christian denominations does not include sola scriptura, nor does it include any of the other Reformation solas. It would not include Roman Catholic views on the sacraments, nor the Orthodox distinction between Tradition and tradition. There are plenty of other things it would not contain either. So none of the parties could agree to work based on such a thing. They would all think that their distinctive traditions supply the balance that is lacking in such a lowest common denominator.

Not only this, but the very attempt to stand on such a lowest common denominator is also wrong. It requires the participants to identify themselves as part of a tradition while also denying that very same tradition. Such a thing is not only deceptive, but it is also not even ecumenical. Ecumenical dialog can only happen when the various traditions are actually represented. Sham representation get everyone nowhere.

These points do not mean that identification those areas of common agreement is useless. Dialog cannot proceed without common ground. What it does mean is that the dialog proceeds out of various traditions. These various traditions do not stand out of a common ground, but interact through that common ground. The attempt to find a lowest common denominator eventually fails because of nature of tradition. For the same reason it is also immoral to try.

Christian Materialism?

2005-08-11T16:46:00.000-07:00

Peter van Inwagen (a well-known philosopher) believes, or at least claims to believe, in both materialism and Christian doctrine. As elements of Christian doctrine, he believes such things as the Trinity, the Incarnation, God as Spirit and the resurrection. As a materialism, he believed that dualism is false and we are all identical with our living bodies. He believes that it is possible for him to consistently hold both of these positions. Unfortunately for him, that is not true.

As a Christian, one must believe that Jesus Christ was fully human and fully God. One must believe that his humanity is exactly the same as ours, except for our sinning. One must also believe that he has always been human since the beginning of the incarnation. Unfortunately, this is inconsistent with materialism. It is at this point that van Inwagen's materialism conflicts with orthodox Christian doctrine. Either he must abandon orthodoxy and no longer call himself a Christian, or he must abandon physicalism.

Now why is this? There was a period of a few days when Jesus was dead. All orthodox Christians believe this. During this period of time, Jesus was still fully human, because it is a commitment of orthodoxy that he remain human since his incarnation. If materialism is true, then Jesus was not human during that time because his body was a corpse. So if materialism is true, then there was a time after the incarnation in which Jesus was fully divine and not human. This is heretical. So a commitment to materialism entails a denial of materialism. Peter van Inwagen cannot have both.

It does get even worse for van Inwagen. Since Jesus' humanity is the same humanity as ours, and he assumed all of our human nature and nothing more than it, we are not material beings either. Since Jesus did exist as a fully human being while he was dead, we will also. So there is no sense in which an orthodox Christian believer can be a consistent materialist. This is not the only difficulty for van Inwagen. Others are mentioned here, here and here. But this difficulty is uniquely different from the identity problem.

Sola Scriptura and Liberal Protestants

2005-08-11T11:22:00.000-07:00

Much of what I have said already about sola scriptura would be pleasing to theological liberals. They are glad that tradition, church and Holy Spirit are acceptable to sola scriptura. Some amoung them would also be glad that I am focussing my attention on what Luther and the Reformers believed when they spoke of sola scriptura. They wish to affirm sola scriptura as Luther did, but with different content than those modern Reformed churches. However, such is not possible. Sola scriptura cannot be watered down to mean anything that these liberals would be happy with.

Some liberals believe that sola scriptura merely means that scripture is the primary source of authority, second to none. However, they also wish to affirm that there are secondary authorities such as reason, tradition and the church. Although sola scriptura does entail that scripture is the primary authority, that does not exhaust the meaning of sola scriptura. Sola scriptura means scripture alone and if the Reformers wished to say that scripture is primary, they would have said prima scriptura instead. In fact, the Westminster confession states that "nothing at any time is to be added [to scripture]".

Another liberal belief is the confusion of sola scriptura and inerrancy. Both the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches have always believed in inerrancy. That was not the controversy at the time of the Reformation. Sola Scriptura sought to place scripture above a mere statement of inerrancy, so that Scripture was the judge of the church as well. The Reformer's belief in sola scriptura is such that the belief entailed a belief in the inerrancy of scripture.

Since prima scriptura is not enough, it will certainly not do to claim that the Protestants were opening scripture to the claims of Reason. Although the Protestants were all open to logic and sound argument, they did not trust philosophical claims that were not based, at least indirectly, on the framework of scripture. On this matter, they were not any more open to the claims of Reason than the Roman Catholic church was.

These set of misunderstandings have further increased our knowledge of sola scriptura. Sola Scriptura is not merely a primary authority, but a sole authority. Although it entailed inerrancy, it is not to be confused with it or changed so that it no longer entails it. Finally, sola scriptura does not open scripture to the claims of Reason. Together with my previous post, this gives us some idea of what the Reformers did mean by sola scriptura. But there is no substitute for actually examining their confessions.

The Existential Problem of Evil

2005-08-10T12:54:00.000-07:00

I have read various writings (mostly analytic) in the philosophy of religion about the problem of evil. These writings would often distinguish between two forms of this problem. One of them was supposed to be the intellectual problem of evil. This problem could be examined by the use of numbered premises and logical thinking. The other problem was called the pastoral problem. This was to be solved by pastoral and, if necessary, professional counselling. I think that this distinction is both false and misleading.

There are some cases in which one discusses the problem of evil merely as an intellectual exercise. There are also some cases in which the problem of evil is a screen hiding emotional issues. Neither of these cases are in the majority. The problem of evil receives a lot of popular attention precisely because emotional commitment is generated. Some have strong religious commitment. Others have a strong committment to justice in the world. Both of these commitments are quite common and both generate strong feelings. Sometimes both of these are present in the same individual. These commitments seem to clash in the problem of evil. If one were to compare this with the amount of attention that the induction problem recieves, one realizes that there is a vast difference. This vast difference is likely because the induction problem does not arise out of the degree of commitment that the problem of evil does.

So those who treat the problem of evil as a merely intellectual pursuit are either pursuing it as a curiousity or separating the commitments from it in order to touch only the intellectual elements. On the other hand, those who need counseling are those who let their commitments generate emotions that overwhelm their reasoning. The majority of people in the middle are brought to the problem of evil by their commitments, but seek an reasonable solution to their conflict. They are neither unreasonable or emotionless.

The problem of evil is brought to our attention by specific examples. One thinks of the Rwandan genocide, or the attacks on the Twin Towers, or the Nazi extermination of Jews. All of these are particular examples of great evil. Out of these we ask questions that are both general and specific. Some of the general questions are philosophical in nature: "how can God exist with this evil?", or "Is it moral to allow such evil?". The rest of the questions raised are theological. They wish to know the motives and plan of God for those evil acts. They are the questions of the situation. They demand an intellectual response, but they also demand a response from those who share the same commitments. It is up to the theologian to answer the question. That means that neither the philosopher nor the counselor can answer it. And that means that one should not make the distinction between "intellectual" and "counseling" problems.

Creator-Owner: A Concept in our Thought

2005-08-10T12:13:00.000-07:00

In an earlier post I had mentioned that traditional theists believe in a Creator-Owner. I also mentioned that this is a point at which atheists probably disagree with quite strongly. My intent is not to prove the thesis of Creator-Owner. All I am intending to do is point out that many people believe it already. Those who believe it already, yet denouce it when it is a part of theistic belief are being inconsistent. Those who do not believe it and denouce it without argument are being narrow-minded. If a significant portion of people believe something, then the thesis is not obviously false. Therefore, it must be refuted through argument if one wishes to show that it is false.

There are many places at which a belief in Creator-Owner shows up. This belief states that mere creation of something is also enough to show ownership of something, and that one may do as one likes with what one owns. A group may not agree with both of these claims, but when they are conjoined, they form the Creator-Owner concept.

I will begin with the right to use property as one desires. This is a point that conservatives and libertarians agree on. It is also one of the defenses used by those who are pro-choice. They believe that a woman owns her body, what is inside her body is owned by her; therefore, she can do as she pleases with it. Anarchists also share this belief, because they believe that the existence of the government is an infringement of individual rights. Since property rights are part of an individual's rights, an individual is permitted to do whatever he pleases with his property. This only covers the right side of the political divide. This belief can also be found amoung the left as well.

Many amoung the left believe that the government it the ultimate owner of everything. They believe that the "right to property" is constructed by the government. Therefore, one ought to obey the government's wishes about one's property, because the government ultimately owns it. There are some environmentalists who believe that Nature owns itself. Therefore, we should let Nature do as it pleases with itself and interfere as little as possible.

Now for the first part of this clause. A lot of those who champion copyright laws against downloading activities will make statements about how the individual owns the work, because he created it. Marx believed that a worker owned the results of his work, because he created it. He writes about factory environments as places in which this natural end of human creation is perverted, because it is not treated as owned. Some of those who critisize slavery also believe this. They write about how slaves own themselves, and own what they create; therefore, it is wrong for that slavers to steal what the slaves have made. So beliefs that assume this sort of clause are quite common.

It may be objected that some of these people do not explicity believe in either thesis. This is quite true. However, these people do implicitly believe this thesis, if I am viewing their arguments charitably. It is also quite true that some of these same people may object when I apply their beliefs to religious beliefs. However, these beliefs are either true all of the time, or none of the time. Having said this, the fact that these beliefs are significantly numerous says nothing about their truth. What it does say it that we ought to take these beliefs seriously and if we disagree then we should formulate an argument against them.

Sola Scriptura: Non-Protestant Understandings

2005-08-09T10:58:00.000-07:00

In order to understand what exactly sola scriptura really means, it is helpful to begin with how the critics understand it. Many orthodox and catholic believers attempt to refute this doctrine, but often do not try to understand in a charitable way. The fact that even Protestants are not clear enough on this issue does not help either. A look at various internet sites reveals a few common errors in understanding this doctrine.

First, some suppose that the doctrine of sola scriptura, if true, will bring a unity in the faith on almost anything. Since this has not happened, some suppose that the doctrine is false. However, this is not what sola scriptura was about. Originally, Luther wished only to reform the church and set it back on a path of repentance. So he did hope that sola scriptura would bring unity. But his hopes did not pan out. Although the doctrine of sola scriptura would bring unity, the sinfulness of humanity prevents this from happening. Doctrinal disputes do occur in which both parties claim to adhere to sola scriptura, but only one of them actually does so. There are other disputes in which the participants have pure motives, but have a different amount of understanding of the various parts of the biblical tradition. Finally, some disputes result from differing philosophical viewpoints that are sometimes unrecognized. All of this means that sola scriptura is not a guarantee of unity.

Second, others suppose that the doctrine of sola scriptura means that Scripture "contains all of the material one needs for theology" and that "one does not need apostolic tradition or the Church’s magisterium...to help one understand it". These understandings are close, but not exactly accurate. Luther consulted the early church fathers, the understandings of philosophy, and his peers when understanding scripture. Many in the Reformed branch of the church study history and linguistics in an effort to understand scripture. So they do not believe that scripture contains the only material one needs for theology. Neither do they believe that apostolic tradition is unnecessary. The correct point is to note that all of the Reformers rejected the magisterium of the Roman Church as it is now understood and as it was understood at that time.

Finally, it is sometimes objected that sola scriptura means that scripture must be understood as a divine revelation apart from the church or the Holy Spirit. Sometimes this is taken to mean that understanding of that scripture must be apart from the church and the Holy Spirit. However, neither of these things are what is meant by sola scriptura. Luther and many of the Reformers taught on the inseparability of the Word and the Spirit. They believed that the Word did not function apart from the Spirit, nor the Spirit apart from the Word. They also believed that Scripture was given to the Church, to be preached by the Church and understood by it. So their belief in sola scriptura was quite compatible with placing Scripture with the Holy Spirit and with the Church.

Answering these misunderstandings of sola scriptura gives us a better understanding of what it is. Sola scriptura is a belief that places a source of unity, but not a guarantee of it. It places a source of doctrine, but is placed within human knowledge and understood by human knowledge. It places Scripture as revelation, but not apart from the church or the Holy Spirit. Since these objections arise from Catholic and Orthodox sources, they deal with some common issues related to tradition, human knowledge and the church. Other misunderstandings result from the liberal wing of the church and deal with completely different issues.

The Problem of Evil: An Internal Inconsistency?

2005-08-08T12:23:00.000-07:00

I have written two posts already about the problem of evil. In the first post I pointed out that the problem of evil cannot be posed without assuming that there are moral truths. Without a defense of some kind for the existence of moral truths in atheism, the theist can avoid the problem by casting doubt on the existence of such a defense. In the second post I refuted the strategy refers to one's ordinary concepts without defending anything in the metaphysical realm. Now I am going to deal with the last avoidance strategy. This is the strategy of claiming that the problem of evil is an internal problem for the theist. This strategy is difficult.

There are several reasons why this particular strategy is difficult. In order for an atheist to show that a problem of evil arises from theism several things have to be shown. First off, the atheist must show that there are evil acts of the kind that he wishes to use, according to what the theist believes is evil. Then he must show that if God was good, according to the understanding of theism, then he would not permit that if he could. Finally, he must show that God, according to the understanding of theism, is powerful enough to prevent that sort of evil. Once the atheist has done that, he would have created a problem of internal consistency for the theist.

The problem is that he cannot begin this project inside a generic form of theism. According to some forms of theism, capital punishment is good. According to pacificist strains, however, it is evil. According to some forms of theism, being the creator of something means that you also own it and can do whatever you please with it. According to other forms of theism, such as process theism, God only influences the world. So any atheist must restrict his critique to a particular subset of theism.

Let's suppose that the atheist states that he is restricting himself to traditional forms of theism. He points out that they all believe that God is all-knowing, all-powerful and perfectly good. He also points out that they have a common agreement on what is right and wrong. So far he would be correct. However, they also have a common belief in creator-ownership. This belief states that if someone makes something then they own it. So if we make a treehouse, then it is ours and we are morally permitted to anything at all to it. These traditional theistic beliefs also believe that God was the creator of everything. Therefore, he is morally permitted to do anything he pleases with it. Whether you like it or not, these beliefs make it very difficult to show that there is any sort of inconsistency in theistic belief.

It will not work to say that these beliefs are horrible, or that they are out of step with our common concepts of right and wrong. If the atheist wishes to make an internal critique, then she must deal with everything in theism. She cannot avoid the parts of theism that make her argument difficult simply because she is offended by them or thinks that they are wrong. She has to remember that it is an entirely separate argument to claim that traditional theism is immoral. At this point, any internal argument for the problem of evil for traditional theism will have to take account of the belief in a Creator-Owner.

The Problem of Evil: Our Ordinary Concepts

2005-08-05T12:50:00.000-07:00

I had posted earlier on the problem of evil and its relationship to the existence of moral truths. I mentioned that one of the ways for the atheist to avoid that objection to the problem of evil was to state that they are simply referring to the ordinary moral truths that people believe exist. They are attempting to offer an explanation for why those truths exist, but only point out the problem that those truths create for the theist. However, this evasion only appears to succeed. Once we take a deeper look at what the atheist is trying to do we find out that this objection fails.

The atheist is asking us to assume that the moral beliefs that we all have must be true, regardless of what is true metaphysically. Yet that is absurd. There are some philosophers who are hard determinists. They believe that no one is free or responsible for their actions. Yet they all acknowledge that we often believe that we are free and responsible. In fact, we may be unable to avoid reactive attitudes when confronted with very evil acts. None of this influences their beliefs on the truth of hard determinism though. If hard determinism is true, then most of us function irrationally by displaying reactive attitudes, blaming or praising someone. But the question of whether someone is actually responsible or not cannot be avoided merely because we would be irrational if no one ever was. It is the same with moral truths. If no moral truth exists, then we are all irrational whenever we believe something about right or wrong. But the fact that we might be irrational does not give us the right to suppose that moral truths exist regardless of which metaphysical theory is correct. On some metaphysical theories, moral truths do not exist.

What this means is that the problem of evil must be posed from within a particular framework of thought. Attempting to pose the problem within our ordinary and common concepts only obscures the fact that our ordinary and common concepts do not supply an explicit metaphysical framework for the existence of moral truths. So the theist could ask for the basis of those moral truths, and judge the problem defective if support for them is not given. If support for moral standards appeals directly or indirectly to God, then one is working within theism. If that is not the case, then one is working within atheism. So in either case, an appeal to our common concepts does not support the problem of evil.

What is Sola Scriptura?

2005-08-05T12:38:00.000-07:00

I was having a conversation recently with one of my friends that pointed out the lack of definition that the term sola scriptura has. There is certainly more than one definition available. One definition of sola scriptura states that it "is the belief that the Bible alone is the only authority on matters of doctrine and faith". The Westminster Confession states that "The whole counsel of God concerning all things necessary for His own glory, man's salvation, faith and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture: unto which nothing at any time is to be added, whether by new revelations of the Spirit, or traditions of men." Yet another definition states that sola scriptura means that scripture is the primary authority for faith and life.

These are only the definitions of that doctrine from Protestant sources. Once we move out of those sources, we move straight into confusion. For example, this blogger believes that sola scriptura means that one must ignore historical context. Another blogger believes that the principle of sola scriptura is about turning the Bible into a paper version of the pope.

So what does sola scriptura really mean? To understand what it means it is helpful to understand the original context of the phrase. The phrase "sola scriptura" was an important part of the Reformation. It was used because of the place that tradition had in the Roman Catholic Church. Luther wished to emphasize that the teaching of justification by faith could be found in the Bible. He also wished to gather support for his beliefs from the early church fathers. So it is important to note that his ideas were not ahistorical. Because of his beliefs on justification, he was led into controversy over the doctrine of scripture. The Roman Catholics (RC) insisted that scripture be interpreted by the Fathers through the Church. They also insisted that they were the sole true church in the world.

The problem with the RC statement was that the Protestants did not think that the RC was part of the true church at all. So they needed some way of defining who was in the church and who was out of it. At first, this was done by the principle of sola scriptura. Those who obey scripture were in the church and those who do not are out. Since the authority of the church was based on its obedience to scripture, it could be identified by the outside. Luther and other Reformers were able to draw support for this from the early church fathers.

Later on, some within the Radical Reformation took this idea much farther than Luther had ever intended. They took sola scriptura to mean that scripture could be understood apart from tradition, apart from history and completely understood by the common reader of it. Yet none of this is what Luther actually said. None of it is within the real doctrine of sola scriptura. But sola scriptura was never defined beyond what is now found within the Westminster confession.

Sola Scriptura and Roman Catholic Tradition

2005-08-04T10:46:00.000-07:00

There has been much dialog recently with the Roman Catholic Church and various Protestant groups - notably the Lutheran Church. This dialog has focussed on justification and santification in particular. Now while this certainly seems encouraging, one must realize that sola scriptura was the material principle of the Reformation. Reconciliation with the Roman Catholic Church cannot occur without actually discussing it. While the Roman Catholic Church retains its two-source view on scripture and tradition, this reconciliation is impossible.

The Roman view on tradition and Scripture is that each of these possess equal authority and separate information. Tradition is supposed to guide the interpretation of scripture, and the interpretation of scripture is supposed to inform and extend tradition. Since they are two separate sources with different information, neither one is primary. Both are used by the Church to advance its mission in the world. This view is known as the two-source view of tradition because tradition contains different information from that found in Scripture, and that different information is not derived from scripture.

Sola Scriptura means, at minimum, that primary importance is to be given to Scripture. Certainly nothing is of equal authority to it. Therefore, it quite obviously follows that the two-source view of tradition is incompatible with sola scriptura. Neither can one have a minor modification to bring it into line with the other. So it quite obviously follows that at least one of the doctrines must be false.

Now dialog with the Roman Catholic Church could continue ignoring this if it was not a matter of first importance. However, the historical evangelical position (of which all Protestants historically have agreed with) states that sola scriptural is of central importance to the faith. So there is no way to continue ignoring this issue and actually progress in any form of reconciliation. The Catholic Church needs to begin discussing the reasons for its belief and the Lutheran Church needs to present the reasons for sola scriptura. If the Lutheran Church, or any group claiming to represent Protestants, fails to do so then it no longer represents Protestants. So let's see some discussion on this issue.

The Problem of Evil and the Existence of Evil

2005-08-04T08:12:00.000-07:00

Often the problem of evil is presented by the atheist without a definition of what evil is. Perhaps he simply means to appeal to the ordinary concept that most people have when they speak of "evil". However, since the problem of evil cannot be stated without some appeal to a concept of evil, the nature of the concept being referred to will affect the very problem itself.

Let's suppose that the atheist refers to the common concept of good and evil. Good and evil are left undefined, but with specific examples. One might use torturing babies is evil and compassion is good as defining examples. One would then proceed with the problem of evil using those examples. The theist, however, can simply undercut that entire strategy. They can and should agree that those are accurate examples. They can simply state that the moral value of those acts would not exist unless God did. Therefore, the problem of evil cannot be an intellectual objection to theism.

The theist would begin by stating the difference between moral knowledge and the existence of moral facts. He agrees that most atheists are moral and know what that requires. However, he is simply arguing for the claim that for all X's such that X is a moral fact, moral fact X does not exist if God does not exist. So it will not be an objection to this to claim that atheists are moral, or that they believe in the existence of moral facts. One needs to actually offer support for one of two claims: either that moral facts can exist without God, or that moral facts do not need to exist in order for obligations of a moral sort to exist.

Now the problem of evil cannot be defended without also defending moral obligation without God. For if there is no moral obligation, and no right or wrong, then there is no evil or good. In that case, the problem of evil cannot even be stated. Likewise, the theist can attempt to prove that morals cannot exist without God. If successful, he will have removed all doubt that the problem of evil creates for theism. So the theist has two different avenues here. He can either undercut the problem of evil by pointing out the lack of defense for the the existence of morality by the atheist, or he can undercut the argument by proving that the atheist does not have the resources of morality at all. In either case, the existence of morality is required to even begin the problem of evil.

Now the atheist can respond in more than one way to this problem. They could assert that they are pointing out an internal problem in theistic belief. In that case, theists obviously cannot use the question of whether moral facts exist to decide the problem. But they also gain the resources of everything within theistic belief. The atheist could decide to respond by stating that they are simply citing common belief again. Just as they pointed out that it is common to believe that torturing babies is evil and compassion is good, it is also common to believe that morality exists. In that case, they are denied the resources of atheism. Both of these routes run into problems of their own. Of course the atheist could attempt to actually deal with the argument from morality, but I am speaking of ways to avoid the argument.

ID and Creationism

2005-08-03T15:10:00.000-07:00

I have heard many comments in some blogs I read about the relationship and nature of Intelligent Design (ID) and creationism. Unfortunately, most of them are very wrong. They confuse the goals of the two movements, they misunderstand the nature of both systems, and get their facts wrong. So here is some of the basic information on the subject.

Creationism is usually where everyone ends up, so I will begin with it. Creationism is a term with at least two distinct meanings. One meaning refers to those who believe that the earth was created in six days, humans were created specially by God, and historical science must be understood in the framework of the book of Genesis. We could call these people Biblical Creationists. Another broader meaning refers to those who are Christians and believe that God intervened in the world. Most of the people who take this label believe in an old earth, and believe that there was no common descent. So this group of people is called Old Earth Creationists in some quarters, or creationists in others.

It should be obvious that one cannot be a creationist without being a monotheist. Both varieties of creationism appear in all three monotheistic religions. Being concise, I am going to focus on Christian versions of these claims. So there are two major versions of creationism within the Christian community. Biblical creationism is defined and represented by three major organizations. These are the Institute for Creation Research (ICR), the Creation Research Society (CRS) and Answers in Genesis (AiG). CRS publishes a journal called Creation Research Society Quarterly, while Answers in Genesis publishes two journals. Creation is intended for popular consumption, while TJ publishes their specialized information. Old Earth Creationism is represented by the organization Reasons to Believe, run by Hugh Ross as well as some other individuals also within the ID community.

ID is both a general banner and an approach to the creation-evolution debate. As a general banner, it includes all of the creationists and some who are not creationists. This unifying banner are these ideas:

1) We can empirically detect some instances of design in the world, if they did occur
and
2) We have detected some instances of design in the world of biology or astronomy

However, ID is not just a unifying banner. It is also an approach. As an approach, their method is to assert that we should start by leaving all religious documents out of the conflict. We should work from the empirical evidence alone, and what we can discover from that evidence. There is also the unstated assumption, shared with secular scientists, that this method will give accurate and fully informed conclusions. It is represented by the Discovery Institute, the Access Research Network and some individuals such as Michael Behe, Philip Johnson, and Dembski.

So now a bit of advice is in order. Before you start jumping to conclusions with the latest press release, and accusing "the intelligent design creationists" of something as one blogger unwisely did, CHECK YOUR FACTS. No creationist or intelligent design organization is pushing for the teaching of creationism or intelligent design as mandatory alongside evolution. If you disagree, then pull up a statement supporting your position from the major people in that stream of thought. But remember that Answers in Genesis states that creationism should NOT be mandanted, and the Discovery Institute says the same thing about ID. And before you comment again about ID, read this.

Philosophy of Mind and Dualism

2005-07-28T16:28:00.000-07:00

I have noticed that much of the recent writing in philosophy of mind assumes that dualism is false. It assumes that some materialist version of monism is correct. Since dualism was popular in the past, one would expect that the rejection of it occurred because of good reasons. One would also expect that popular texts on philosophy of mind would present the various kinds of dualism together with the arguments that defeated it. Now I really do not know enough about the historical situation to comment on it. What I can say is that my expectations were not satisfied. I have read a few introductions to philosophy of mind and they have two glaring problems. They present bad arguments against dualism, and they fail to mention that there are historically non-Cartesian forms of dualism.

The most common arguments I have heard against dualism are the science objection and the interaction objection. You have to keep in mind that these objections should be the best. The first objection simply says that our modern scientific knowledge precludes dualism. It does nothing of the kind. It precludes naive Cartesian dualism, but not all forms of Cartesian dualism and certainly not all kinds of dualism. So that objection is a complete failure. The second objection is that it is implausible to suppose that two radically different kinds of things causally interact. Of course, the nature of causation is undefined, so this objection is vague. But on certain accounts of causation, this objection is false and a problem for the materialist in any case. Since both of these objections are horrible, one can only conclude that introductory textbook writers don't know why dualism is supposed to be false. Perhaps they are just following the crowd.

It would be bad enough if bad reasons were given to support a denial of dualism. However, when a vast section of dualistic views are ignored, it shows that most writers on introductory philosophy of mind books don't know what dualism is and certainly don't understand it. A major dualist view is that of Thomas Aquinas. For those who do not know, he was not a Cartesian dualist. His analysis of human persons followed that of Aristotle. So he believed that the body was not the mere vehicle for the soul. Thoughts could occur on the material plane, at least in some sense. Yet a person did survive the death of their body with the memories of their current life. Since Aquinas is a major figure within philosophy, there is no good reason to ignore him.

It would be a mistake to extrapolate from these facts any sort of conclusion about the field of philosophy of mind. But I do have suspicions. I suspect that the field assumes materialism without argument. If faced with a living dualist, the philosopher would first mention something about the age of the argument. If that did not work, the he would mention one of the two problems above. If the dualist is still not convinced, then the materialist philosopher would leave convinced that the dualist was irrational. I hope that this is not the case. But my experiences with introductory textbooks give me reason to suspect that it is.

An Argument for Intellectual Property

2005-07-27T14:07:00.000-07:00

When I have objected to the idea of intellectual property, the reaction I have recieved most often is disagreement without argument. However, I have sometimes recieved an argument in support of the idea of intellectual property. This is one of those arguments.

When some writers produce a work, it is entirely their effort. Whatever one produces entirely on one's own, is owned by the one who produces it. So a writer owns the work that they produce. But the work that the writer produces is not material. It is the story or non-fiction writing that they produce. Therefore, the writer owns the ideas that they write. Since any copy of those ideas is identical with the writer's ideas, the writer owns every instance of those ideas. Therefore, some information is owned.

As it stands, the above argument is valid. However, the argument must not contain a false premise for the argument to be sound. Certainly the first premise is correct. I would not want to say that at least some writers place all of their effort into a work that they do. The second premise is false though. Consider the case of the a worker who is paid to make an item of furniture. They also put all of their effort into building the furniture, but they do not own the finished product. They are paid a monetary amount instead.

Now this is not the only problem with that argument. Let's suppose that I stole some materials to build an item of furniture. I constructed this piece of furniture entirely by my own efforts. Yet I do not own the finished product. Why? Well, because I stole the materials! So even outside of some contract situation, it is still not the case that sole effort results in ownership.

This argument can be altered so that it avoids the two problems mentioned earlier. Let's modify the second premise. It will now state that if someone has placed their sole effort into something, stolen nothing to create it and is not under any relevant kind of contract related to it, then they own it. We now have to modify the first premise as well. Some writers produce a work by their sole effort, do not steal anything to create it and are not under a contract related to it. Now is this revised argument sound?

Now there are some writers like that. Is there a case in which something is created in that manner but not owned by the creator? Well consider this scenario. Let's say there is a scientist that owns some human sperm and eggs. He decides to combine a sperm with an egg inside of an artificial womb that he also owns. He is under no contract at all at this point. Nine months later, a child is born. Does he own the child? He satisfies the conditions set out in the second premise. So if he does not own the child, then the second premise is false. Since he obviously does not own the child, the second premise must be false.

So this modified argument is also unsound. At this point I am open to suggestions as to how to improve this argument. If it cannot be improved, then it does not supply us with a good reason to believe in intellectual property. Now, there may be another good argument out there. This exercise only shows that a particular form of the argument is a failure.

Pluralism and Religion

2005-07-26T15:13:00.000-07:00

There are three main beliefs about the relationship of one's religion to salvation/liberation. One of these options is that of the pluralist. The pluralist believes that one can obtain salvation/liberation through more than one religion. Furthermore, each of those religions offers at least a partially accurate description of the Absolute/God. Now the pluralist must understand religious belief in such a way as to allow for pluralism to be true. This obvious point means that pluralists are not able to believe just any thesis about religious belief.

Pluralists must believe that religious belief shares some form of common principle. This common principle must be consistent with a belief in pluralism. Therefore, this common principle cannot be doctrinal beliefs. Since many religious believers are in a social setting, this may be related to such a common principle. However, this social setting is also shared by other institutions, such as schools. But schools are not religious institutions by nature. So religious belief must be more than a social setting.

One of the differences between a school and a church is the different attitudes one has in both places. One is an institution of learning, but the other is a place of prayer. This different attitude is an indication that the end of each institution is also different. In a school the end is learning. In a church, the end is prayer?

There is no other set of beliefs or institution that places prayer with such importance as a religion does. So prayer is distinctive to religious belief. This does not mean that prayer is the common principle of religious belief. One way to determine if it is not is to look for a religion that lacks prayer. Now I cannot think of one that does. Perhaps there is one, but one has to remember that meditation also counts as prayer. So it is not likely that there is a religion that lacks prayer. Another way to determine if prayer is the central principle of religion is to look for a religion that places a higher emphasis on something other than prayer. This is not hard to find. In some religions, emphasis is placed on doing good works. This emphasis far exceeds any due to prayer.

So prayer is not the common principle of religious belief. However, there is one thing that good works and prayer have in common. Both of these strive to do what God desires. In prayer, one desires to know God and communicate with him. One learns to match one's own desires with his. In good works, one aims to carry out the desires of God. In an Eastern religion, one may meditate in order to achieve enlightenment. One does good works in order to help along this process. In both cases, someone who does this well is known as a holy person. Perhaps holy people are the common element in religious beliefs.

How does one know which people are holy? If one says that those who pray well and do good works, then there is another question to be asked. What sort of prayer is good? What works are good? Now various religions differ on the details of these points. In fact, religions that emphasize meditation understand it much differently than those who pray to a personal deity. Those who pray would not even count such meditation as prayer at all! So if holy men are the common principle of religions and they are understood through prayer and good works, then pluralism is false. This is because holy men would be recognized through a doctrinal system, and they would become holy only through a doctrinal system.

The pluralist does have a different way of understanding holy men. Instead of those who pray well and do good works as defined in a doctrinal system, holy men are those who have mystical experiences. Since every religion has holy men, this mean that religious belief has a common principle that is consistent with pluralism. But now two different questions arise. What is the relationship between prayer and good works in such a system of religious belief, and are there holy men who lack mystical experiences? But those questions are for later.

Tolerance and Religion

2005-07-25T15:51:00.000-07:00

There was a blogger who recently referred to something that seems common in the Canadian public mind. This idea is that if you believe that your religion is the only true way to heaven, or that non-believers will go to hell then you are intolerant. In fact, such comments can be found in many statements, both public and private, in the Canadian world. The problem is that such comments betray a lack of understanding of what religion is.

What sort of thing would religion have to be in order for those sort of claims to be true? Well, it could not be the sort of thing to make truth claims. If a religion made a claim that "The moon is made out of cheese" as a core claim of the religion, then that religion would be false. If a religion made the claim that going to heaven could only be accomplished by suicide bombing, then such a religion would be immoral. Neither of these claims are intolerant. So if exclusivism is intolerant, then religion can't have these sort of claims.

The other major feature of religion is the social and emotional aspect. People are married in a church, die in a church and attend weekly services. In some religions, meditation is emphasized. In others, moral practice is emphasized instead. In any case, all religions do have a social aspect. If this aspect were the only aspect of religions, then exclusivism is intolerant. Exclusivism would amount to the claim that my social environment is better than yours. Since the religion would not actually contain any truth claims, this statement could not be made on the basis of religious beliefs. Since exclusivist claims are made inside religious beliefs and using religious authority, such claims could not be based on the truth. Therefore, they are intolerant.

So all of this shows that under one conception of what religious beliefs are, exclusivism is intolerant. Yet there is another way to view religious beliefs. John Hick believes that religious beliefs have an experiential encounter with the Absolute at their core. Now experiential encounters are not propositional truths either. If that is all that religion is, then exclusivism is intolerant under this understanding of religious belief as well.

Since these two views on religious belief are compatible, it is also possible to combine them to form a third view of religion. We could call this view of religion the social-emotional-mystical view. In fact, I think that this third view is more plausible than the previous two are separately. Under this conception, exclusivism is certainly immoral. However, this view is not argued for amoung Canadians. Neither is it identified as a view at all. It is presupposed. Once it has been identified, it needs argument. After all, no consistently moral exclusivist believes in any of these three conceptions of religion. So where is the argument?

The Property Question

2005-07-22T14:04:00.000-07:00

The question of whether there is intellectual property can only be answered under a particular understanding of property. Now there are four different ways in which some information could be property. Each way understands the government and the law in different ways.

The first way is the social contract theory. Under this theory, information is property because the government says that it is. Since everyone consents to be governed, they must accept the laws of the government. Apart from the regulations of the government, no property exists at all, whether physical or intellectual. This usually means that right and wrong are defined by the laws of the government. Under this theory, the actual laws of the government create property in the same way that they create morality.

The second way is that of public property. Under this theory all information is owned by the public. However, the government is the agent of the public and decides how that information is used and by whom. So when the government says that a particular author has a copyright to a book, it is really denying copying permission to everyone but the author and those the author permits.

The third way is what I am calling source ownership. Under this theory, a person owns a piece of information that they have 'created', and all of the copies of that same information. However, if someone else should have 'created' the same piece of information on their own, then each retains information over their own piece of information.

The fourth way is what I am calling information ownership. Under this theory, a person owns a piece of information and every instance of that information. This owership extends to instances of that information that were not copied from first person to 'create' it.

The difference between the third and fourth way is not merely theoretical. In some cases patents have been filed to preempt someone who had discovered the same process at about the same time. Both persons were working independently. This has happened relatively often. In another case, altered DNA has been copyrighted. Since the DNA was altered for experimental purposes, it is not unlikely to suppose that another would alter the DNA in the same way.

The first and second ways are also different. Under social contract theory, property would not exist without the government. On the other hand, it exists in the public if it is public property. So it would exist even if the government did not. Furthermore, there may be a right or wrong way for the government to administer public property, but not if that property exists because of a social contract.

Philosophy and Copyright

2005-07-21T16:56:00.000-07:00

I believe that there is no such thing as intellectual property. Whatever one can say of ideas and information, one cannot say that they are owned by anyone. I also believe that it is not immoral to copy someone's book, movie or other work. I am not in favor of plagiarism. The copying that I am referring to is the type banned by copyright laws.

Before explaining any of the reasons for my beliefs, it would be helpful to draw a map of the philosophical territory. There are four distinct philosophical questions that are raised by my beliefs. Answers and arguments for one question are not necessarily applicable to another.

First, can information, ideas and processes be owned as property in some sense? If so, what is the nature of this property, and how does it compare with the ownership of physical things. If not, what are the implications for copying, modifying or adding to information. This question is not about the moral implications of copying. It is only about whether information can be owned.

Second, is it ever morally permissible to copy, alter or add to information of the type that we consider copyrighted? If so, then what is the nature of this? Does it permit this copying all of the time, or only some of the time. If not, then why not?

Third, should some kinds of copying, modifying or adding to information that we would consider copyrighted be forbidden or restricted by the law. This question is not decided by the answers to the two previous questions. It would depend on why one believes laws are created and what the purpose of the government really is.

Fourth, is it permissible in any circumstances to break our present copyright laws or other copyright laws that could be made. Again, this question is not determined by the answers to the three previous questions. Likely the Christian will have something substantial to say at this point.

My beliefs mentioned earlier concern only the first and second questions. We might call the first question the property question, and the second question the moral question. I have not mentioned my beliefs on the legal question or the practical question. That ends the mapping of the philosophical territory. It would make this post too long to discuss these questions in depth.

First Post

2005-07-21T12:36:00.000-07:00

This blog will be about the various things that I talk about with the people that I know. That means that philosophical issues, theological issues and cultural/political issues will be the main topics. The title emphasizes the connection between scripture and reason. Without scripture our view of the world is unbalanced and unreliable. Without reason scripture cannot be interpreted or understood. This phrase replaces the vague "faith and reason" phrase with some well-defined content.

Links Policy: If I link to someone, that means that I believe that they have a blog worth reading. Therefore, the mere fact that someone links to me does not mean that I will link to them. However, my links do not count as endorsement of the opinions or kind of opinions found on that blog.

Comments Policy: I will delete any slanderous or irrelevent comments I find. I may not respond to any comments although I do appreciate the feedback. Any corrections are also welcome as well as any comments relevent to the content of the post.