The Problem of Evil: Our Ordinary Concepts
I had posted earlier on the problem of evil and its relationship to the existence of moral truths. I mentioned that one of the ways for the atheist to avoid that objection to the problem of evil was to state that they are simply referring to the ordinary moral truths that people believe exist. They are attempting to offer an explanation for why those truths exist, but only point out the problem that those truths create for the theist. However, this evasion only appears to succeed. Once we take a deeper look at what the atheist is trying to do we find out that this objection fails.
The atheist is asking us to assume that the moral beliefs that we all have must be true, regardless of what is true metaphysically. Yet that is absurd. There are some philosophers who are hard determinists. They believe that no one is free or responsible for their actions. Yet they all acknowledge that we often believe that we are free and responsible. In fact, we may be unable to avoid reactive attitudes when confronted with very evil acts. None of this influences their beliefs on the truth of hard determinism though. If hard determinism is true, then most of us function irrationally by displaying reactive attitudes, blaming or praising someone. But the question of whether someone is actually responsible or not cannot be avoided merely because we would be irrational if no one ever was. It is the same with moral truths. If no moral truth exists, then we are all irrational whenever we believe something about right or wrong. But the fact that we might be irrational does not give us the right to suppose that moral truths exist regardless of which metaphysical theory is correct. On some metaphysical theories, moral truths do not exist.
What this means is that the problem of evil must be posed from within a particular framework of thought. Attempting to pose the problem within our ordinary and common concepts only obscures the fact that our ordinary and common concepts do not supply an explicit metaphysical framework for the existence of moral truths. So the theist could ask for the basis of those moral truths, and judge the problem defective if support for them is not given. If support for moral standards appeals directly or indirectly to God, then one is working within theism. If that is not the case, then one is working within atheism. So in either case, an appeal to our common concepts does not support the problem of evil.
The atheist is asking us to assume that the moral beliefs that we all have must be true, regardless of what is true metaphysically. Yet that is absurd. There are some philosophers who are hard determinists. They believe that no one is free or responsible for their actions. Yet they all acknowledge that we often believe that we are free and responsible. In fact, we may be unable to avoid reactive attitudes when confronted with very evil acts. None of this influences their beliefs on the truth of hard determinism though. If hard determinism is true, then most of us function irrationally by displaying reactive attitudes, blaming or praising someone. But the question of whether someone is actually responsible or not cannot be avoided merely because we would be irrational if no one ever was. It is the same with moral truths. If no moral truth exists, then we are all irrational whenever we believe something about right or wrong. But the fact that we might be irrational does not give us the right to suppose that moral truths exist regardless of which metaphysical theory is correct. On some metaphysical theories, moral truths do not exist.
What this means is that the problem of evil must be posed from within a particular framework of thought. Attempting to pose the problem within our ordinary and common concepts only obscures the fact that our ordinary and common concepts do not supply an explicit metaphysical framework for the existence of moral truths. So the theist could ask for the basis of those moral truths, and judge the problem defective if support for them is not given. If support for moral standards appeals directly or indirectly to God, then one is working within theism. If that is not the case, then one is working within atheism. So in either case, an appeal to our common concepts does not support the problem of evil.
posted by Matthew at 12:50 PM
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