Methodological Naturalism and Science Stoppers
Part of the reason for believing in methodological naturalism (MN) is that appealing directly to God as the source of an action is a science stopper. Science cannot investigate how God did it, not can it investigate the nature of God. Both Plantinga and Michael Martin agree on these points. The question is whether these points are a solid justification for MN or not. These points are not a justification for MN because they are inconclusive.
Plantinga notes that even if denying MN is a science stopper, it does not mean that God did not act directly in that circumstance. If one follows the practice of MN, one will come to conclusions that one knows from other information to be false. So our practice of science will not be truth-seeking, but will only seek after certain kinds of explanations, even if we know that they are false. Martin does not explicitly disagree with this argument. What he does believe about it is unclear.
Plantinga also argues that empirical investigation may be able to establish cases in which God has acted directly. The scientist would simply rule out indirect explanations, leaving only direct ones. Martin does not believe that we can ever rule out indirect explanations. Therefore, there would be no empirical evidence for the direct action of God. The problem comes with exactly how Martin knows that indirect explanations cannot be ruled out. He claims this based entirely on a priori reasons such as the progress of science and theory revision. Such reasons only establish MN if metaphysical naturalism is true. He does not offer any mathematical or logical proof for such a conclusion. Apart from such a proof, one would need a posteriori reasons for believing that God's direct action cannot be established through science.
Martin does offer just this sort of a posteriori reason later on as a confirmation of his position. He says that the progress of science has replaced supernatural explanations with natural ones. Although this is true, it will not serve as an adequate reason. He would need to show that any direct action of God is similiar to those supernatural explanations that were later replaced. Merely pointing out that God's action is supernatural will not do that. Perhaps God's action on the world leaves a signal of intelligent design. Perhaps those supernatural explanations did not leave such a signal. Then they would not be similiar. Therefore, this does not confirm or support his position.
All of these points mean that MN cannot be justified on the basis of science stoppers without further argument. Michael Martin simply does not show that God's direct action is relevantly similiar to replaced supernatural explanations. Neither does he give a logical a priori argument for why God's direct actions cannot be detected through science. Apart from those sort of arguments, Plantinga's case against MN succeeds.
Plantinga notes that even if denying MN is a science stopper, it does not mean that God did not act directly in that circumstance. If one follows the practice of MN, one will come to conclusions that one knows from other information to be false. So our practice of science will not be truth-seeking, but will only seek after certain kinds of explanations, even if we know that they are false. Martin does not explicitly disagree with this argument. What he does believe about it is unclear.
Plantinga also argues that empirical investigation may be able to establish cases in which God has acted directly. The scientist would simply rule out indirect explanations, leaving only direct ones. Martin does not believe that we can ever rule out indirect explanations. Therefore, there would be no empirical evidence for the direct action of God. The problem comes with exactly how Martin knows that indirect explanations cannot be ruled out. He claims this based entirely on a priori reasons such as the progress of science and theory revision. Such reasons only establish MN if metaphysical naturalism is true. He does not offer any mathematical or logical proof for such a conclusion. Apart from such a proof, one would need a posteriori reasons for believing that God's direct action cannot be established through science.
Martin does offer just this sort of a posteriori reason later on as a confirmation of his position. He says that the progress of science has replaced supernatural explanations with natural ones. Although this is true, it will not serve as an adequate reason. He would need to show that any direct action of God is similiar to those supernatural explanations that were later replaced. Merely pointing out that God's action is supernatural will not do that. Perhaps God's action on the world leaves a signal of intelligent design. Perhaps those supernatural explanations did not leave such a signal. Then they would not be similiar. Therefore, this does not confirm or support his position.
All of these points mean that MN cannot be justified on the basis of science stoppers without further argument. Michael Martin simply does not show that God's direct action is relevantly similiar to replaced supernatural explanations. Neither does he give a logical a priori argument for why God's direct actions cannot be detected through science. Apart from those sort of arguments, Plantinga's case against MN succeeds.
posted by Matthew at 10:40 AM
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