The Existential Problem of Evil

I have read various writings (mostly analytic) in the philosophy of religion about the problem of evil. These writings would often distinguish between two forms of this problem. One of them was supposed to be the intellectual problem of evil. This problem could be examined by the use of numbered premises and logical thinking. The other problem was called the pastoral problem. This was to be solved by pastoral and, if necessary, professional counselling. I think that this distinction is both false and misleading.

There are some cases in which one discusses the problem of evil merely as an intellectual exercise. There are also some cases in which the problem of evil is a screen hiding emotional issues. Neither of these cases are in the majority. The problem of evil receives a lot of popular attention precisely because emotional commitment is generated. Some have strong religious commitment. Others have a strong committment to justice in the world. Both of these commitments are quite common and both generate strong feelings. Sometimes both of these are present in the same individual. These commitments seem to clash in the problem of evil. If one were to compare this with the amount of attention that the induction problem recieves, one realizes that there is a vast difference. This vast difference is likely because the induction problem does not arise out of the degree of commitment that the problem of evil does.

So those who treat the problem of evil as a merely intellectual pursuit are either pursuing it as a curiousity or separating the commitments from it in order to touch only the intellectual elements. On the other hand, those who need counseling are those who let their commitments generate emotions that overwhelm their reasoning. The majority of people in the middle are brought to the problem of evil by their commitments, but seek an reasonable solution to their conflict. They are neither unreasonable or emotionless.

The problem of evil is brought to our attention by specific examples. One thinks of the Rwandan genocide, or the attacks on the Twin Towers, or the Nazi extermination of Jews. All of these are particular examples of great evil. Out of these we ask questions that are both general and specific. Some of the general questions are philosophical in nature: "how can God exist with this evil?", or "Is it moral to allow such evil?". The rest of the questions raised are theological. They wish to know the motives and plan of God for those evil acts. They are the questions of the situation. They demand an intellectual response, but they also demand a response from those who share the same commitments. It is up to the theologian to answer the question. That means that neither the philosopher nor the counselor can answer it. And that means that one should not make the distinction between "intellectual" and "counseling" problems.