Geisler and Aquinas on Divine Timelessness
I have begun reading through the second volume of Geisler's systematic theology. As I read into this work, I have noticed just how much Geisler depends on Aquinas' work. He endorses almost all of Aquinas' positions and uses many of the same arguments. One of these positions is the idea that God is outside of time. I used to hold that position, but do not believe it anymore. So I was curious as to how he would support his position. I found that one of his main arguments is God cannot have any kind of passive potencies, beings in time have passive potencies; therefore, God is not in time. This argument fails because it assumes that if God is in time, he is in time in the same sense that we are.
I agree that God does not possess any kind of passive potency. He cannot undergo changes in his substance. The argument that Geisler offers is also valid, yet I disagree with the conclusion. So it should be obvious that I disagree with the second premise. In fact, I hold that the second premise applies to everything but God. Every being except God has passive potencies because it is not pure actuality. Every being except God is also inside time. But Geisler needs to show that being in time entails that a being undergo substantial change. Geisler makes several theological arguments to show that beings in time undergo substantial change.
In his first argument Geisler claims that time itself is the measure of change. If nothing at all changed, then there would be no time at all. This means two different things. Since God cannot undergo substantial change, time did not exist apart from creation. Therefore, time arises from the work of creation. This also means that anything that is created exists in time because it undergoes a change in substance. However, God does not undergo any change in substance. So any change that God could undergo as a part of being in time will be the substantial changes that creation experiences in relation to him. That sort of change does not require passive potency. So this does not show that God is outside of time. One could take the argument that time is the measure of change to meant that time only occurs to those who undergo substantial change. If one did so, then the argument could not support the idea that God is outside of time. It would be a clear example of question-begging.
In his second argument Geisler claims that time limits beings. Since God has no limits, he must not be inside time. This argument assumes that the past and future exist in some sense, and then deduce that God would be limited if he only occupied the present. However, no argument is given for supposing that either the future or the past exist. Those who believe that God is temporal do not believe in the existence of the past or the future. Therefore, an argument is necessary. So this argument fails as well.
In his third argument Geisler states that God is pure act and since temporal beings have potentiality, God is not temporal. He believes that God is disanalogous to time, having no past or future like it does. However, he has not shown that temporal beings have potentiality. Neither has he demonstrated that time has a past or a future. Therefore, this argument also fails.
In his fourth argument Geisler states that since God is necessary he has no potential not to exist. What has no potential in its being cannot change. Since time involves change, God is timeless. This argument equivocates on the word "change". In the final premise, it includes both substantial and non-substantial change. In the second last premise, it includes substantial change. Therefore, this argument also fails.
Since none of these arguments succeed, Geisler must rely on his Biblical evidence and historical consensus to establish the idea that God is timeless. Although I believe in all of the doctrines that he is attempting to use to convince me, I hold that these doctrines are about God's substance. Therefore, they cannot prove that God is outside of time. All they do is establish that God cannot be in time in the same sense that we are - a conclusion that Geisler should appreciate.
I agree that God does not possess any kind of passive potency. He cannot undergo changes in his substance. The argument that Geisler offers is also valid, yet I disagree with the conclusion. So it should be obvious that I disagree with the second premise. In fact, I hold that the second premise applies to everything but God. Every being except God has passive potencies because it is not pure actuality. Every being except God is also inside time. But Geisler needs to show that being in time entails that a being undergo substantial change. Geisler makes several theological arguments to show that beings in time undergo substantial change.
In his first argument Geisler claims that time itself is the measure of change. If nothing at all changed, then there would be no time at all. This means two different things. Since God cannot undergo substantial change, time did not exist apart from creation. Therefore, time arises from the work of creation. This also means that anything that is created exists in time because it undergoes a change in substance. However, God does not undergo any change in substance. So any change that God could undergo as a part of being in time will be the substantial changes that creation experiences in relation to him. That sort of change does not require passive potency. So this does not show that God is outside of time. One could take the argument that time is the measure of change to meant that time only occurs to those who undergo substantial change. If one did so, then the argument could not support the idea that God is outside of time. It would be a clear example of question-begging.
In his second argument Geisler claims that time limits beings. Since God has no limits, he must not be inside time. This argument assumes that the past and future exist in some sense, and then deduce that God would be limited if he only occupied the present. However, no argument is given for supposing that either the future or the past exist. Those who believe that God is temporal do not believe in the existence of the past or the future. Therefore, an argument is necessary. So this argument fails as well.
In his third argument Geisler states that God is pure act and since temporal beings have potentiality, God is not temporal. He believes that God is disanalogous to time, having no past or future like it does. However, he has not shown that temporal beings have potentiality. Neither has he demonstrated that time has a past or a future. Therefore, this argument also fails.
In his fourth argument Geisler states that since God is necessary he has no potential not to exist. What has no potential in its being cannot change. Since time involves change, God is timeless. This argument equivocates on the word "change". In the final premise, it includes both substantial and non-substantial change. In the second last premise, it includes substantial change. Therefore, this argument also fails.
Since none of these arguments succeed, Geisler must rely on his Biblical evidence and historical consensus to establish the idea that God is timeless. Although I believe in all of the doctrines that he is attempting to use to convince me, I hold that these doctrines are about God's substance. Therefore, they cannot prove that God is outside of time. All they do is establish that God cannot be in time in the same sense that we are - a conclusion that Geisler should appreciate.
posted by Matthew at 8:38 PM
3 Comments:
"I agree that God does not possess any kind of passive potency. He cannot undergo changes in his substance."
Does Geisler limit passive potency to only substantial capacities? Aquinas would not, as a good Aristotelian. Potencies have to do with both substance and accident.
Geisler does not limit it to change in substance, but also includes change in accident as well. It must be understood that neither catagory includes relations. That wasn't clear in my post (now that I have re-read it).
I do agree with Geisler on this. However, one has to be clear and distinguish between such things as God's knowledge of the present and change in relations. Neither involve a change in God, yet I affirm both. By knowledge of the present, I mean knowledge of tensed truths.
I'm curious to know what explanation you would have for how relations are not accidents. I agree with the position you're arguing for Matt, but I don't know how to explain how relations and accidents are different and how to argue for that. This issue actually came up in my Metaphysics of Theism class with JWeed and she views relations as being accidents. This seems quite odd to me because how could someone think that just because someone else is walking away from another person that that would cause any change in the person that is standing around. This just appears to be untenable because it sounds so ridiculous. And wouldn't her position just fall apart even if God was timeless? For there would be a change in relations just through God being related to the world that he created from before when there was nothing yet created. This all seems incomprehensible as to how God could have been creating (i.e. performing an action) and yet remain timeless. Anyway, let me know what you think.
Post a Comment
<< Home