Believing in the Trinity vs. 'Paradoxing' the Trinity
Is a paradoxical doctrine of the trinity compatible with believing that same doctrine? The answer to that question is the same as the answer to paradox in general. It depends on what one means by paradox.
First off, there are two different ways that one can believe a doctrine. One way is to believe in it directly, by believing a proposition or series of propositions that express that doctrine. Another is to believe indirectly. This way of believing does so not by believing a proposition, but a person or group of people. We believe that the doctrine of the trinity, that those people believe, is true. We trust that these people believe some set of propositions or believe some others who do.
Secondly, there are at least three different senses of the word paradox. One sense is that of contradiction. I am going to ignore that one because it is not compatible with belief in the trinity. The other two senses are different ways of understanding merely apparent contradiction. In one sense, there can be no demonstration that the set of propositions that appear to contradict do not actually contradict one another. In practice, this position is the same as the one I rejected. I am calling this kind of paradox the Tillian paradox. In the other sense, there can be a demonstration that the set of propositions do not contradict one another. I am calling this kind of paradox the Thomist paradox.
Combining these points shows that any Tillian paradox cannot be directly believed, and any such paradox refers to nothing. In the realm of belief, the Tillian paradox is identical to a contradiction. Since one cannot directly believe any contradictions, one cannot directly believe a Tillian paradox. But this creates a problem. For the only way to believe a Tillian paradox is to believe it indirectly. Let's suppose that such a paradox is called X. So I believe X because I believe the doctrine that these other people believe. But then why do these other people believe? They must believe indirectly as well. Since this is an infinite regress, X does not refer to any propositions at all! But in that case, Tillian paradoxes do not successfully reference any paradox of belief at all.
So what does this mean in the end? It means that any attempt to understand theology in a Tillian sense of paradox is doomed to fall into an epistemological abyss. And that includes the doctrine of the trinity.
First off, there are two different ways that one can believe a doctrine. One way is to believe in it directly, by believing a proposition or series of propositions that express that doctrine. Another is to believe indirectly. This way of believing does so not by believing a proposition, but a person or group of people. We believe that the doctrine of the trinity, that those people believe, is true. We trust that these people believe some set of propositions or believe some others who do.
Secondly, there are at least three different senses of the word paradox. One sense is that of contradiction. I am going to ignore that one because it is not compatible with belief in the trinity. The other two senses are different ways of understanding merely apparent contradiction. In one sense, there can be no demonstration that the set of propositions that appear to contradict do not actually contradict one another. In practice, this position is the same as the one I rejected. I am calling this kind of paradox the Tillian paradox. In the other sense, there can be a demonstration that the set of propositions do not contradict one another. I am calling this kind of paradox the Thomist paradox.
Combining these points shows that any Tillian paradox cannot be directly believed, and any such paradox refers to nothing. In the realm of belief, the Tillian paradox is identical to a contradiction. Since one cannot directly believe any contradictions, one cannot directly believe a Tillian paradox. But this creates a problem. For the only way to believe a Tillian paradox is to believe it indirectly. Let's suppose that such a paradox is called X. So I believe X because I believe the doctrine that these other people believe. But then why do these other people believe? They must believe indirectly as well. Since this is an infinite regress, X does not refer to any propositions at all! But in that case, Tillian paradoxes do not successfully reference any paradox of belief at all.
So what does this mean in the end? It means that any attempt to understand theology in a Tillian sense of paradox is doomed to fall into an epistemological abyss. And that includes the doctrine of the trinity.
Labels: christian theology, epistemology, philosophy of religion
posted by Matthew at 2:40 PM
6 Comments:
"In the realm of belief, the Tillian paradox is identical to a contradiction. Since one cannot directly believe any contradictions, one cannot directly believe a Tillian paradox."
This begs the whole question at issue.
You are going to have to say more than that! Do you claim that Tillian paradoxes are not identical to contradictions in the realm of belief? Or do you dispute my inference instead?
Merely pointing out that my results exclude your beliefs on paradox does not mean that I have begged the question.
I suppose I deny equating apparent contradictions with contradictions simpliciter, and thus I deny that they cannot be believed directly (or indirectly, for that matter).
Andrew,
I don't think Matt is equating an apparent contradiction with an actual contradiction. And from what I understand he is not saying that a person should not or could not believe in an apparent contradiction. I think what he's saying is that the particular sense in which "paradox" is used (that is, the sense including your own view of paradox), at least practically speaking, amounts in reality to an actual contradiction rather than its claim to be merely an "apparent contradiction." Matt's argument that this is the case does not exclude the reality of apparent contradictions, but only excludes that particular sense of understanding paradoxes.
Regarding the Trinity, I think we would all admit that it is an prime example of an 'apparent contradiction'. I think what Matt is saying is that for something to be an apparent condradiction it is essential that it have the possibility to be understood and explained. For if something bears no possiblity for it to be understood, then how can its truth value be evaluated? That's my take on it, but that may not be what Matt's saying.
PS: honeymoons are awesome!
Greg,
That is where I am going. I am going to be more precise at a later post. This post was an expression of my unformed - but still true - thoughts.
"
Regarding the Trinity, I think we would all admit that it is an prime example of an 'apparent contradiction'. I think what Matt is saying is that for something to be an apparent condradiction it is essential that it have the possibility to be understood and explained. For if something bears no possiblity for it to be understood, then how can its truth value be evaluated? That's my take on it, but that may not be what Matt's saying."
Well, that's fine, but then my view would fall into the Thomist category; I think God can explain the Trinity as perfectly logically consistent. I just don't think human beings have, so far (they may even do it some time in the future, even before the parousia, I don't know).
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