Libertarian Freedom in the Fall

I suppose that among the various theological arguments for libertarian freedom, this one is unique. It begins with a set of theological beliefs about the original unfallen state of human beings and deduces that human beings have (at least then) libertarian freedom. Simply, we begin with the fact that human beings were created by God alone. We were created good. We made a choice to do evil. Therefore that choice requires libertarian freedom.

This first points are matters of orthodoxy. According to Genesis, human beings were created good (Gen 1:31). There was no evil, sin or any inclination to do either. Adam and Eve made a choice to do evil (Gen 3:1-7, Ro 5:12, 1 Tim 2:14). So whatever we conclude, denying one of these points is not an option. This alone does not give us libertarian freedom. We need to examine what it means to do evil.

Suppose that I know that X'ing is evil. I also know that it is possible for me to do X in my current situation. Suppose that I believe that some of my desires will be at least partially fulfilled by X'ing. So far, I have done no wrong. But the moment that I form an intention to do X, I am now sinning. Unless outside factors stop me, I will do X. But now we ask what caused me to form an intention to do X? How would one answer this in the case of Adam and Eve?

One could suggest that it was entirely due to a particular set of beliefs and desires that each person formed such an intention. If so, then are the desires evil? Did one deliberately ignore other beliefs? Was there any evil or sin in this previous state? If one says yes to any of these questions, then I one just repeats the causation question. What caused that desire: deliberate ignorance or evil desires? I would continue to follow this pattern until I was told either that the previous state was good, or that the current state was not caused by the previous one. So suppose that one were to state that this previous state was good rather than evil.

So Adam and Eve's intention to sin was caused by a good set of beliefs and desires. But then how did they sin? Their desires were good and they were not deliberately ignoring anything. So we have to conclude that they were either mistaken or insane. Neither of these options is possible given the information we have. Since God created them good, they were complete. They were functioning correctly and insanity is a matter of not functioning correctly. So insanity is not an option. Since they were told that they were not to eat of the tree, and they knew only good and authority from God, there was no way for them to make an honest mistake. So their intention to sin could not be caused by a good set of beliefs and desires either.

The remaining option is to suggest that their intention to sin was caused by something else. It could not be their condition or their character. Both of those were good. Neither could it be any part of their environment as that was also good. One is left with the suggestion that some external agent caused them to do so. We wouldn't accuse God of giving them an evil intention, so perhaps we are accusing the serpent? The very narrative of Genesis rules this idea out. So do the later statements in the epistles. So what option but libertarian freedom is left at this point?

I wish to briefly mention one argument that might be used at this point. One might simply declare that this matter is a mystery, and we do not understand how Adam and Eve were able to sin given their creation. This is not an option. First of all, the Bible does not commit us to a denial of libertarian freedom. Second, this is a matter of an explicit contradiction. Appealing to mystery in this case is mere hand-waving. I will say that this is my first attempt to deal with this argument properly. I do not consider Calvin's now rejected answer to this, nor do I consider anyone else.

What is Tritheism?

Tritheism is the belief that there are three gods. It is one way to deny trinitarianism. So I am not looking for the simple understanding of what tritheism is. I am trying to understand what it means to say that there are three gods. How is that to be distinguished from the claim of trinitarians that there are three persons, but one God?

One way to do this is by looking at some examples of multiple gods in various religions. Many forms of polytheism have deities that are born from other deities. These are cases of (at least) two different gods. So are deities that come into existence before or after other deities. There are also cases of deities that cease to exist before or after of deities. In all of these cases, multiple gods are in view. Polytheism does not contain more creative examples of multiple deities, but dualism does. In the form of dualism I am familiar with, one god is good and the other god is evil. Both are without beginning or end. Yet there are two gods rather than one. Some principle must underlie these cases, but what is it?

Looking at the polytheist example, one notices that if one divine person come into existence or ceases to exist at a different time than the other divine person, then there are two gods. Apart from the issue that any non-eternal being can't really be divine, let's look just at the numbering issue. in any case in which there are two individuals, one of which ceases to exist or begins to exist before the other, the two individuals are distinct beings. This is an example of a general principle. In the dualist example, we know that there two beings because they have incompatible properties. The same being cannot be continuously an advocate of good and a continuous advocate of evil at the same time. The temporal example is also an example of incompatible properties. So we could say that two individuals are distinct beings only if they have incompatible properties.

This will not be enough though. How do we know if two individuals lack incompatible properties? A further analysis of distinct beings is necessary. Let's suppose that two eternal and apparently compatible beings existed. The next question is to ask whether one of them could have existed without the other. If so, then the two individuals are also two distinct beings. So in general, for any two individuals, if one could exist without the other, then those two individuals are two different beings. If the two individuals are the same being, then one's existence is also the existence of the other.

If the trinitarian believes in one God, then she believes that the existence of the Son is the same existence as the Father and the Holy Spirit. She also believe that all three lack incompatible properties. With these understandings in place, it is impossible for anyone to believe in three gods. Tritheism is avoided. In that case, tritheism can be defined quite simply: there are three divine individuals and the existence of each individual is a different existence from the others.

The Trinitarian Doctrine

My series of posts related to paradox have been using the trinity as an example of a paradox. So this is a good point to clarify what this doctrine is. It is also a good point to distinguish between two different sets of claims regarding the trinity. One set of claims is the actual propositions that make up the trinitarian doctrine. The other set is those claims that enable us to both recognize trinitarian doctrine and indirectly believe it.

One first starts with what trinitarians actually believe about the doctrine of the trinity. First off, all trinitarians are monotheists. They all believe in exactly one God. Therefore they deny any form of polytheism. Second, all trinitarians believe that the historical person of Jesus is God, and that he is God is the same sense that the Holy Spirit and the Father are God. This means that all three are equally God. Therefore they deny any diminishing of the divine status of Jesus or the Holy Spirit. Third, all trinitarians believe that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are distinct. Each one has a property that the other does not have, and each one is a person. (Both terms were defined by the trinitarian controversies.) These three points define the center of trinitarian doctrine. (I am ignoring the doctrine of procession because some trinitarians reject it.)

Any doctrine of the trinity will be a set of propositions that is the truth-maker of the above positions while not entailing any contradiction. Yet the three points above are not the actual doctrine of the trinity. Consider the Father, Jesus and God. According to the first point, there is one God. According to the second point, the Father and Jesus are both equally God. According to the final point, the Father and Jesus are distinct and have different properties. So the simplest reading of these points generates a contradiction. That means that the three points are not first-order propositions. They must be second-order propositions about unmentioned first-order propositions instead. One does not discuss the meaning of propositions, only whether they are true or false. One discusses the meaning of sentences.

So what are those three points? They are the way to recognize the actual doctrine of the trinity. Since these three points are true of the trinitarian doctrine, they are necessary to recognize that doctrine. Any doctrine these points are true of would be trinitarian, so these points are also sufficient. Therefore, these points are both sufficient and required to recognize trinitarian doctrine and to believe it indirectly.

Appearing to Contradict?

In a previous post, I have made use of the idea that some propositions appear to contradict one another. In another post I implied that any appearance of contradiction is identical to an actual contradiction. These two ideas can be explained by explaining what an apparent contradiction is and how it is different from an actual contradiction.

An actual contradiction is simple. A and not-A is a contradiction. Any set of propositions that generate that are also contradictory. So is any set of propositions conjoined with a logically necessary truth, or a conceptually necessary truth. For example, the propositions this square is red all over and this square is green all over form a contradictory set because it is a conceptually necessary truth that no square can be red all and green all over at the same time.

An apparent contradiction cannot be any set of first-order propositions. Any such set would either be contradictory, or it would be consistent. The appearance of contradiction in such a set would be the same as the reality.

Because of this, an apparent contradiction must contain second-order propositions. Not only this, but at least some of them must be about which proposition a certain sentence expresses. Let's consider the example of the doctrine of the Trinity. Any such doctrine states the sentence that "God is one". It also states that "God is three". Any first analysis of these sentences takes them to be stating the propositions God is one unit and God is three units. These propositions form a contradictory set along with the logically necessary truth if something is one unit then it is not three units. So if the doctrine of the Trinity is not a contradiction, then those sentences cannot express the propositions that they appear at first to express. Yet this is a second-order proposition about what propositions are actually expressed by a sentence! In fact, any Trinitarian believer believes that the "is" of the first sentence, and the "is" of the second are not the same relation. This does not tell us what the Trinitarian doctrine is, but what it is not. It is also the second-order proposition used in order to avoid having two sentences express contradictory propositions.

An apparent contradiction is not a contradiction at all. It is a set of sentences that appear to express a set of contradictory propositions, but are believed to express a different set of propositions instead. Without the second-order belief, one would be believing in a contradiction.

On Contradictions, Direct Belief and Tillian Paradoxes

In my previous post I laid out a brief case that Tillian paradoxes cannot be believed directly. In the midst of that argument, I made the assertion that one cannot directly believe a contradiction. Although true as a simple summary, there are some distinctions that need to be made. Under some circumstances it is possible to directly believe a contradiction, and under others it is not. The key difference is immediate awareness of the conflicting propositions.

Let's imagine a situation in which a person believes these four propositions: my computer was not operating at noon, there are only two computers in the house, a computer was in use at noon in the house and the other computer was not at use at noon. The conjunction of these four propositions generates a contradiction. Since these are all propositions, this is a case of direct belief. So all that remains is to imagine a situation in which someone would have all of these beliefs at the same time. Let's suppose that I know that my computer is off and the other computer is only used by others while they are there. I know that there are only two computers in the house because that is all that I see, and I know that the others in the house were away at noon. I later receive an e-mail that indicates that it was sent from an address used by the others in the house. As I think about it, I realize that it could not have been sent unless someone was at home. But until I think about it, I am directly believing a set of contradictory propositions.

Now try to imagine believing a simple contradiction of any kind, such as the sky is blue and the sky is not blue. I can't. I imagine something else: some of the sky is blue and some is not, or the sky is blue at one time and not at another, or I first believe one and then the other. None of these count as believing a simple contradiction. Neither can one believe a set of contradictory propositions while being immediate aware of all of them. Consider the previous example. Once I became aware that the e-mail was sent and focus my awareness on this fact, I believe that someone was home using the other computer. Focusing my awareness on that proposition leads to the belief that the other computer was in use at noon. Yet that is the contradictory of the belief I previously held!

These examples show that immediate awareness is sufficient to dispel any direct belief in contradictory propositions. They also show that lacking such awareness allows for the possibility of such beliefs existing directly. So precision requires that I restate my earlier point on Tillian paradoxes. They cannot be believed directly while bringing such propositions into the immediate awareness. One can believe them directly without doing so.

Believing in the Trinity vs. 'Paradoxing' the Trinity

Is a paradoxical doctrine of the trinity compatible with believing that same doctrine? The answer to that question is the same as the answer to paradox in general. It depends on what one means by paradox.

First off, there are two different ways that one can believe a doctrine. One way is to believe in it directly, by believing a proposition or series of propositions that express that doctrine. Another is to believe indirectly. This way of believing does so not by believing a proposition, but a person or group of people. We believe that the doctrine of the trinity, that those people believe, is true. We trust that these people believe some set of propositions or believe some others who do.

Secondly, there are at least three different senses of the word paradox. One sense is that of contradiction. I am going to ignore that one because it is not compatible with belief in the trinity. The other two senses are different ways of understanding merely apparent contradiction. In one sense, there can be no demonstration that the set of propositions that appear to contradict do not actually contradict one another. In practice, this position is the same as the one I rejected. I am calling this kind of paradox the Tillian paradox. In the other sense, there can be a demonstration that the set of propositions do not contradict one another. I am calling this kind of paradox the Thomist paradox.

Combining these points shows that any Tillian paradox cannot be directly believed, and any such paradox refers to nothing. In the realm of belief, the Tillian paradox is identical to a contradiction. Since one cannot directly believe any contradictions, one cannot directly believe a Tillian paradox. But this creates a problem. For the only way to believe a Tillian paradox is to believe it indirectly. Let's suppose that such a paradox is called X. So I believe X because I believe the doctrine that these other people believe. But then why do these other people believe? They must believe indirectly as well. Since this is an infinite regress, X does not refer to any propositions at all! But in that case, Tillian paradoxes do not successfully reference any paradox of belief at all.

So what does this mean in the end? It means that any attempt to understand theology in a Tillian sense of paradox is doomed to fall into an epistemological abyss. And that includes the doctrine of the trinity.

Four Different Kinds of 'Christian'

I believe that those who self-identify as Christian can be placed into four different groups. These groups are general: many different kinds of believers can be found in them. Two of these groups believe that Christianity is a kind of universal unattached to history. The other two groups believe that Christianity is a particular that is uniquely historical. These four groups could be called the mystical, moral, cultural and messianic.

Mystical Christians believe that the real essence of what it means to be Christian is found in some kind of mystical union with the divine (God). This mystical union cannot be expressed in words. There is no human language, whether natural or artificial, capable of truthfully conveying what occurs in this mystical union. This view has one essential characteristic. It locates the center of Christianity in a mystical, non-discursive experience.

Moral Christians believe that the real essence of what it means to be a Christian is found in a right moral behavior and thought. This kind of Christian could believe that this moral behavior is found most completely in Christianity, equally in all religions, or just better than most in Christianity. This moral behavior is able to be copied by all, or perhaps only those who are properly enlightened. The only essential characteristic of this view is that the center of Christianity is right morality: both in thought and behavior.

Cultural Christians believe that the real essence of what it means to be a Christian is found in a particular accident of history unique to that individual that associates him with certain beliefs of the time. These need only be moral, mystical or historical beliefs that people of that circumstance associate with Christianity. These circumstances could be racial, political, national or familial. They could be the belief of one's parents, the church one attends, or the moral opinions one espouses. These Christians rarely reflect on their beliefs about the nature of Christianity. When they do, they often think of themselves as being Christians in a lesser sense. The one essential characteristic of this view is that Christianity is an element of culture just like any other cultural element.

Messianic Christians believe that the real essence of what it means to be a Christian is found in the particular history of Jesus of Nazareth understood as the Lord. These Christians disagree with each other over many things, are from many denominations, and include both liberals and conservatives. The one essential characteristic of this view is that the belief that Jesus (of history) is Lord is essential and central to being Christian.

I have been unable to think of a particular view that cannot be subsumed under one of these four. If these are all of the views, then it is only fair to say that I am a Messianic Christian. I should mention a few things though. None of these views entail pluralism, nor do any deny it. It is also possible to believe elements of more than one view. However, it is not possible to believe more than one view.

An Argument for Determinism

I was reading Jeremy's blog and noticed that he had a post up on arguments for determinism. He had two arguments: one theological and one "scientific". I only wish to deal with the theological argument at this point. The theological argument supposes that God has absolute control over creation. This absolute control is believed to require determinism. The problem is motivating this position. Why should we believe that God has this kind of control? What kind of arguments would we need to show this?

It is worth pointing out that the absolute control conceived of is not merely a strong form of control. One could accept the position of Molinism and believe that God can exercise detailed control over every aspect of the world. If one did that, then one could not believe in determinism at all. So one must believe that God exercises some form of control that is even stronger. Perhaps he could cause the choices of free beings to line up with his will. Since Molinism does not allow this, this would result in a stronger view of control. It is also the only way to have a stronger view of control than Molinism.

So now that we know what kind of control is required, we have to wonder what could convince us that God has this kind of control. Perhaps we could quote a Bible verse. But the Bible does not say anything that requires this form of control to be true. It would have to say that God efficiently caused the free choice of someone to be what he wanted. You cannot find that, or any set of verses that require such a view as that to be true. Perhaps a theology would require this form of control. It is hard to see how it could without being ad hoc. At best, it could claim that God's perfection requires absolute control of creation. I don't find such a claim intuitively appealing. As long as I have strong control, all of my intuitions are satisfied. So why should I believe that God's perfection requires absolute control?

Perhaps we could advance the argument that God is the most powerful being possible. Since a God with absolute control is more powerful than a God with merely strong control, God has absolute control. The response is very simple. Apart from a proof that freedom is compatible with determinism, there is no good reason to believe that absolute control is even possible. In that case, a God with strong control is the most powerful being possible.

All of this has assumed that the person who believes in absolute control also avoids attacking Molinism directly. However, this is an option. He could argue that Molinism is irreparably inconsistent. The intuitions that supported strong control should now support absolute control. So far, this is a good argument. But consider the fact that I also have intuitions and arguments for incompatiblism. Since we both believe in free will, I would have to ask whether the evidence for absolute control really does outweigh that for incompatibilism. I am not sure that it does. An argument for absolute control would have to take this into account and give an appropriate argument.

No matter how one tries to advance determinism theologically, one is required to give an account that shows the superiority of theological arguments for God's stronger control over universe to the philosophical arguments for incompatiblism. One also has to either refute Molinism, or demonstrate that freedom is compatible with determinism. Quite a bit of work for a argument that tries to demonstrate determinism!

Good Trinity Blog

I was looking around the internet and noticed a good blog that I had seen before. This blog is solely about the Christian doctrine of the trinity. It has good articles with some good comments. The writer is a philosophy professor who has written about the doctrine before. As you might expect, he approaches it from a philosophical point of view.