Libertarian Freedom in the Fall

I suppose that among the various theological arguments for libertarian freedom, this one is unique. It begins with a set of theological beliefs about the original unfallen state of human beings and deduces that human beings have (at least then) libertarian freedom. Simply, we begin with the fact that human beings were created by God alone. We were created good. We made a choice to do evil. Therefore that choice requires libertarian freedom.

This first points are matters of orthodoxy. According to Genesis, human beings were created good (Gen 1:31). There was no evil, sin or any inclination to do either. Adam and Eve made a choice to do evil (Gen 3:1-7, Ro 5:12, 1 Tim 2:14). So whatever we conclude, denying one of these points is not an option. This alone does not give us libertarian freedom. We need to examine what it means to do evil.

Suppose that I know that X'ing is evil. I also know that it is possible for me to do X in my current situation. Suppose that I believe that some of my desires will be at least partially fulfilled by X'ing. So far, I have done no wrong. But the moment that I form an intention to do X, I am now sinning. Unless outside factors stop me, I will do X. But now we ask what caused me to form an intention to do X? How would one answer this in the case of Adam and Eve?

One could suggest that it was entirely due to a particular set of beliefs and desires that each person formed such an intention. If so, then are the desires evil? Did one deliberately ignore other beliefs? Was there any evil or sin in this previous state? If one says yes to any of these questions, then I one just repeats the causation question. What caused that desire: deliberate ignorance or evil desires? I would continue to follow this pattern until I was told either that the previous state was good, or that the current state was not caused by the previous one. So suppose that one were to state that this previous state was good rather than evil.

So Adam and Eve's intention to sin was caused by a good set of beliefs and desires. But then how did they sin? Their desires were good and they were not deliberately ignoring anything. So we have to conclude that they were either mistaken or insane. Neither of these options is possible given the information we have. Since God created them good, they were complete. They were functioning correctly and insanity is a matter of not functioning correctly. So insanity is not an option. Since they were told that they were not to eat of the tree, and they knew only good and authority from God, there was no way for them to make an honest mistake. So their intention to sin could not be caused by a good set of beliefs and desires either.

The remaining option is to suggest that their intention to sin was caused by something else. It could not be their condition or their character. Both of those were good. Neither could it be any part of their environment as that was also good. One is left with the suggestion that some external agent caused them to do so. We wouldn't accuse God of giving them an evil intention, so perhaps we are accusing the serpent? The very narrative of Genesis rules this idea out. So do the later statements in the epistles. So what option but libertarian freedom is left at this point?

I wish to briefly mention one argument that might be used at this point. One might simply declare that this matter is a mystery, and we do not understand how Adam and Eve were able to sin given their creation. This is not an option. First of all, the Bible does not commit us to a denial of libertarian freedom. Second, this is a matter of an explicit contradiction. Appealing to mystery in this case is mere hand-waving. I will say that this is my first attempt to deal with this argument properly. I do not consider Calvin's now rejected answer to this, nor do I consider anyone else.

Open Theism: Reasons for Libertarian Freedom

We can understand some of the philosophical undercurrents in open theism by examining their arguments for libertarian freedom. In order to do that we first have to be aware of what these arguments are. So here are the arguments presented in this outline.

One reason, presented by Sanders, is that certain biblical language is nullified unless libertarian freedom is true. This includes God's grief over sin, changing his mind, responding to our prayers, entering into genuine dialog and reciprocal relations with human beings. Since the biblical language is not nullified (the Bible is our authority), libertarian freedom exists.

Another reason is that libertarian freedom is necessary for genuine, loving relationships. We cannot enter into them unless we are capable of doing other than what the other person intends (even if that person is God). Not only this, but loving another is not possible unless we have libertarian freedom.

A third reason is that libertarian freedom is necessary for our thought to be rational. This reason is pulled from philosophical reasons. Open theists endorse it, but they did not originate it.

A fourth reason is that libertarian freedom is necessary for us to be held morally responsible in a way that makes a difference. It is also key to understanding sin. Without libertarian freedom we could not have sinned, nor could we have rebelled against God's plan.

A fifth reason is that libertarian freedom is necessary to maintain the Biblical belief that God has always stood in opposition to sin. This is particularly apparent in the case of Adam and Eve. Under compatibilism, God could have prevented Adam from sinning without removing his freedom, but that option is not open under libertarian freedom.

There may be more reasons, but it is useful to note that open theists place a special emphasis on loving relationships, biblical language and God's opposition to sin. So these particular arguments for libertarian freedom need closer examination. It would also be prudent to examine the place of libertarian freedom in open theism as well as their beliefs on freedom in heaven. But that is for another time.

Why I Believe in Libertarian Freedom

I have been thinking that giving my reasons for believing in the libertarian theory of free will can only help in the dialog on this topic. From the comments that I have read, many compatibilist Christians do not really know why libertarian Christians believe as they do. I do not claim to represent the majority in all respects, but I think my reasons are characteristic of those Christians who are libertarians. I have (as far as I can remember) alway held to these beliefs. My reasons have changed as I have matured, so I am only going to give the reasons I have now.

My first reason comes directly from Christian belief. Adam and Eve fell from a state of innocence by their own choice. This is referred to as the "original sin". They were created good by God, had a sinful condition after and fell by their own free choice. These are all points of orthodox Christianity. Since this is true, we must find an explanation of freedom that does not violate them when it is consistent. Libertarianism is the only option. I am not proving anything here, I am merely stating my opinion. This same dilemma for other forms of freedom is also found in the fall of Satan.

My second reason also comes from Christian belief. Libertarianism is a consistent and meaningful theory at least in the case of God. We believe that God could have created nothing, could have not send redemption, and could have decided not to give any other grace to human beings. Since these are also points of orthodox Christianity, denying them is not an option. Libertarian freedom for God is required for orthodox Christianity.

My third reason is the connection between moral responsibility and freedom. This is a reason I share with non-Christian adherents of libertarianism. If I am responsible, then I am the source of that act. But if I am its source, then the act is free in a libertarian sense. Once again, I am merely stating my opinion, I am not giving an argument.

My fourth reason has to do with information. I do not believe that any combination of law and chance is capable of generating information. I believe this on the basis of the work of William Dembski. If true, then every case of information generation is also a case of the exercise of libertarian freedom. I find it quite implausible to account for all information in the world by God's direct intervention, so this is also an argument for libertarian freedom in human beings.

These are basically my reasons. My reasons do NOT start of as arguments for freedom and then further arguments for having a libertarian freedom. I believe in freedom because I believe in libertarian freedom. These reasons are not all philosophical: two are theological and one is mathematical/philosophical. It would be helpful to note that these reasons are not feelings, nor are they based on feelings. I have not given my arguments, but only a very brief summary of the arguments. I do not mention such arguments as 'freedom to choose God' because I believe they do not fit with the Bible as a whole and suffer other problems as well. Other than that, these arguments are independent. You would have to refute all of them in order to change my mind on this issue. No one I have read has come close to refuting one of them (and I have read Calvin).

An Argument for Determinism

I was reading Jeremy's blog and noticed that he had a post up on arguments for determinism. He had two arguments: one theological and one "scientific". I only wish to deal with the theological argument at this point. The theological argument supposes that God has absolute control over creation. This absolute control is believed to require determinism. The problem is motivating this position. Why should we believe that God has this kind of control? What kind of arguments would we need to show this?

It is worth pointing out that the absolute control conceived of is not merely a strong form of control. One could accept the position of Molinism and believe that God can exercise detailed control over every aspect of the world. If one did that, then one could not believe in determinism at all. So one must believe that God exercises some form of control that is even stronger. Perhaps he could cause the choices of free beings to line up with his will. Since Molinism does not allow this, this would result in a stronger view of control. It is also the only way to have a stronger view of control than Molinism.

So now that we know what kind of control is required, we have to wonder what could convince us that God has this kind of control. Perhaps we could quote a Bible verse. But the Bible does not say anything that requires this form of control to be true. It would have to say that God efficiently caused the free choice of someone to be what he wanted. You cannot find that, or any set of verses that require such a view as that to be true. Perhaps a theology would require this form of control. It is hard to see how it could without being ad hoc. At best, it could claim that God's perfection requires absolute control of creation. I don't find such a claim intuitively appealing. As long as I have strong control, all of my intuitions are satisfied. So why should I believe that God's perfection requires absolute control?

Perhaps we could advance the argument that God is the most powerful being possible. Since a God with absolute control is more powerful than a God with merely strong control, God has absolute control. The response is very simple. Apart from a proof that freedom is compatible with determinism, there is no good reason to believe that absolute control is even possible. In that case, a God with strong control is the most powerful being possible.

All of this has assumed that the person who believes in absolute control also avoids attacking Molinism directly. However, this is an option. He could argue that Molinism is irreparably inconsistent. The intuitions that supported strong control should now support absolute control. So far, this is a good argument. But consider the fact that I also have intuitions and arguments for incompatiblism. Since we both believe in free will, I would have to ask whether the evidence for absolute control really does outweigh that for incompatibilism. I am not sure that it does. An argument for absolute control would have to take this into account and give an appropriate argument.

No matter how one tries to advance determinism theologically, one is required to give an account that shows the superiority of theological arguments for God's stronger control over universe to the philosophical arguments for incompatiblism. One also has to either refute Molinism, or demonstrate that freedom is compatible with determinism. Quite a bit of work for a argument that tries to demonstrate determinism!