Why Be An Expressivist?
I have often taken it to be a norm of philosophical inquiry that one should assume that one's fellow philosophers come to their positions for rational reasons and would reject them if given good reason to do so. One adds to that statement the ceteris paribus clause. Sometimes evidence tells us otherwise. Philosophers are not always rational. But do we have any reason to believe that the expressivist is in this camp? Given the current state of metaethics, there is no good reason to take this position.
I will start by talking about someone who is honest about his beliefs and the evidence. This someone is willing to follow the evidence wherever it leads (unlike Dawkins), and is well informed about the current state of metaethics. This someone chooses to believe in expressivism and rejects accounts of morality that are realist in nature. He is aware that others disagree and may even be somewhat familiar with the current debates in the philosophy of religion. He is not a theist. My point is that such people as this exist.
This person is an expressivist for three reasons. The first reason is naturalism. Given naturalism expressivism is the best explanation of morality. However, this person is not going to rest the entire case on a vindication of naturalism. He also claims that expressivism is the best explanation given all of our current theories of morality, regardless of whether that theory is natural. Finally, he claims that expressivism is simpler because there is no need for the extra ontology of moral realism. Let's examine these claims one at a time.
The claim that naturalism supports expressivism is something I will agree with and ignore. First off, naturalism is not a part of metaethics. It is either an epistemological belief or a metaphysical belief. Second, and more importantly, one is rarely given the reasons for believing that naturalism is true. It is presupposed in much of modern philosophy and little evidence is given to support it. Therefore, I will simply reject it and claim that my rejection is as justified as the modern acceptance of said doctrine is.
The second reason concerns the belief that expressivism is the best explanation of morality. One simply takes all current theories of morality and compares them. I will only consider varieties of moral realism. These varieties come in two forms: naturalist and non-naturalist. There are only two versions of non-naturalism: the Platonic theory and divine command theory. Naturally, both of these are implausible. The Platonic theory supposes that the moral facts are in Platonic heaven. This belief means that our knowledge of moral facts is mysterious at best. The motivation behind morality is unexplained and the rationality of morality is also unexplained. Finally, the content of the moral facts is also unexplained. The divine command theory is not any better. It suffers from the Euthyphro dilemma. It also fails to explain why some things are wrong or right even though God has not commanded that they be done or not done. Finally, it fails to explain the connection between God's commanding something and it being right. So non-natural realism is implausible.
Naturalist realism is also implausible. One cannot analytically identify any moral fact with a natural fact. For we could meaningfully ask whether or not the supposed fact "being happy" really was good. So any identity must be a synthetic identity. All of the proposed examples of synthetic identities have severe problems with them. Therefore, naturalist realism is also implausible. Therefore, realism is implausible.
Expressivism is not as implausible as these options. It ties moral motivation to conative states such as desires, commands and commitments. It explains moral reasoning by analogy with the reasoning we employ with such conative states. It also supplies an explanation for the commonalities and the differences in moral approaches by noting that most human beings want the same sorts of things. Since morals are not beliefs, there is no need to explain moral facts. Since morals are identical with our own conative states, our knowledge of them can also be explained. Although there are some problems with expressivism, realism has more problems.
The final reason is simplicity. We want a moral theory to avoid relativism, account for our moral practices and reasoning, and explain the various features of moral discourse. Since expressivism does all of this without moral facts, there is no need for a realism that does have moral facts. Therefore, expressivism is a simpler theory.
Given the point that these assertions can be rather easily defended in the current literature of moral theory, my hypothetical expressivist seems rather real. So unless we have a particular reason to doubt the rationality of a particular expressivist, we should count the expressivist as a rational philosopher. If we wish to defend realism, then we will need to develop a moral theory that is better than the ones currently available. We also need to point out reasons that an expressivist theory cannot account for morality. Until then, expressivism is not only a rational position but also the best explanation for morality in current metaethics.
I will start by talking about someone who is honest about his beliefs and the evidence. This someone is willing to follow the evidence wherever it leads (unlike Dawkins), and is well informed about the current state of metaethics. This someone chooses to believe in expressivism and rejects accounts of morality that are realist in nature. He is aware that others disagree and may even be somewhat familiar with the current debates in the philosophy of religion. He is not a theist. My point is that such people as this exist.
This person is an expressivist for three reasons. The first reason is naturalism. Given naturalism expressivism is the best explanation of morality. However, this person is not going to rest the entire case on a vindication of naturalism. He also claims that expressivism is the best explanation given all of our current theories of morality, regardless of whether that theory is natural. Finally, he claims that expressivism is simpler because there is no need for the extra ontology of moral realism. Let's examine these claims one at a time.
The claim that naturalism supports expressivism is something I will agree with and ignore. First off, naturalism is not a part of metaethics. It is either an epistemological belief or a metaphysical belief. Second, and more importantly, one is rarely given the reasons for believing that naturalism is true. It is presupposed in much of modern philosophy and little evidence is given to support it. Therefore, I will simply reject it and claim that my rejection is as justified as the modern acceptance of said doctrine is.
The second reason concerns the belief that expressivism is the best explanation of morality. One simply takes all current theories of morality and compares them. I will only consider varieties of moral realism. These varieties come in two forms: naturalist and non-naturalist. There are only two versions of non-naturalism: the Platonic theory and divine command theory. Naturally, both of these are implausible. The Platonic theory supposes that the moral facts are in Platonic heaven. This belief means that our knowledge of moral facts is mysterious at best. The motivation behind morality is unexplained and the rationality of morality is also unexplained. Finally, the content of the moral facts is also unexplained. The divine command theory is not any better. It suffers from the Euthyphro dilemma. It also fails to explain why some things are wrong or right even though God has not commanded that they be done or not done. Finally, it fails to explain the connection between God's commanding something and it being right. So non-natural realism is implausible.
Naturalist realism is also implausible. One cannot analytically identify any moral fact with a natural fact. For we could meaningfully ask whether or not the supposed fact "being happy" really was good. So any identity must be a synthetic identity. All of the proposed examples of synthetic identities have severe problems with them. Therefore, naturalist realism is also implausible. Therefore, realism is implausible.
Expressivism is not as implausible as these options. It ties moral motivation to conative states such as desires, commands and commitments. It explains moral reasoning by analogy with the reasoning we employ with such conative states. It also supplies an explanation for the commonalities and the differences in moral approaches by noting that most human beings want the same sorts of things. Since morals are not beliefs, there is no need to explain moral facts. Since morals are identical with our own conative states, our knowledge of them can also be explained. Although there are some problems with expressivism, realism has more problems.
The final reason is simplicity. We want a moral theory to avoid relativism, account for our moral practices and reasoning, and explain the various features of moral discourse. Since expressivism does all of this without moral facts, there is no need for a realism that does have moral facts. Therefore, expressivism is a simpler theory.
Given the point that these assertions can be rather easily defended in the current literature of moral theory, my hypothetical expressivist seems rather real. So unless we have a particular reason to doubt the rationality of a particular expressivist, we should count the expressivist as a rational philosopher. If we wish to defend realism, then we will need to develop a moral theory that is better than the ones currently available. We also need to point out reasons that an expressivist theory cannot account for morality. Until then, expressivism is not only a rational position but also the best explanation for morality in current metaethics.
Labels: ethics, metaphilosophy
posted by Matthew at 1:06 PM
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