Why Be An Expressivist?

I have often taken it to be a norm of philosophical inquiry that one should assume that one's fellow philosophers come to their positions for rational reasons and would reject them if given good reason to do so. One adds to that statement the ceteris paribus clause. Sometimes evidence tells us otherwise. Philosophers are not always rational. But do we have any reason to believe that the expressivist is in this camp? Given the current state of metaethics, there is no good reason to take this position.

I will start by talking about someone who is honest about his beliefs and the evidence. This someone is willing to follow the evidence wherever it leads (unlike Dawkins), and is well informed about the current state of metaethics. This someone chooses to believe in expressivism and rejects accounts of morality that are realist in nature. He is aware that others disagree and may even be somewhat familiar with the current debates in the philosophy of religion. He is not a theist. My point is that such people as this exist.

This person is an expressivist for three reasons. The first reason is naturalism. Given naturalism expressivism is the best explanation of morality. However, this person is not going to rest the entire case on a vindication of naturalism. He also claims that expressivism is the best explanation given all of our current theories of morality, regardless of whether that theory is natural. Finally, he claims that expressivism is simpler because there is no need for the extra ontology of moral realism. Let's examine these claims one at a time.

The claim that naturalism supports expressivism is something I will agree with and ignore. First off, naturalism is not a part of metaethics. It is either an epistemological belief or a metaphysical belief. Second, and more importantly, one is rarely given the reasons for believing that naturalism is true. It is presupposed in much of modern philosophy and little evidence is given to support it. Therefore, I will simply reject it and claim that my rejection is as justified as the modern acceptance of said doctrine is.

The second reason concerns the belief that expressivism is the best explanation of morality. One simply takes all current theories of morality and compares them. I will only consider varieties of moral realism. These varieties come in two forms: naturalist and non-naturalist. There are only two versions of non-naturalism: the Platonic theory and divine command theory. Naturally, both of these are implausible. The Platonic theory supposes that the moral facts are in Platonic heaven. This belief means that our knowledge of moral facts is mysterious at best. The motivation behind morality is unexplained and the rationality of morality is also unexplained. Finally, the content of the moral facts is also unexplained. The divine command theory is not any better. It suffers from the Euthyphro dilemma. It also fails to explain why some things are wrong or right even though God has not commanded that they be done or not done. Finally, it fails to explain the connection between God's commanding something and it being right. So non-natural realism is implausible.

Naturalist realism is also implausible. One cannot analytically identify any moral fact with a natural fact. For we could meaningfully ask whether or not the supposed fact "being happy" really was good. So any identity must be a synthetic identity. All of the proposed examples of synthetic identities have severe problems with them. Therefore, naturalist realism is also implausible. Therefore, realism is implausible.

Expressivism is not as implausible as these options. It ties moral motivation to conative states such as desires, commands and commitments. It explains moral reasoning by analogy with the reasoning we employ with such conative states. It also supplies an explanation for the commonalities and the differences in moral approaches by noting that most human beings want the same sorts of things. Since morals are not beliefs, there is no need to explain moral facts. Since morals are identical with our own conative states, our knowledge of them can also be explained. Although there are some problems with expressivism, realism has more problems.

The final reason is simplicity. We want a moral theory to avoid relativism, account for our moral practices and reasoning, and explain the various features of moral discourse. Since expressivism does all of this without moral facts, there is no need for a realism that does have moral facts. Therefore, expressivism is a simpler theory.

Given the point that these assertions can be rather easily defended in the current literature of moral theory, my hypothetical expressivist seems rather real. So unless we have a particular reason to doubt the rationality of a particular expressivist, we should count the expressivist as a rational philosopher. If we wish to defend realism, then we will need to develop a moral theory that is better than the ones currently available. We also need to point out reasons that an expressivist theory cannot account for morality. Until then, expressivism is not only a rational position but also the best explanation for morality in current metaethics.

Four Errors of (Modern) Philosophers

When we read philosophical writings, we aim to learn from what we read. Sometimes these writers point out errors in the work of other philosophers. These errors often tend to be the opposite of the errors that the particular philosopher falls into. As I think about it now, there are four errors that modern philosophers tend to fall into. These errors come in pairs, just like Aristotle's vices.

One of these errors is commonly found in 'scientific' philosophers. These are the philosophers who think of philosophy as a building block, defense or conceptual analysis of science itself. They often try to avoid metaphysics, deeper epistemology, and anything that carries the least scent of religion. Science is understood to be the ultimate human inquiry. The methods of science are the methods of knowledge. Science, as well as any discipline informed by its methods, are capable of discovering all knowledge in the universe given enough time. Nothing is hidden from human beings. We really can know everything! This is the error. No formal method can tell us everything, and some knowledge really is out of the reach of human beings.

The error opposite to this one is well recognized by 'scientific' philosophers themselves. It is commonly presented by mystical, ideological and religious philosophers for various reasons. These philosophers reject human reason(ing) because of various circumstances in the world. Perhaps reason is a human construct, it does not apply in the divine realm, it is irredeemably biased by power, or it does not address human concerns. Whatever the reason may be, human reason is rejected in favor of action. Yet these various philosophers attempt to use reason to support their own ideas! If it had such problems, then their reasoning shows that they should not use reason to justify their position. Their devaluing of reason is their error.

Sometimes, the discussion in academic philosophy can become so focussed and detailed that it is difficult to relate to the central issues of philosophy or the concerns of human beings. Many philosophers engage in minor disputes that eat up all of their time, while spending no time relating such disputes to the wider philosophical picture. This creates a divide between various philosophical areas. Connections between the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of religion are not explored. Neither are connections between other areas of philosophy. There is no systematic picture of philosophical thought. This error is the most common and therefore the one least likely to be recognized.

The opposite of that error is a focus on the central issues of philosophy and the concerns of human beings to the exclusion of those matters of detail necessary to them. The few philosophers who fall into this error recognize the current error in philosophy. The best solution is for the central matters to receive our time, and side issues are simply irrelevant. This position sounds quite silly. Matters of detail are necessary to solve any important matter. What we must avoid is turning a major issue into a minor one, or a minor one into a major one!

I do not mean to suggest that these are the only errors of modern philosophy, or even the most important ones. But I do think that they are common and important. The answer to these errors lies in recognizing them when they appear and seeking a middle ground between two extremes - just like the virtues of Aristotle.