Science and Methodological Naturalism

Part of the debate over ID involves the question of whether science is committed to methodological naturalism. Everyone agrees that science is not committed to atheism or to naturalism. Methodological naturalism is the method of investigating a subject that proceeds as if naturalism were true. There is more than one definition of naturalism, but for now I shall take it to be the conjuction of three ideas:

1) The universe is causally closed
2) The universe is ultimately physical
3) The universe is governed by some combination of laws and chance (this does not exclude those who deny the existence of laws or chance provided that they affirm one of them)

The denial of any one of these three ideas means that one is not a believer in naturalism. Since scientists say that methodological naturalism is not the same as naturalism, I will proceed by assuming that the reasons that commit one to methodological naturalism (MN) are good reasons even to those who do not believe in naturalism. Before I begin looking at the various arguments for MN, it would be helpful to mention the main players and their articles.

One the side of those who affirm MN, we have an article by Michael Martin, and various books such as God, the Devil and Darwin by Niall Shanks, Finding Darwin's God by Kenneth Miller and The Tower of Babel: Evidence against the New Creationism by Robert Pennock. These books do not agree (Shanks thinks that Miller is a creationist), but they do believe in MN and do try to defend it.

On the side of those who deny MN, we have an a three-part article by Plantinga, an article by Dembski, an article by Stephen Meyer and a post by Studi Galeleini. These articles do not all take the same perspective, and they are not all 0f the same quality or length. However, I do think that they include a broad perspective on the various reasons that there are to deny MN.

It would take a while to look at various arguments for and against MN, and I plan to do so in later posts. However, my focus in going to be on the sort of arguments present in the works I have already mentioned.

The Demarcation Problem, God and ID

I have noticed that various debates about intelligent design assume that if ID theory does includes references to God then it cannot be scientific. Sometimes this is simply assumed, and sometimes it is argued for. These opponents usually agree that ID is not truly science. Perhaps it is philosophy, or perhaps it is pseudoscience, but it certainly cannot be science. All of the arguments I have currently heard for this position are not good, although some are better than others.

The common argument that I have heard is that science deals with the natural world, ID involves the supernatural in its theories; therefore, ID is not science. Although this is false (ID does not refer to the supernatural), this argument is indefensible. If we take the "natural world" to be referring to the the world that we can access with our senses, this argument claims that any sort of theory that invokes a supernatural being as an explanation for features of the natural world is not scientific. The problem is that "science" should also be understood in the natural sense, as referring to the systematic understanding of the natural world. In that case, the argument turns out to be a denial of full-fledged theism. The claim that science deals with the natural world is a claim that our systematic understanding of the world must be mediated by the senses. One cannot move from that premise to the conclusion that no supernatural entities may appear in science. One needs an extra premise: that there is no empirical evidence for supernatural entities. Yet that is precisely what is in dispute. So on a common understanding of "science" and "natural world", this argument begs the question against ID. The other understanding of "natural world" takes "dealing with the natural world" to mean that science must use methodological naturalism. Since this is also in dispute, this understanding also begs the question against ID. So this argument is a failure.

Another argument I have heard is that science deals with efficient causes but not final causes. Since ID deals with final causes, it is not a part of science. One should first be aware that this does not mean that God immediately leaves science. For example, if particular efficient causes (miracles) are best explained by God's existence, then science includes God quite directly. Not only this, but final causes can't leave science as easily as one might think. When science asks questions about the function of something (ie. appendix), it is investigating final causes as Aristotle understood them. Science does investigate such things, and quite frequently. Therefore, such a distinction will not be able to demarcate science from non-science.

I have also heard mere assertions that God is not a part of the natural world and therefore cannot be a part of a scientific theory. This does not amount to an argument. It is a theological assertion cloaking itself as part of philosophy. If God truly is the sustainer and creator of this world, then he is a part of the world in a way that nothing and no one else is. Therefore, this argument begs the question against theists.

All of these arguments fail, and I have yet to see one that has a good chance of succeeding. Perhaps this is part of the reason that these arguments are convincing less people as time proceeds. There is no common ground that can be appealed to in order to rule ID out of science. So unless the advocates of the anti-ID position wish to encourage fellow believers, perhaps they should move on to better arguments.

Duhemian and Augustinian Science

There is a distinction that Plantinga created between two types of activities that describe themselves as science. One of them is "Duhemian science" and the other is "Augustinian science". There are a number of positions on the nature of the scientific activity that become clear when this distinction is used.

According to Plantinga, Duhemian science is a type of science that is independent of one's metaphysical and religious commitments. By this Plantinga does not mean to exclude all metaphysical and religious views. He only wishes to exclude those that are not universally shared. Now Plantinga is not sure on whether Duhemian science will use methodological naturalism. He says that "perhaps we should speak of 'methodological neutralism', or maybe 'metaphysical neutralism'". The point is that all of the knowledge gained from this sort of science would be public and rely on universally shared beliefs.

Plantinga also believes in Augustinian science. This is the sort of science that investigates the natural world with some sort of metaphysical or religious commitments. These commitments may be Christian, Buddhist, Islamic or secular humanist, but the point is that they are commitments formed from an area outside of science itself. This kind of science would investigate the questions that presuppose some kind or commitment, or perhaps they would investigate certain questions to find out more information. This kind of science is only available to those of a particular group.

These distinctions make it easier to characterize four different positions on religious or metaphysical commitment in science. One of these positions is that only Duhemian science is actually science. This is the position shared by everyone who denies that ID is science, yet affirms that evolutionary theory is science. They either believe that Duhemian science includes methodological naturalism, or believe that methodological naturalism has been vindicated in some way by scientific activity. A second position is the one shared by ID advocates. They differ amoung themselves as to whether Augustinian science is science, but agree that their position is part of Duhemian science. They also believe that methodological naturalism is not a part of Duhemian science, but that it is methodologically neutral instead. A third position is held by those who advocate biblical creationism. They believe that Duhemian science is restricted to non-historical areas of science that deal with repeatable experiments. This Duhemian science is expects that the universe holds to order and rules, but does not need a commitment to either methodological naturalism or methodological neutralism. Their Augustinian science is based on the Christian faith, and it investigates historical and non-repeatable events in the natural world. The fourth and final position is that of the presuppositionalists within a tiny section of the Reformed camp and the postmodernists. These people believe that there is no Duhemian science. Every science is Augustinian, and attempts to do Duhemian science are merely attempts to do Augustinian science while hiding one's commitments. Each of these views is made clear by the distinction that Plantinga created.

Each of the views differs on the nature of science. They differ on whether methodological naturalism is a part of Duhemian science and even on whether there can be such a science. They also differ on what domain Augustinian science has and on whether it exists or not. What these differences do make clear is that positions within the creation-evolution discussion are tied to particular views of the scientific enterprise. These debates are not about the facts alone, but also about philosophical views of what science is.

Barna Polls, Hick and the "Christian" West

There are some who speak of a moral problem within evangelical Christianity. There are others who speak about the problems with believing that the Christian west is superior to other civilizations. So what do Ron Sider and John Hick have in common? They both rely on a combination of polls and intuition to reach their claims about Christians. Yet one's intuition is not always reliable, and there are no proper polls to measure such things.

It should be obvious that one cannot rely on the intuitions in order to gather percentages. One should rely on revelation, or on a properly done poll. Hick's intuition tells him that 98%-99% of people follow the religion of their parents. A logical look at history tells us that his figures are not correct. He is not the only person do this either. It may seem reasonable to suggest that most people believe in evolution, but this is not the case either. Polls taken show that only 10% of people believe in evolutionary theory completely. On these sorts of issues, there is no good reason to believe that intuition is reliable.

However, Sider and Hick are likely also thinking of various polls that have been taken to measure Christian practice. These polls do not actually do that. The only measure of evangelical Christianity is the Barna poll. An evangelical is defined as "born again; say their faith is very important in their life today; believe they have a personal responsibility to share their religious beliefs about Christ with non-Christians; believe that Satan exists; believe that the eternal salvation is possible only through grace, not works; believe that Jesus Christ lived a sinless life on earth; and describe God as the all-knowing , all-powerful, perfect deity who created the universe and still rules it today". Barna defines the category "born-again" as someone who has made a "commitment to Jesus Christ" that is still important in their life today and believes that when they die they will "go to heaven because I have confessed my sins and have accepted Jesus Christ as my savior". The remainder of Christians come under the label "notional Christian". The label "born-again" is not a current label. Although some who are older do describe themselves as "born-again" it is a useless category. It is possible to be an evangelical and believe that everyone will be saved, Jesus was just a man, Christianity is just like other religions, and the Trinity is false. Such a person is clearly not a Christian at all. Barna has simply applied the evangelical label to the dominant characteristics of those who claim to be evangelical. Not only this, but Barna does not include such things as prayer, Bible reading and accountability to the list of evangelical characteristics. What Barna thinks is an evangelical is not an evangelical at all.

Barna cannot reliably measure Christian or evangelical Christian characteristics and there is no other current polling system that does measure them. Since intuition and polls are the only way that these numbers could be known, they are not known. Therefore, Hick and Sider cannot make comments about the behahior of "evangelical" Christians that have any strong connection to the behavior of those who follow the historical Christianity of the apostles.

ID and Naturalism

A comment on a earlier post caused me to think about the relationship of ID (intelligent design) and naturalism. Many of those who expouse ID say that if it is presented in a science classroom it should not be presented as a philosophical or a theological enterprise. Instead, it should be promoted as a scientific research program. AS long as this is followed, ID is compatible with naturalism.

This sounds shocking because many of the backers behind ID do not believe in naturalism and do not believe that it should constrain science. Nevertheless, as long as ID is a scientific enterprise, it does not conflict with naturalism. As a scientific enterprise, ID is the investigation of intelligently designed things. As a scientific enterprise, ID does not entertain thoughts about the nature or identity of the designer. So there is no scientific reason to suppose that the designer is not embodied. Perhaps the designer is an alien. Perhaps this alien created our universe. ID as a scientific enterprise cannot deny this.

At this point I can imagine an objection: But no ID theorist really believes that! True, but irrelevant. There are people who take the scientific evidence for a beginning of the universe to mean that God created it. Not everyone is convinced by this sort of argument. However, this form of argument is exactly the same as the design argument from evidence inside ID theory. The cosmological (kalam) argument begins with a scientific or metaphysical data of a beginning to the universe and deduces that there must be a first cause. The design argument begins with the evidence of ID and argues that there must be an unembodied designer. The evidence of ID and a beginning to the universe are equally consistent with naturalism in a scientific context. It is only when we move outside that narrow context that these facts may no longer be consistent with naturalism.

So although the scientific project of ID is consistent with anti-naturalism, it is also consistent with naturalism. In fact, there are many metaphysical theories of the universe and causation that it is compatible with. There is a sense in which ID is not consistent with naturalism, but that sense is not a scientific sense. It is the sense of seeking out the best explanation for intelligently designed features of our world.

Sola Scriptura: Understanding Sufficiency

The content of Scripture is sufficient to equip the believer in faith and life. The believer is simply a person who is a Christian. The faith refers both to the practice of the Christian faith in prayer, Bible understanding, good works and other spiritual disciplines, and the beliefs that a Christian is supposed to hold. The life refers to every activity done by the believer, every thought and every vocation. By combining the two terms, one is referring to the totality of a believer's life. This implies that the gospel message is entirely contained in Scripture, Scripture contains all of the necessary teaching for faith and life, Scripture contains all of the information necessary to resolve any conflict in either belief or practice and Scripture can teach its own interpretation.

The gospel message is entirely contained within Scripture because Scripture is sufficient to equip the believer in faith, and the gospel message is necessary for faith. All of orthodoxy has held that Christians need the gospel message in order to be saved. It has also stated that they continue to need this gospel in the Christian life. Furthermore, they also need to make new disciples. New disciples need to be told the gospel, and the believer must understand the gospel in order to tell the disciple. Since all of these requirements are a part of being a faithful believer, the sufficiency of Scripture means that the gospel message in entirely contained within Scripture.

Living in faith requires teaching. This sort of teaching will include all of one's doctrinal commitments, as well as any principles and rules for living a moral life. Since such teaching is required to live a life of faith and the Bible is sufficient to equip one for the life of faith, the Bible contains all of such teaching. It is also necessary to disciple new believers by teaching them. Such is agreed by every orthodox person. Therefore, the Bible contains all such teaching information.

The Bible also contains all of the information necessary to resolve any conflict of belief or practice. Such conflicts occur in life, and since the Bible is sufficient to equip one for life and resolving conflicts is part of the Christian belief, the Bible is capable of equiping one to resolve such conflicts. Resolving conflict is always a good work. Since all good works are a part of the Christian faith, the Bible is sufficient to equip one to resolve conflicts of belief and of practice.

The Bible is also capable of teaching its own interpretation. Since scripture must provide plenty of information, Scripture would not be sufficient unless it also provided a means to obtain that information. If Scripture did not provide that, then we would have to obtain that means somewhere else. In that case, Scripture would not be sufficient, because another source would be necessary to obtain that information. Therefore, Scripture is capable of teaching its own interpretation.

All of these points demonstrate that many of the original implications of the creeds can be derived from sola scriptura. Scripture contains the gospel, all teaching for life and faith, everything necessary to resolve conflicts of faith and belief, and offers its own interpretation. This is not a demonstration that scripture is necessary, nor does it demonstrate that every part of Scripture serves some purpose. What it does demonstrate is that these things follow from accepting sola scriptura within orthodox Christian tradition.

Sola Scriptura: The Need for Clarity

It is quite frequent for the Reformed to make or deny appeals to sola scriptura. These appeals are taken quite seriously, but they are not always believed. In fact, some appeal to sola scriptura in one instance to solve a problem that another person declares cannot be solved by sola scripture. This dilemma cannot be solved by mere appeal to sola scriptura. Rather, the doctrine must be clearly set out so that everyone knows what it means and when it applies.

Now some may claim that the doctrine of sola scriptura is already clear enough in the original creeds. There are no problems there, and certainly no need for further work to clear up the matter. Perhaps those who misuse sola scriptura are simply unwilling to believe the Bible. Perhaps they are simply not familiar with the original creeds. This may be true. Regardless of that, the original creeds still have problems with them. Consider the fact that one creed states that the Hebrew MT textual tradition is inerrant. That sort of claim is one that virtually every modern scholar would disagree with. Conservative scholars who believe in sola scriptura do not believe that it implies that sort of thing about the manuscript traditions. The creeds are also vague about the precise relationship of scripture and tradition. For example, just how are we to treat the creeds? Are we to believe in them unconditionally, or only conditionally? There is at least one creed on each side of this question. There are also questions that the creeds do not answer. These include the relationship of the sciences to the Bible, the place of philosophy in theology and the relationship of theology to the Bible. This should be enough to demonstrate that the creeds do not provide enough clarity to the issues involved.

At this point, someone may suggest that the commentary of the Reformers may offer some help with these sort of questions. Perhaps it does. It does not matter though. If the Reformers did offer such commentary, then it has not achieved the sort of status that would allow it to define sola scriptura. Furthermore, a simple seach cannot find anything on what the Reformers did mean by the term. Finally, the fact that the creeds do dispute the various implications of sola scriptura is a good indication that the Reformers themselves did not agree on the subject. So they will not be able to resolve this.

This leaves only one way to resolve these questions. One must investigate the implications of sola scriptura using the resources of the creeds. These implications cannot be obtained by purely historical means, nor can this project be avoided. These implications are not a new definition of scripture. They merely clear up the meaning of the sola scriptura that is already present in the creeds.

Learning From the Ontological Argument

Philosophers generally agree that no version of the ontological argument is compelling. Although it may contain premises that are true and the argument is recognized to be valid by everyone, no atheist believes all of the premises. So as an argument, it can do very little. What the ontological argument can do is demonstrate the status of God's existence. It also shows that there are interesting implications for existence proofs related to Anselmian theism.

Plantinga has a modal ontological argument that is like this one: It is possible that God exists. It is part of God's nature that he exist necessarily. Therefore, God exists. This argument may sound like cheating, but it is a valid argument. Atheists must deny the first premise, since the second premise follows from the definition of God in Anselmian theism. So either God exists necessarily, or it is impossible for God to exist at all. This is agreed by everyone.

This has interesting consequences for proofs for or against the existence of God. Any time that an atheist is attempting to prove that God does not exist, he must assume that there is something about our world that conflicts with the very nature of God. Now he must point to something that is actual. It will not work to move from what he thinks is possible to a proof against God's existence. The reason for this comes from implications about necessary beings.

If God is a necessarily existent being and his nature is incompatible with the existence of something, then that something cannot exist. So if we find that something, then we know that God does not exist. But we cannot suppose that the something is possible merely because it is conceivable. For if God does exist, then it is not possible. Let's use an example. Suppose that a world in which an evil demon tortures babies forever is an evil that a good God could not allow to exist in any circumstances. Such a world is clearly conceivable, but it is not possible if God exists.

Nor can we suggest that the mere fact that we can conceive of such worlds should count against the existence of God. There are good reasons that the theist can give as to why such worlds are conceivable. She could suggest that the human mind is capable of thinking of contradictions and errors, so why is it not also capable of thinking of non-possible things? Such a response is surely plausible. In any case, the facts about what sort of thing we can conceive are facts about the actual world, and not facts about possible worlds. So even if that was a good argument, it would still be within the range of acceptable arguments.

Hick Again: Yet Another Bad Argument

I found another one of Hick's arguments. This one shows a severe lack of understanding of Christian belief. I don't think that it is quite as bad as the previous two arguments, but it is certainly not very good. His argument is quite short, but seems to appear in more than one place in his work. This argument fails because Hick once again begs the question against the exclusivist.

His argument is as follows: "For me, what is at stake is whether it is realistic today to ignore the global context in which we live, and the fact that other religions, and I am thinking now particularly of Islam, turn human beings away from selfish self-concern to serve God, just as much as Christianity does." Now he may have two different arguments here. One of them might be the argument that our "global context" should cause us to question our exclusivism. The other argument might be the idea that since other religions turn people to God, we should abandon our exclusivism. I will deal with his argument as if it were two arguments, but he may only be advancing the second.

The first argument is nothing more than a fallacy. The fact that we live in a "global" context does not undermine exclusivism any more than being in a "scientific" age undermines miracles. This is nothing more than snobbery disguised as an argument. I could just as easily suggest that living in the age of the church, we know that atheism is false, or that the superiority of Christianity is revealed in our global context. Yet both of those arguments are also snobbery. Perhaps what Hick means to suggest by this is that Christian belief was suprised to encounter our present context. He does not use this argument, but it would be unsound. Christians have been involved in plenty of missionary work, they have viewed Christ as the Saviour of the entire world, and they have crossed ethnic, language and national barriers to do so. Christianity is not surprised to be in our context.

The second argument begs the question. Christian exclusivists do not believe that any Muslim is serving God by following Islam. They also do not think that Islam turns anyone away from selfishness. Neither do they believe that Islam helps anyone serve God, especially not as well as Christianity. Christian exclusivists believe that one can only serve God by following Christ. One can only be turned away from selfishness by the only salvation there is: the life in Christ. One can only be helped to serve God by the Holy Spirit, who works in that special way in Christian believers only. Now exclusivists do not deny that the Holy Spirit works in the non-believer, but such work is not intended to help the person serve God! It is primarily intended for person to believe and follow Christ so that he can be saved.

Since neither of these arguments work, it is quite obvious that Hick's arguments against exclusivism are a failure. Since all of these arguments have a common fallacy, there must be a reason. My suggestion is that these arguments are not intended for an exclusivist audience. They are intended for pluralists. Since many pluralists do not understand exclusivism, they are convinced that it is defeated by these arguments. Hick is not confronted by hordes of exclusivist critics because their attention is focused on inclusivism instead. His arguments make much more sense if they are viewed as deductions from his interpretation of religious beliefs. In that case, they should no longer be presented as reasons for believing in pluralism. Intead, he should present them as a pluralistic way of understanding religion.

Hick and Another Bad Argument for Pluralism

You would think that Hick could at least try to understand the exclusivist position. Instead of doing this, he places two different arguments against it that are quite worthless. Yesterday I pointed out that his first argument was flawed because it contained a false premise, was irrelevant and begged the question. This argument fails to understand the exclusivist position.

Here is Hick's argument: "But the basic criticism of both Christian and Muslim exclusivism is that it denies by implication that God, the sole creator of the world and of all humanity, is loving, gracious and merciful, and that His love and mercy extend to all humankind. If God is the creator of the entire human race, is it credible that God would set up a system by which hundreds of millions of men, women and children, the majority of the human race, are destined through no fault of their own to eternal torment in hell? I say 'through no fault of their own' because it cannot be anyone's fault that they were born where they were instead of within what exclusivism regards as the one limited area of salvation." Now we can take this argument apart and see what Hick is saying.

1) The location of one's birth is not something one is responsible for
2) If exclusivism is true, then damnation depends on one's location of birth
3) Therefore, if exclusivism is true, then damnation depends on something that one is not responsible for
4) If God loves all of humanity, then damnation would not depend on something that one is not responsible for
5) Therefore, if exclusivism is true, then God does not love all of humanity
6) But God really does love all of humanity
7) Therefore, exclusivism is false

As you can see, Hick's argument depends on the assertion that a belief in exclusivism means that salvation will depend on where one is born. It is curious to note that Hick does not defend this absurd idea. Neither does he mention any exclusivist who believes it. He cannot mention any, because no exclusivist believes that. All exclusivists will say that people are damned because they are sinners. The location of their birth does not enter into the equation at all. So why does Hick think that exclusivism means that this sort of belief is true?

If you remember, the previous argument for pluralism argued that approximately 98% of people retain the religion of their youth. Although this is false, it is easy to see how this led to the belief that exclusivism means that you are saved based on location. After all, world-wide travel is a modern invention. However, even if this statistic were true, the exclusivist would not really need to believe that. All they need to believe is that one's location is not the reason for their damnation. Since they already believe that, the exclusivist position does not mean that damnation is a matter of location!

At this point, you may be wondering if I have avoided Hick's real argument. After all, the message of salvation does not reach everyone. There are some who are born and never hear it. The exclusivist believes that if you do not hear it, you cannot be saved. He believes that they are not damned for failing to respond to a message that they did not hear. Those who do not hear are damned because they are sinners. Maybe Hick intends to advance an argument about who recieves salvation. Maybe he does not. That is not the argument he is actually making. If he means to talk about salvation, then he cannot act as if damnation is unjust. If he does, then he is not advancing an argument about salvation.

The Implications of Sola Scriptura

This will be the last of my posts discussing the historic elements of sola scriptura. I am not a historian, so my discussion is merely to inform the uninformed of what the basic issues are. The core of sola scriptura is taken to be both the sufficiency and authority of scripture. However, every creed implies that these are not terms to be understood in any sort of way. They imply something about interpretation, or about original documents, or tradition. Yet the creeds do not agree on what sola scriptura does imply. Neither do they explain why sola scriptura is supposed to imply what it does. Yet there may be a common element to what is believed to be implied by sola scriptura.

The Belgic and Westminster Confessions both state that the scriptures were not believed based on the testimony of others or the church, but on the testimony of the Holy Spirit and the evidence. The Belgic confession also says that the doctrine of the authority of scripture is great enough to break fellowship over, and higher than any tradition, creed or document of the fathers. The Second Helvetic Confession also places scripture above all creeds, councils, traditions and interpretations of the Fathers. This must be properly balanced with the understanding of the Solid Declaration of the Formula of Concord when it states that the creeds, writings and councils of the early church must be accepted because they were formed out of scripture.

Sola scriptura also affected how the Bible was to be properly interpreted and who could understand it. The Westminster confession stated that an ordinary person could through ordinary means understand enough of the Bible in order to be saved. This was not viewed as a statement about the clarity of the entire Bible. Because of these considerations, translation of the scriptures was viewed as an obligation on the church. The Second Helvetic Confession states that scripture was to be interpreted by the use of grammar and their occasion as well as other scriptures and our knowledge of God.

It is also interesting to note that the Belgic confession and the Westminster confession give a list of every book that is actually in the Bible. The Belgic confession even lists the Apocryphal books by name and excludes them from the canon. The Westminster confession points to the original language versions of the Old and New Testaments as being "immediately inspired". In a rather peculiar case, the Helvetica Consensus Formula declared that the vowel points of the Hebrew were inspired by God along with the rest of the MT, and that other manuscript traditions were wrong when they deviated from that.

By examining these creeds, one notices three sets of implications that were found by examining sola scriptura. One of these implications is why scripture is believed. It is not believed on the basis of the church recieving it, or on the fathers, or by another testimony of the church. It is believed because of the testimony of the Holy Spirit, and confirmed by evidence. This implication did not lead to discarding any of these testimonies, but only to placing them under scripture. Another implication was for the interpretation of scripture. Since the reformers rejected the teaching magisterium of the Roman Catholic church, they needed to indicate what replaced it. So the confessions give ordinary people understanding of the basic gospel message from scripture, and says that understanding can be reached through textual analysis and comparison with other scriptures. The final implication dealt with the range of scripture. This included lists of books, which documents were actually inspired and even a statement about the inspiration of manuscript traditions. Although the confessions are not united on the particular implications of sola scriptura in these areas, they do unite in saying that these areas are affected by the doctrine. The particular emphasis that they do state are also consistent with one another. But by further examination will one understand what the doctrine of sola scriptura does imply.

The Problem of Evil: Negating the Argument

In an earlier set of posts I pointed out that one can use the existence of moral truths as a way to negate the problem of evil. This observation can be extended. There are some arguments for theism, and others for Christian theism in particular that negate the problem of evil entirely if they are successful. They are some forms of the ontological arguments and moral arguments for theism, and some arguments for the existence of divine revelation for Christian theism. This has implications for the success of the problem of evil as an argument.

If some forms of the ontological argument are successful, then God exists necessarily. That means that it is not even possible that God not exist. Therefore, the existence of evil is not a problem for the existence of God in any way. The only way it could be a problem is the existence of evil was logically incompatible with God's existence. Yet that argument has been dropped in modern philosophy of religion since the work of Plantinga. If other forms of the ontological argument are successful, then it is known with certainty that God exists. Since the problem of evil does not claim to know with certainty that God does not exist, but only establish some doubt, it is negated by those forms of the ontological argument as well. If the arguments from reason are counted as forms of the ontological argument, then they also negate the problem of evil. If not, then they count as another form of argument that negates the problem of evil. These forms of the argument from reason are the ones that state that some aspect of reason, the human reasoning process, rationality or some other object of the argument entail or rationally compel one to believe in God.

Some forms of the moral argument state that the existence of moral truths or the knowledge of them entail the existence of God. These forms of the moral argument negate the problem of evil. Since evil could be even be recognized or exist apart from the existence of God, it does not constitute a problem for God. These arguments also negate the problem of evil.

Arguments from revelation, whether to some (Bible) or to all (conscience and nature) can also be used to negate the problem of evil if one believes that this revelation entails the truth of Christian theism or the existence of the Christian God. These set of arguments can be particularized for any religion, but must remain specific to a particular religion.

These sets of arguments, if successful, negate the problem of evil. This also works in reverse. If the problem of evil is successful, then none of these arguments work. Why mention this? The problem of evil is often isolated from the rest of theistic and atheistic arguments. This observations shows that it is not really isolated. Because of the relationship with these other arguments, some implications result. If the problem of evil is more plausible than any of these arguments taken together in their own contexts, then the problem of evil is successful. If those previous arguments, taken together in their own contexts, are more plausible than the problem of evil, then the problem of evil is unsuccessful. One cannot declare the problem of evil successful apart from an examination of these other problems.

John Hick and a Worthless Argument for Pluralism

Now it is hardly pointless to critize something that Hick has written decades ago without knowing that he still believes it. However, he has given this argument again, in February of 2005. His argument for pluralism is supposed to create a problem for the belief that one religion is the most true. Instead, his argument contains a false premise and is irrelevant and question-begging.

Hicks argument is this: "In the vast majority of cases throughout the world, probably 98% or so, the religion to which a person adheres (and also against which some rebel) depends on where they were born. Someone born into a Muslim family in a Muslim country, or indeed a Muslim family in a non-Muslim country, is very likely to become a Muslim. Someone born into a Christian family is equally likely to become a Christian. And the same is true of Jews, Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Taoists." He continues his argument as follows: "And the religion which has formed us from childhood naturally seems to us to be obviously true; it fits us and we fit it as usually none other can. It is true that there are individual conversions from one faith to another, but these are statistically insignificant in comparison with the massive transmission of faith from generation to generation within the same tradition."

I bit of thinking will tell you that this argument contains a false premise. Just about two thousand years ago, there were no Christians. In 500 AD there were no Muslims. About two and a half thousand years ago there were no Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs or Taoists. The only religions older than all of these are Judaism and tribal religions. So that means that the vast majority of people today belong to a religion that began at some point in history. So obviously just about every religion had to gain adherents through conversion. This is exactly the opposite of the point that Hick was trying to make, but it is nonetheless true. The fact that Christianity gained many adherents through non-violent conversion was historically viewed as an argument for the truth of Christianity. What he is describing is not even true in the present! Christianity and Islam are both gaining numerous adherents through conversion.

His argument is also irrelevant. There could be many explanations for the fact that many people retain their original religion. Perhaps they have not been exposed to the correct one yet. Perhaps they unwilling to follow the correct one when they hear it. Perhaps some other explanation is given. Without a specific explanation for this followed by an argument for the explanation, this argument is worthless even if it did contain true premises. In fact, without the explanation his argument sounds exactly like an appeal to majority. If the majority did follow their traditional religion, that does not mean anything more about their traditional religion.

His argument is also question-begging. He cannot start his argument by assuming that no one religion is most true. That is what the argument is trying to show. Obviously, if the idea that Christianity is not most true is assumed, then he is begging the question. This is exactly what he does. Christians believe that no one can be saved without hearing the gospel. They also believe that the sin of human beings and the influence of the devil blind people so that they cannot understand this gospel even if they do hear it. It is only an act of God that can unblind people to hear and understand the gospel. So the fact that most now remain in their traditional religion can be explained in two different ways. First, they have not heard the gospel. Any other religion that approached them would not have contained the truth of God and they would not have converted to it. Second, when some hear the gospel, they remain blinded and do not believe it. These considerations function quite well as a explanation for Hick's "data". The only reason he could have to ignore it is if he was assuming it was false. Since that would be question-begging, his argument is question-begging.

Now it should be obvious that Hick's argument is an abysmal failure. This does not say anything about the actual status of pluralism as a belief. What it does say is that pluralism needs a good argument, and this is not one of them. It is also wise to keep in mind that some philosophers miss problems in arguments for their own belief systems. It is also good to remember that numbers and percent signs do not transform unfounded speculation into statistical knowledge.

Sola Scriptura and the Reformed Tradition

I intend to include Lutheran confessions under this heading as well as Reformed ones. These two sets of confessions define what it means to believe in sola scriptura. Within both of these traditions, sola scriptura was defined as a belief in the sufficiency and authority of scripture.

Various reformed confessions state the authority and sufficiency of Scripture. The Belgic confession (1561) states that "We receive all these books [the Bible], and these only, as holy and canonical, for the regulation, foundation, and confirmation of our faith". The Second Helvetic Confession states (1561/1566) states that "in this Holy Scripture, the universal Church of Christ has the most complete exposition of all that pertains to a saving faith". The Heidelberg Catechism (1563) does not explicitly mention sola scriptura. However, every part of the creed is referenced with Scripture, and no other references are present. Furthermore, revelation is connected only with "the Word", which refers to Scripture. The Westminster Confession states that "The whole counsel of God concerning all things necessary for His own glory, man's salvation, faith and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture". All of these confessions agree that Scripture is sufficient for issues of faith and life.

The Lutheran Confessions are no different. The Augsburg Confession (1530) states that they were "showing what manner of doctrine from the Holy Scriptures and the pure Word of God has been up to this time set forth in our lands, dukedoms, dominions, and cities, and taught in our churches". In Article XXI, it places scripture in opposition to the teaching of the Roman Catholic church. Since they are in opposition, scripture ought to be followed. The later development of Lutheran doctrine continued to follow this pattern. In the solid declaration of the formula of concord, it states that "Whereby All Dogmas should be Judged according to God's Word" as one of the headings. So the Lutherans are also in agreement of this.

Although some of these creeds contain some unusual affirmations, they all agree on a couple of points. First, they believe that the scriptures contain all of Christian doctrine, and practice and are sufficient for instructing one in one's life. Second, they believe that the scriptures are also the highest and ultimate authority in those same areas. These two areas of agreement have implications for one's beliefs about scripture, but those two beliefs form the core of sola scriptura. It is important to note that some of these confessions state that they agree with various early creeds, and others point out they are in agreement with the early fathers of the church. So these beliefs about scripture were never viewed as a source of conflict with the teaching of the church at large, but only with the Roman Catholic church in particular.

Ecumenicism: A Wrong Strategy

Ecumenical dialog has usually attempted to work towards church unity. I am not speaking of inter-religious dialog. I am speaking of dialog between Christian churches alone. This work has been motivated by the perceived disunity of the Church. Not only are there hundreds of denominations, but some of them think that others are not even Christian. Then there is the tendency amoung the Reformed to demonize Catholics, while the "church growth" crowd sanctifies them. Meanwhile the Orthodox are left out of the picture, and the Fundamentalists are treated like a disease by all. Attempts at unity have attempted to find a lowest common denominator in both belief and practice. This solution will never work and should not be tried at all.

This solution will not work because it ignores the tradition that each denomination has already formed. The lowest common denominator of Christian denominations does not include sola scriptura, nor does it include any of the other Reformation solas. It would not include Roman Catholic views on the sacraments, nor the Orthodox distinction between Tradition and tradition. There are plenty of other things it would not contain either. So none of the parties could agree to work based on such a thing. They would all think that their distinctive traditions supply the balance that is lacking in such a lowest common denominator.

Not only this, but the very attempt to stand on such a lowest common denominator is also wrong. It requires the participants to identify themselves as part of a tradition while also denying that very same tradition. Such a thing is not only deceptive, but it is also not even ecumenical. Ecumenical dialog can only happen when the various traditions are actually represented. Sham representation get everyone nowhere.

These points do not mean that identification those areas of common agreement is useless. Dialog cannot proceed without common ground. What it does mean is that the dialog proceeds out of various traditions. These various traditions do not stand out of a common ground, but interact through that common ground. The attempt to find a lowest common denominator eventually fails because of nature of tradition. For the same reason it is also immoral to try.

Christian Materialism?

Peter van Inwagen (a well-known philosopher) believes, or at least claims to believe, in both materialism and Christian doctrine. As elements of Christian doctrine, he believes such things as the Trinity, the Incarnation, God as Spirit and the resurrection. As a materialism, he believed that dualism is false and we are all identical with our living bodies. He believes that it is possible for him to consistently hold both of these positions. Unfortunately for him, that is not true.

As a Christian, one must believe that Jesus Christ was fully human and fully God. One must believe that his humanity is exactly the same as ours, except for our sinning. One must also believe that he has always been human since the beginning of the incarnation. Unfortunately, this is inconsistent with materialism. It is at this point that van Inwagen's materialism conflicts with orthodox Christian doctrine. Either he must abandon orthodoxy and no longer call himself a Christian, or he must abandon physicalism.

Now why is this? There was a period of a few days when Jesus was dead. All orthodox Christians believe this. During this period of time, Jesus was still fully human, because it is a commitment of orthodoxy that he remain human since his incarnation. If materialism is true, then Jesus was not human during that time because his body was a corpse. So if materialism is true, then there was a time after the incarnation in which Jesus was fully divine and not human. This is heretical. So a commitment to materialism entails a denial of materialism. Peter van Inwagen cannot have both.

It does get even worse for van Inwagen. Since Jesus' humanity is the same humanity as ours, and he assumed all of our human nature and nothing more than it, we are not material beings either. Since Jesus did exist as a fully human being while he was dead, we will also. So there is no sense in which an orthodox Christian believer can be a consistent materialist. This is not the only difficulty for van Inwagen. Others are mentioned here, here and here. But this difficulty is uniquely different from the identity problem.

Sola Scriptura and Liberal Protestants

Much of what I have said already about sola scriptura would be pleasing to theological liberals. They are glad that tradition, church and Holy Spirit are acceptable to sola scriptura. Some amoung them would also be glad that I am focussing my attention on what Luther and the Reformers believed when they spoke of sola scriptura. They wish to affirm sola scriptura as Luther did, but with different content than those modern Reformed churches. However, such is not possible. Sola scriptura cannot be watered down to mean anything that these liberals would be happy with.

Some liberals believe that sola scriptura merely means that scripture is the primary source of authority, second to none. However, they also wish to affirm that there are secondary authorities such as reason, tradition and the church. Although sola scriptura does entail that scripture is the primary authority, that does not exhaust the meaning of sola scriptura. Sola scriptura means scripture alone and if the Reformers wished to say that scripture is primary, they would have said prima scriptura instead. In fact, the Westminster confession states that "nothing at any time is to be added [to scripture]".

Another liberal belief is the confusion of sola scriptura and inerrancy. Both the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches have always believed in inerrancy. That was not the controversy at the time of the Reformation. Sola Scriptura sought to place scripture above a mere statement of inerrancy, so that Scripture was the judge of the church as well. The Reformer's belief in sola scriptura is such that the belief entailed a belief in the inerrancy of scripture.

Since prima scriptura is not enough, it will certainly not do to claim that the Protestants were opening scripture to the claims of Reason. Although the Protestants were all open to logic and sound argument, they did not trust philosophical claims that were not based, at least indirectly, on the framework of scripture. On this matter, they were not any more open to the claims of Reason than the Roman Catholic church was.

These set of misunderstandings have further increased our knowledge of sola scriptura. Sola Scriptura is not merely a primary authority, but a sole authority. Although it entailed inerrancy, it is not to be confused with it or changed so that it no longer entails it. Finally, sola scriptura does not open scripture to the claims of Reason. Together with my previous post, this gives us some idea of what the Reformers did mean by sola scriptura. But there is no substitute for actually examining their confessions.

The Existential Problem of Evil

I have read various writings (mostly analytic) in the philosophy of religion about the problem of evil. These writings would often distinguish between two forms of this problem. One of them was supposed to be the intellectual problem of evil. This problem could be examined by the use of numbered premises and logical thinking. The other problem was called the pastoral problem. This was to be solved by pastoral and, if necessary, professional counselling. I think that this distinction is both false and misleading.

There are some cases in which one discusses the problem of evil merely as an intellectual exercise. There are also some cases in which the problem of evil is a screen hiding emotional issues. Neither of these cases are in the majority. The problem of evil receives a lot of popular attention precisely because emotional commitment is generated. Some have strong religious commitment. Others have a strong committment to justice in the world. Both of these commitments are quite common and both generate strong feelings. Sometimes both of these are present in the same individual. These commitments seem to clash in the problem of evil. If one were to compare this with the amount of attention that the induction problem recieves, one realizes that there is a vast difference. This vast difference is likely because the induction problem does not arise out of the degree of commitment that the problem of evil does.

So those who treat the problem of evil as a merely intellectual pursuit are either pursuing it as a curiousity or separating the commitments from it in order to touch only the intellectual elements. On the other hand, those who need counseling are those who let their commitments generate emotions that overwhelm their reasoning. The majority of people in the middle are brought to the problem of evil by their commitments, but seek an reasonable solution to their conflict. They are neither unreasonable or emotionless.

The problem of evil is brought to our attention by specific examples. One thinks of the Rwandan genocide, or the attacks on the Twin Towers, or the Nazi extermination of Jews. All of these are particular examples of great evil. Out of these we ask questions that are both general and specific. Some of the general questions are philosophical in nature: "how can God exist with this evil?", or "Is it moral to allow such evil?". The rest of the questions raised are theological. They wish to know the motives and plan of God for those evil acts. They are the questions of the situation. They demand an intellectual response, but they also demand a response from those who share the same commitments. It is up to the theologian to answer the question. That means that neither the philosopher nor the counselor can answer it. And that means that one should not make the distinction between "intellectual" and "counseling" problems.

Creator-Owner: A Concept in our Thought

In an earlier post I had mentioned that traditional theists believe in a Creator-Owner. I also mentioned that this is a point at which atheists probably disagree with quite strongly. My intent is not to prove the thesis of Creator-Owner. All I am intending to do is point out that many people believe it already. Those who believe it already, yet denouce it when it is a part of theistic belief are being inconsistent. Those who do not believe it and denouce it without argument are being narrow-minded. If a significant portion of people believe something, then the thesis is not obviously false. Therefore, it must be refuted through argument if one wishes to show that it is false.

There are many places at which a belief in Creator-Owner shows up. This belief states that mere creation of something is also enough to show ownership of something, and that one may do as one likes with what one owns. A group may not agree with both of these claims, but when they are conjoined, they form the Creator-Owner concept.

I will begin with the right to use property as one desires. This is a point that conservatives and libertarians agree on. It is also one of the defenses used by those who are pro-choice. They believe that a woman owns her body, what is inside her body is owned by her; therefore, she can do as she pleases with it. Anarchists also share this belief, because they believe that the existence of the government is an infringement of individual rights. Since property rights are part of an individual's rights, an individual is permitted to do whatever he pleases with his property. This only covers the right side of the political divide. This belief can also be found amoung the left as well.

Many amoung the left believe that the government it the ultimate owner of everything. They believe that the "right to property" is constructed by the government. Therefore, one ought to obey the government's wishes about one's property, because the government ultimately owns it. There are some environmentalists who believe that Nature owns itself. Therefore, we should let Nature do as it pleases with itself and interfere as little as possible.

Now for the first part of this clause. A lot of those who champion copyright laws against downloading activities will make statements about how the individual owns the work, because he created it. Marx believed that a worker owned the results of his work, because he created it. He writes about factory environments as places in which this natural end of human creation is perverted, because it is not treated as owned. Some of those who critisize slavery also believe this. They write about how slaves own themselves, and own what they create; therefore, it is wrong for that slavers to steal what the slaves have made. So beliefs that assume this sort of clause are quite common.

It may be objected that some of these people do not explicity believe in either thesis. This is quite true. However, these people do implicitly believe this thesis, if I am viewing their arguments charitably. It is also quite true that some of these same people may object when I apply their beliefs to religious beliefs. However, these beliefs are either true all of the time, or none of the time. Having said this, the fact that these beliefs are significantly numerous says nothing about their truth. What it does say it that we ought to take these beliefs seriously and if we disagree then we should formulate an argument against them.

Sola Scriptura: Non-Protestant Understandings

In order to understand what exactly sola scriptura really means, it is helpful to begin with how the critics understand it. Many orthodox and catholic believers attempt to refute this doctrine, but often do not try to understand in a charitable way. The fact that even Protestants are not clear enough on this issue does not help either. A look at various internet sites reveals a few common errors in understanding this doctrine.

First, some suppose that the doctrine of sola scriptura, if true, will bring a unity in the faith on almost anything. Since this has not happened, some suppose that the doctrine is false. However, this is not what sola scriptura was about. Originally, Luther wished only to reform the church and set it back on a path of repentance. So he did hope that sola scriptura would bring unity. But his hopes did not pan out. Although the doctrine of sola scriptura would bring unity, the sinfulness of humanity prevents this from happening. Doctrinal disputes do occur in which both parties claim to adhere to sola scriptura, but only one of them actually does so. There are other disputes in which the participants have pure motives, but have a different amount of understanding of the various parts of the biblical tradition. Finally, some disputes result from differing philosophical viewpoints that are sometimes unrecognized. All of this means that sola scriptura is not a guarantee of unity.

Second, others suppose that the doctrine of sola scriptura means that Scripture "contains all of the material one needs for theology" and that "one does not need apostolic tradition or the Church’s magisterium...to help one understand it". These understandings are close, but not exactly accurate. Luther consulted the early church fathers, the understandings of philosophy, and his peers when understanding scripture. Many in the Reformed branch of the church study history and linguistics in an effort to understand scripture. So they do not believe that scripture contains the only material one needs for theology. Neither do they believe that apostolic tradition is unnecessary. The correct point is to note that all of the Reformers rejected the magisterium of the Roman Church as it is now understood and as it was understood at that time.

Finally, it is sometimes objected that sola scriptura means that scripture must be understood as a divine revelation apart from the church or the Holy Spirit. Sometimes this is taken to mean that understanding of that scripture must be apart from the church and the Holy Spirit. However, neither of these things are what is meant by sola scriptura. Luther and many of the Reformers taught on the inseparability of the Word and the Spirit. They believed that the Word did not function apart from the Spirit, nor the Spirit apart from the Word. They also believed that Scripture was given to the Church, to be preached by the Church and understood by it. So their belief in sola scriptura was quite compatible with placing Scripture with the Holy Spirit and with the Church.

Answering these misunderstandings of sola scriptura gives us a better understanding of what it is. Sola scriptura is a belief that places a source of unity, but not a guarantee of it. It places a source of doctrine, but is placed within human knowledge and understood by human knowledge. It places Scripture as revelation, but not apart from the church or the Holy Spirit. Since these objections arise from Catholic and Orthodox sources, they deal with some common issues related to tradition, human knowledge and the church. Other misunderstandings result from the liberal wing of the church and deal with completely different issues.

The Problem of Evil: An Internal Inconsistency?

I have written two posts already about the problem of evil. In the first post I pointed out that the problem of evil cannot be posed without assuming that there are moral truths. Without a defense of some kind for the existence of moral truths in atheism, the theist can avoid the problem by casting doubt on the existence of such a defense. In the second post I refuted the strategy refers to one's ordinary concepts without defending anything in the metaphysical realm. Now I am going to deal with the last avoidance strategy. This is the strategy of claiming that the problem of evil is an internal problem for the theist. This strategy is difficult.

There are several reasons why this particular strategy is difficult. In order for an atheist to show that a problem of evil arises from theism several things have to be shown. First off, the atheist must show that there are evil acts of the kind that he wishes to use, according to what the theist believes is evil. Then he must show that if God was good, according to the understanding of theism, then he would not permit that if he could. Finally, he must show that God, according to the understanding of theism, is powerful enough to prevent that sort of evil. Once the atheist has done that, he would have created a problem of internal consistency for the theist.

The problem is that he cannot begin this project inside a generic form of theism. According to some forms of theism, capital punishment is good. According to pacificist strains, however, it is evil. According to some forms of theism, being the creator of something means that you also own it and can do whatever you please with it. According to other forms of theism, such as process theism, God only influences the world. So any atheist must restrict his critique to a particular subset of theism.

Let's suppose that the atheist states that he is restricting himself to traditional forms of theism. He points out that they all believe that God is all-knowing, all-powerful and perfectly good. He also points out that they have a common agreement on what is right and wrong. So far he would be correct. However, they also have a common belief in creator-ownership. This belief states that if someone makes something then they own it. So if we make a treehouse, then it is ours and we are morally permitted to anything at all to it. These traditional theistic beliefs also believe that God was the creator of everything. Therefore, he is morally permitted to do anything he pleases with it. Whether you like it or not, these beliefs make it very difficult to show that there is any sort of inconsistency in theistic belief.

It will not work to say that these beliefs are horrible, or that they are out of step with our common concepts of right and wrong. If the atheist wishes to make an internal critique, then she must deal with everything in theism. She cannot avoid the parts of theism that make her argument difficult simply because she is offended by them or thinks that they are wrong. She has to remember that it is an entirely separate argument to claim that traditional theism is immoral. At this point, any internal argument for the problem of evil for traditional theism will have to take account of the belief in a Creator-Owner.

The Problem of Evil: Our Ordinary Concepts

I had posted earlier on the problem of evil and its relationship to the existence of moral truths. I mentioned that one of the ways for the atheist to avoid that objection to the problem of evil was to state that they are simply referring to the ordinary moral truths that people believe exist. They are attempting to offer an explanation for why those truths exist, but only point out the problem that those truths create for the theist. However, this evasion only appears to succeed. Once we take a deeper look at what the atheist is trying to do we find out that this objection fails.

The atheist is asking us to assume that the moral beliefs that we all have must be true, regardless of what is true metaphysically. Yet that is absurd. There are some philosophers who are hard determinists. They believe that no one is free or responsible for their actions. Yet they all acknowledge that we often believe that we are free and responsible. In fact, we may be unable to avoid reactive attitudes when confronted with very evil acts. None of this influences their beliefs on the truth of hard determinism though. If hard determinism is true, then most of us function irrationally by displaying reactive attitudes, blaming or praising someone. But the question of whether someone is actually responsible or not cannot be avoided merely because we would be irrational if no one ever was. It is the same with moral truths. If no moral truth exists, then we are all irrational whenever we believe something about right or wrong. But the fact that we might be irrational does not give us the right to suppose that moral truths exist regardless of which metaphysical theory is correct. On some metaphysical theories, moral truths do not exist.

What this means is that the problem of evil must be posed from within a particular framework of thought. Attempting to pose the problem within our ordinary and common concepts only obscures the fact that our ordinary and common concepts do not supply an explicit metaphysical framework for the existence of moral truths. So the theist could ask for the basis of those moral truths, and judge the problem defective if support for them is not given. If support for moral standards appeals directly or indirectly to God, then one is working within theism. If that is not the case, then one is working within atheism. So in either case, an appeal to our common concepts does not support the problem of evil.

What is Sola Scriptura?

I was having a conversation recently with one of my friends that pointed out the lack of definition that the term sola scriptura has. There is certainly more than one definition available. One definition of sola scriptura states that it "is the belief that the Bible alone is the only authority on matters of doctrine and faith". The Westminster Confession states that "The whole counsel of God concerning all things necessary for His own glory, man's salvation, faith and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture: unto which nothing at any time is to be added, whether by new revelations of the Spirit, or traditions of men." Yet another definition states that sola scriptura means that scripture is the primary authority for faith and life.

These are only the definitions of that doctrine from Protestant sources. Once we move out of those sources, we move straight into confusion. For example, this blogger believes that sola scriptura means that one must ignore historical context. Another blogger believes that the principle of sola scriptura is about turning the Bible into a paper version of the pope.

So what does sola scriptura really mean? To understand what it means it is helpful to understand the original context of the phrase. The phrase "sola scriptura" was an important part of the Reformation. It was used because of the place that tradition had in the Roman Catholic Church. Luther wished to emphasize that the teaching of justification by faith could be found in the Bible. He also wished to gather support for his beliefs from the early church fathers. So it is important to note that his ideas were not ahistorical. Because of his beliefs on justification, he was led into controversy over the doctrine of scripture. The Roman Catholics (RC) insisted that scripture be interpreted by the Fathers through the Church. They also insisted that they were the sole true church in the world.

The problem with the RC statement was that the Protestants did not think that the RC was part of the true church at all. So they needed some way of defining who was in the church and who was out of it. At first, this was done by the principle of sola scriptura. Those who obey scripture were in the church and those who do not are out. Since the authority of the church was based on its obedience to scripture, it could be identified by the outside. Luther and other Reformers were able to draw support for this from the early church fathers.

Later on, some within the Radical Reformation took this idea much farther than Luther had ever intended. They took sola scriptura to mean that scripture could be understood apart from tradition, apart from history and completely understood by the common reader of it. Yet none of this is what Luther actually said. None of it is within the real doctrine of sola scriptura. But sola scriptura was never defined beyond what is now found within the Westminster confession.

Sola Scriptura and Roman Catholic Tradition

There has been much dialog recently with the Roman Catholic Church and various Protestant groups - notably the Lutheran Church. This dialog has focussed on justification and santification in particular. Now while this certainly seems encouraging, one must realize that sola scriptura was the material principle of the Reformation. Reconciliation with the Roman Catholic Church cannot occur without actually discussing it. While the Roman Catholic Church retains its two-source view on scripture and tradition, this reconciliation is impossible.

The Roman view on tradition and Scripture is that each of these possess equal authority and separate information. Tradition is supposed to guide the interpretation of scripture, and the interpretation of scripture is supposed to inform and extend tradition. Since they are two separate sources with different information, neither one is primary. Both are used by the Church to advance its mission in the world. This view is known as the two-source view of tradition because tradition contains different information from that found in Scripture, and that different information is not derived from scripture.

Sola Scriptura means, at minimum, that primary importance is to be given to Scripture. Certainly nothing is of equal authority to it. Therefore, it quite obviously follows that the two-source view of tradition is incompatible with sola scriptura. Neither can one have a minor modification to bring it into line with the other. So it quite obviously follows that at least one of the doctrines must be false.

Now dialog with the Roman Catholic Church could continue ignoring this if it was not a matter of first importance. However, the historical evangelical position (of which all Protestants historically have agreed with) states that sola scriptural is of central importance to the faith. So there is no way to continue ignoring this issue and actually progress in any form of reconciliation. The Catholic Church needs to begin discussing the reasons for its belief and the Lutheran Church needs to present the reasons for sola scriptura. If the Lutheran Church, or any group claiming to represent Protestants, fails to do so then it no longer represents Protestants. So let's see some discussion on this issue.

The Problem of Evil and the Existence of Evil

Often the problem of evil is presented by the atheist without a definition of what evil is. Perhaps he simply means to appeal to the ordinary concept that most people have when they speak of "evil". However, since the problem of evil cannot be stated without some appeal to a concept of evil, the nature of the concept being referred to will affect the very problem itself.

Let's suppose that the atheist refers to the common concept of good and evil. Good and evil are left undefined, but with specific examples. One might use torturing babies is evil and compassion is good as defining examples. One would then proceed with the problem of evil using those examples. The theist, however, can simply undercut that entire strategy. They can and should agree that those are accurate examples. They can simply state that the moral value of those acts would not exist unless God did. Therefore, the problem of evil cannot be an intellectual objection to theism.

The theist would begin by stating the difference between moral knowledge and the existence of moral facts. He agrees that most atheists are moral and know what that requires. However, he is simply arguing for the claim that for all X's such that X is a moral fact, moral fact X does not exist if God does not exist. So it will not be an objection to this to claim that atheists are moral, or that they believe in the existence of moral facts. One needs to actually offer support for one of two claims: either that moral facts can exist without God, or that moral facts do not need to exist in order for obligations of a moral sort to exist.

Now the problem of evil cannot be defended without also defending moral obligation without God. For if there is no moral obligation, and no right or wrong, then there is no evil or good. In that case, the problem of evil cannot even be stated. Likewise, the theist can attempt to prove that morals cannot exist without God. If successful, he will have removed all doubt that the problem of evil creates for theism. So the theist has two different avenues here. He can either undercut the problem of evil by pointing out the lack of defense for the the existence of morality by the atheist, or he can undercut the argument by proving that the atheist does not have the resources of morality at all. In either case, the existence of morality is required to even begin the problem of evil.

Now the atheist can respond in more than one way to this problem. They could assert that they are pointing out an internal problem in theistic belief. In that case, theists obviously cannot use the question of whether moral facts exist to decide the problem. But they also gain the resources of everything within theistic belief. The atheist could decide to respond by stating that they are simply citing common belief again. Just as they pointed out that it is common to believe that torturing babies is evil and compassion is good, it is also common to believe that morality exists. In that case, they are denied the resources of atheism. Both of these routes run into problems of their own. Of course the atheist could attempt to actually deal with the argument from morality, but I am speaking of ways to avoid the argument.

ID and Creationism

I have heard many comments in some blogs I read about the relationship and nature of Intelligent Design (ID) and creationism. Unfortunately, most of them are very wrong. They confuse the goals of the two movements, they misunderstand the nature of both systems, and get their facts wrong. So here is some of the basic information on the subject.

Creationism is usually where everyone ends up, so I will begin with it. Creationism is a term with at least two distinct meanings. One meaning refers to those who believe that the earth was created in six days, humans were created specially by God, and historical science must be understood in the framework of the book of Genesis. We could call these people Biblical Creationists. Another broader meaning refers to those who are Christians and believe that God intervened in the world. Most of the people who take this label believe in an old earth, and believe that there was no common descent. So this group of people is called Old Earth Creationists in some quarters, or creationists in others.

It should be obvious that one cannot be a creationist without being a monotheist. Both varieties of creationism appear in all three monotheistic religions. Being concise, I am going to focus on Christian versions of these claims. So there are two major versions of creationism within the Christian community. Biblical creationism is defined and represented by three major organizations. These are the Institute for Creation Research (ICR), the Creation Research Society (CRS) and Answers in Genesis (AiG). CRS publishes a journal called Creation Research Society Quarterly, while Answers in Genesis publishes two journals. Creation is intended for popular consumption, while TJ publishes their specialized information. Old Earth Creationism is represented by the organization Reasons to Believe, run by Hugh Ross as well as some other individuals also within the ID community.

ID is both a general banner and an approach to the creation-evolution debate. As a general banner, it includes all of the creationists and some who are not creationists. This unifying banner are these ideas:

1) We can empirically detect some instances of design in the world, if they did occur
and
2) We have detected some instances of design in the world of biology or astronomy

However, ID is not just a unifying banner. It is also an approach. As an approach, their method is to assert that we should start by leaving all religious documents out of the conflict. We should work from the empirical evidence alone, and what we can discover from that evidence. There is also the unstated assumption, shared with secular scientists, that this method will give accurate and fully informed conclusions. It is represented by the Discovery Institute, the Access Research Network and some individuals such as Michael Behe, Philip Johnson, and Dembski.

So now a bit of advice is in order. Before you start jumping to conclusions with the latest press release, and accusing "the intelligent design creationists" of something as one blogger unwisely did, CHECK YOUR FACTS. No creationist or intelligent design organization is pushing for the teaching of creationism or intelligent design as mandatory alongside evolution. If you disagree, then pull up a statement supporting your position from the major people in that stream of thought. But remember that Answers in Genesis states that creationism should NOT be mandanted, and the Discovery Institute says the same thing about ID. And before you comment again about ID, read this.