The Problem of Evil: Negating the Argument

In an earlier set of posts I pointed out that one can use the existence of moral truths as a way to negate the problem of evil. This observation can be extended. There are some arguments for theism, and others for Christian theism in particular that negate the problem of evil entirely if they are successful. They are some forms of the ontological arguments and moral arguments for theism, and some arguments for the existence of divine revelation for Christian theism. This has implications for the success of the problem of evil as an argument.

If some forms of the ontological argument are successful, then God exists necessarily. That means that it is not even possible that God not exist. Therefore, the existence of evil is not a problem for the existence of God in any way. The only way it could be a problem is the existence of evil was logically incompatible with God's existence. Yet that argument has been dropped in modern philosophy of religion since the work of Plantinga. If other forms of the ontological argument are successful, then it is known with certainty that God exists. Since the problem of evil does not claim to know with certainty that God does not exist, but only establish some doubt, it is negated by those forms of the ontological argument as well. If the arguments from reason are counted as forms of the ontological argument, then they also negate the problem of evil. If not, then they count as another form of argument that negates the problem of evil. These forms of the argument from reason are the ones that state that some aspect of reason, the human reasoning process, rationality or some other object of the argument entail or rationally compel one to believe in God.

Some forms of the moral argument state that the existence of moral truths or the knowledge of them entail the existence of God. These forms of the moral argument negate the problem of evil. Since evil could be even be recognized or exist apart from the existence of God, it does not constitute a problem for God. These arguments also negate the problem of evil.

Arguments from revelation, whether to some (Bible) or to all (conscience and nature) can also be used to negate the problem of evil if one believes that this revelation entails the truth of Christian theism or the existence of the Christian God. These set of arguments can be particularized for any religion, but must remain specific to a particular religion.

These sets of arguments, if successful, negate the problem of evil. This also works in reverse. If the problem of evil is successful, then none of these arguments work. Why mention this? The problem of evil is often isolated from the rest of theistic and atheistic arguments. This observations shows that it is not really isolated. Because of the relationship with these other arguments, some implications result. If the problem of evil is more plausible than any of these arguments taken together in their own contexts, then the problem of evil is successful. If those previous arguments, taken together in their own contexts, are more plausible than the problem of evil, then the problem of evil is unsuccessful. One cannot declare the problem of evil successful apart from an examination of these other problems.