Geisler and Aquinas on Divine Timelessness

I have begun reading through the second volume of Geisler's systematic theology. As I read into this work, I have noticed just how much Geisler depends on Aquinas' work. He endorses almost all of Aquinas' positions and uses many of the same arguments. One of these positions is the idea that God is outside of time. I used to hold that position, but do not believe it anymore. So I was curious as to how he would support his position. I found that one of his main arguments is God cannot have any kind of passive potencies, beings in time have passive potencies; therefore, God is not in time. This argument fails because it assumes that if God is in time, he is in time in the same sense that we are.

I agree that God does not possess any kind of passive potency. He cannot undergo changes in his substance. The argument that Geisler offers is also valid, yet I disagree with the conclusion. So it should be obvious that I disagree with the second premise. In fact, I hold that the second premise applies to everything but God. Every being except God has passive potencies because it is not pure actuality. Every being except God is also inside time. But Geisler needs to show that being in time entails that a being undergo substantial change. Geisler makes several theological arguments to show that beings in time undergo substantial change.

In his first argument Geisler claims that time itself is the measure of change. If nothing at all changed, then there would be no time at all. This means two different things. Since God cannot undergo substantial change, time did not exist apart from creation. Therefore, time arises from the work of creation. This also means that anything that is created exists in time because it undergoes a change in substance. However, God does not undergo any change in substance. So any change that God could undergo as a part of being in time will be the substantial changes that creation experiences in relation to him. That sort of change does not require passive potency. So this does not show that God is outside of time. One could take the argument that time is the measure of change to meant that time only occurs to those who undergo substantial change. If one did so, then the argument could not support the idea that God is outside of time. It would be a clear example of question-begging.

In his second argument Geisler claims that time limits beings. Since God has no limits, he must not be inside time. This argument assumes that the past and future exist in some sense, and then deduce that God would be limited if he only occupied the present. However, no argument is given for supposing that either the future or the past exist. Those who believe that God is temporal do not believe in the existence of the past or the future. Therefore, an argument is necessary. So this argument fails as well.

In his third argument Geisler states that God is pure act and since temporal beings have potentiality, God is not temporal. He believes that God is disanalogous to time, having no past or future like it does. However, he has not shown that temporal beings have potentiality. Neither has he demonstrated that time has a past or a future. Therefore, this argument also fails.

In his fourth argument Geisler states that since God is necessary he has no potential not to exist. What has no potential in its being cannot change. Since time involves change, God is timeless. This argument equivocates on the word "change". In the final premise, it includes both substantial and non-substantial change. In the second last premise, it includes substantial change. Therefore, this argument also fails.

Since none of these arguments succeed, Geisler must rely on his Biblical evidence and historical consensus to establish the idea that God is timeless. Although I believe in all of the doctrines that he is attempting to use to convince me, I hold that these doctrines are about God's substance. Therefore, they cannot prove that God is outside of time. All they do is establish that God cannot be in time in the same sense that we are - a conclusion that Geisler should appreciate.

Methodological Naturalism and Science Stoppers

Part of the reason for believing in methodological naturalism (MN) is that appealing directly to God as the source of an action is a science stopper. Science cannot investigate how God did it, not can it investigate the nature of God. Both Plantinga and Michael Martin agree on these points. The question is whether these points are a solid justification for MN or not. These points are not a justification for MN because they are inconclusive.

Plantinga notes that even if denying MN is a science stopper, it does not mean that God did not act directly in that circumstance. If one follows the practice of MN, one will come to conclusions that one knows from other information to be false. So our practice of science will not be truth-seeking, but will only seek after certain kinds of explanations, even if we know that they are false. Martin does not explicitly disagree with this argument. What he does believe about it is unclear.

Plantinga also argues that empirical investigation may be able to establish cases in which God has acted directly. The scientist would simply rule out indirect explanations, leaving only direct ones. Martin does not believe that we can ever rule out indirect explanations. Therefore, there would be no empirical evidence for the direct action of God. The problem comes with exactly how Martin knows that indirect explanations cannot be ruled out. He claims this based entirely on a priori reasons such as the progress of science and theory revision. Such reasons only establish MN if metaphysical naturalism is true. He does not offer any mathematical or logical proof for such a conclusion. Apart from such a proof, one would need a posteriori reasons for believing that God's direct action cannot be established through science.

Martin does offer just this sort of a posteriori reason later on as a confirmation of his position. He says that the progress of science has replaced supernatural explanations with natural ones. Although this is true, it will not serve as an adequate reason. He would need to show that any direct action of God is similiar to those supernatural explanations that were later replaced. Merely pointing out that God's action is supernatural will not do that. Perhaps God's action on the world leaves a signal of intelligent design. Perhaps those supernatural explanations did not leave such a signal. Then they would not be similiar. Therefore, this does not confirm or support his position.

All of these points mean that MN cannot be justified on the basis of science stoppers without further argument. Michael Martin simply does not show that God's direct action is relevantly similiar to replaced supernatural explanations. Neither does he give a logical a priori argument for why God's direct actions cannot be detected through science. Apart from those sort of arguments, Plantinga's case against MN succeeds.

Geisler on General Revelation

I have been reading Geisler's systematic theology recently. Compared to much modern theology, his work is extremely good. It is exactly what a systematic theology should look like. I am saying this so that you know that I do not disagree with everything that Geisler says. In fact, I agree with almost everything he says that I have read so far. However, his account of the relationship between the Bible and general revelation is flawed. There are three different problems with it. First of all, he gives no argument for the claim that science is the interpretation of general revelation. Second, he ignores the fact that general revelation requires an extra layer of interpretation in comparison with the Bible. Third, he does not consider the idea that sin may have distorted general revelation in a way that the Bible cannot be distorted.

The first point is quite important. There are two different positions on the content of general revelation. One of these positions is that general revelation is only about God and morality. Therefore, such scientific details as the composition of rocks, or the workings of animals are not a part of general revelation. Those details are general revelation only in the sense that they reveal a divine designer. The other position simply states that one is discovering God's truth through science. Such science (when correct) will disclose part of God's general revelation that was not understood before. In one position, general revelation has little content and scientific discoveries simply reinforce the same material. In the other position, science helps us discover new information about God's general revelation. Geisler's argument simply does not address this alternative view.

The second point is even more important than the first point. Let's suppose that science really is an interpretation of general revelation. Geisler later states that neither science nor one's interpretation of the Bible should be given precedence in a conflict between the two. Instead, one should pick the side that is more certain. This will only work if one of these does not suffer from some sort of epistemological disadvantage. Yet that scenario is exactly what he does not discuss. It is obvious that the Bible is verbal. Interpretation of the Bible proceeds by examining the text. In the case of nature, there is no text. One has to first set out some observations about the world, and then interpret those observations through a theory. This setting out of fact is not neutral, but is influenced by theory. Therefore, science has a layer of interpretation that Biblical interpretation does not have. An extra layer of interpretation means that science is epistemologically disadvantaged in any conflict with the Bible.

The third point is the most important one of all. The Bible is inerrant in the autographs. General revelation is also "inerrant" when the world was first created. These cases are not similiar. For we have a great confidence that our manuscripts are very close to the originals. We obtain this confidence through the scientia of textual criticism. Without the Biblical information, we do not know what part of general revelation has been altered by sin. I do not mean to claim that the moral code is unclear or a designer is not obvious. What I mean to claim is that we have diseases, death and evil designs. Such evil designs include poison, attack and defense structures and other classic examples of natural evil. Without the Bible, one can easily conclude that God is a designing, all-powerful and extremely evil intelligence.

I could add another example to interpretive problems in science vs Biblical interpretations, but for now this should be enough. Apart from a sustained argument against these sort of positions, one of Geisler's positions present in one of his preconditions has not been established. Any time that he discusses issues about the relationship of science and the Bible, one may not need to follow his conclusions. (This could affect his later arguments about scientific evidence for the age of the earth, for example.)