The Incarnation and Naming

I read an article on the incarnation quite a while ago. It was written by a Christian philosopher and attempted to show some philosophical problems with the incarnation. These problems are serious enough that their solution should be a top priority to any Christian philosopher. If no solution can be found, then the doctrine of the incarnation is unintelligible. This would mean that the Christian faith itself is false. All of this is to point out the seriousness of the article I am discussing. That said, I believe that I know what the flaw in the argument is. Before I can move to that, I need to explain how naming is connected to the doctrine of the Incarnation.

The doctrine of the Incarnation is the doctrine that the second person of the Trinity - God the Son assumed human form in its entirety without losing any part of his divine nature. Another way of putting this doctrine is to say that the historical human being named Jesus is the same person as God the Son. Now it is quite clear what we are referring to when we say "God the Son". Our trinitarian doctrine comes before the doctrine of the incarnation. It is the reference of the name "Jesus" that is the problem.

This problem of what is referenced by the name Jesus is the same problem as what it referenced by any personal name - "Bob", "Bill Smith", and so on. What precisely does this name refer to? One could suggest that it refers to the body alone. So when we say "Bill" we are really talking about the physical body in front of us. This option is favored by some physicalists. But it is not an option open to us. Another option is to suggest that "Bill" refers to both the body and the soul together. This option also fails. These two options fail for the same reason. After death, but before resurrection, there would be no "Bill". So the same would be true for Jesus. Yet the orthodox understanding of the incarnation requires that Jesus do things (such as descend into hell, or vanquish Satan) in this very time period. So this cannot work. Nor can the name "Jesus" refer to his soul alone. This would create modal problems when applied to the doctrine of the incarnation and improperly divides the soul from the body when they are together. Of course, "Jesus" cannot refer to his divine nature either! Obviously the people of Jesus' time - and those afterword - did not think that explaining who Jesus was would show that he was divine.

Summarizing then, "Jesus" does not refer to a part of human nature or a human nature as a whole. Neither does it refer in whole or in part to divine nature. The name "Jesus" refers to the person of Jesus. "Jesus" refers to Jesus himself. The same is also true for all other personal names. The name refers to the person but not the nature.

I am not doing to deal with objections, nor am I going to show why this can be true without begging the question, or why other referents for "Jesus" fail in detail. That I can do later. All I wish to do is show the main oprions and the one that I have chosen. The why of this I will also share later.

Incest is morally permissible...

...if homosexual activity is. This argument does not work in reverse, nor do I endorse either activity. My argument is very simple: If some homosexual activity is morally permissible, then the some forms of incest are permissible. Any argument that establishs homosexuality activity as legitimate will also establish incest as legitimate. Any argument that denies legitimacy to incest will also deny it homosexual activity.

I have heard it said that the government ought to stay out of the way of what happens between two consenting adults. If applied to homosexual activity, this means that the government should not punish it. If applied to incest, this argument means the same. So if two adults who happen to be siblings are in a consenting sexual relationship, the law could not forbid this without interfering in the behaviour of consenting adults. So either this is a bad argument for homosexual activity or it is a good one for incestuous activity.

I have also heard it said that the government ought to allow people as much freedom as possible to pursue their individual ideas of the good life. A part of a homosexual's idea of the good life is homosexual activity. A part of some other people's idea of a good life is incest. If it is possible to allow a homosexual to pursue their idea of a good life, then there is no good reason to forbid someone who practices incest from pursuing their idea of the good life.

At this point two objections come to mind. One is the biological argument, and the other one is emotional 'argument'. The biological argument points out that the children of close relatives have genetic problems. This suggests that that one should not have children with a close relative. But unless having children is connected with a moral sexuality, then it does not show that incestuous sex is wrong. If homosexual behaviour is permisslble, then there is no such link. Therefore, this argument shows nothing. The emotional argument is in even worse shape. I find both behaviours very disgusting, but that is not a real argument. Besides, if it was, then it could also be used against homosexual activity.

All of this is a bit quick, but I strongly doubt that anyone could find a good argument against this. Any such argument would need to both permit homosexual activity and deny incestuous activity without being ad hoc. Of course, I doubt that any homosexual activist openly supports incest! But the logic of their own arguments requires that they do.