Looking at Morality: Discovering the Boundaries

I suggested that the best way to discover the exact domain of moral statements is to distinguish them from law, etiquette, art, skills and other disciplines. So now the question is which disciplines to compare morality with? The best strategy is probably to look at each of the allegedly common characteristics of morality and ask which other areas of discourse also have these common characteristics. Working from these areas of discourse,

One of the first areas I noticed was the prescriptive. Morality gives us commands. So do the areas of law and etiquette. As far as I can think of, no other domain of discourse gives us commands. A second area I noticed was that of action-guiding. Morality guides our behavior. Law and etiquette also guide our behavior. A third area is that of rationality and descriptiveness. These are very large areas to look at, as they contain science, some law and etiquette, ordinary beliefs and practices, etc. So by looking at the general characteristics of these domains of discourse one finds that three areas share them: morality, law and etiquette.

The next thing to do is to ask what these domains all have in common apart from what has already been mentioned. One of the things one notices is certain kinds of language such as "should", "ought", "good", "bad" and other evaluative and normative terms. Another thing that one notices is that failure to abide by the rules has consequences ranging from bodily harm to societal disapproval. One also notices that breaking the rules is usually comes with some negative feelings such as guilt or regret, and one is apt to try and hide one's behavior or justify it to others. As far as I know, these are the common areas between these three areas of discourse.

Not all of our behavior is found to fall under an area of discourse. Looking generally, do any other practices show these features? I think that the answer is yes. Normative language is used in skills (such as construction, art and technological innovation). It is also used in discourses and arguments (ie. that is a bad argument, you ought to use this inference rather than that one, etc). These areas also have consequences ranging from bodily harm to societal disapproval from breaking their norms. Consider what happens when you build a bad bridge (but assume that you are not morally at fault), or what happens when you advance a bad argument. These situations can even cause the same kind of emotions and reactions as moral or legal situations can.

These four areas: three domains of discourse and two general areas are the only ones in which these general features occur. Rational oughts such as an ought to believe or practical one can both be treated as as discourse oughts. Self-interest can be treated as an issue of practical rationality either actually or hypothetically. I am not aware of any other examples.

A Look at Morality

I have spent some time thinking about morality. I am just about finished a class on metaethics (the study of what morality is), and I am familiar with other areas of ethics as well. One problem that has jumped out at me is that everyone assumes that what they mean when they talk about morality is the same as what everyone else means. Since that is rarely true, some disagreements are hidden by verbal agreement. However, these thinker do tend to agree that certain statements are definitely moral ones. (Such as "lying is wrong", "we ought to keep our promises" and so on.) So how do we decide what morality is about?

First I think that it would be good to point out common features of moral thinking that are commonly agreed to be there. First, moral thinking tends to be prescriptive. Moral commands are not descriptions. They are imperatives. Morality tends to guide our actions. This action-guiding of morality is not just in exceptional circumstances but often. Morality is usually considered to override our wants and preferences. We are not allowed to steal simply because it would be fun or because we would like to have the new toys without buying them. Finally, morality is both rational and descriptive. We disagree about moral claims, reason about moral claims and these claims include descriptions - that is right or he is bad.

Once we have these basic features, we can look at the problem. Nearly every point above has been disputed by some philosopher. The majority (near majority?) of current work in metaethics assumes that there are no true moral descriptions. Also, some disagree over whether other non-moral areas have some of these properties. Examples include etiquette, art, self interest, law, etc. Others insist that these areas only have moral properties because they are based to some degree in moral thought. Finally, it is not as if there is any agreement on what sort of moral theory is right or what methods are the right ones to find the right theory.

It seems that we must start somewhere. I suggest that we start with a few guidelines. First, we should say that ordinary moral decisions and practices are usually rational. All other things being equal, if one theory says that people are less rational than another theory, the first theory is less likely to be true. Second, we should preserve as much common sense morality as possible. All other things being equal, a theory that preserves our common sense is better than one that does not. Third, we should explain why morality includes the things that it does and excludes others. Fourth, our theory should explain what morality is and why it has the properties that it does. Finally, our theory should explain why rival theories exist and why they believe what they do.

Given these sort of principles, I think that we must start with what absolutely everyone agrees with. This is the idea that ethics is not the same thing as etiquette, art, law or any other area. The proper question is why it is a different area. Once that question is answered, one is well on the way to answering what the domain of morality is.

Naturalism and First Philosophy: Logic As Practice

The last post pointed out that naturalism (of the epistemic variety) assumes that first philosophy is unnecessary. I used the example of the principle of non-contradiction as a counter-example to this claim. I pointed out that naturalists have at least three responses to this claim, and refuted the first response. At this point the naturalist could claim that the principle of non-contradiction is not a belief. If this response is successful, then the naturalist has successfully defended her theory from my attack.

The naturalist might believe that the principle of non-contradiction is a proposition describing the behavior of human being when believing. No one believes contradictions. She could extend this even farther. Quine describes his two principles as pragmatic principles, not beliefs or rationally based principles. If the principle is not a belief, then she could explain adherence to it in pragmatic terms. We behave in this way because believing contradictory things decreases survival value. Since it is not a belief, there is no need to provide a justification for it.

The question to ask is this: do people ever believe that the principle of non-contradiction is true? If anyone does, then the question of justification enters again, and naturalism is defeated. So someone who believes that principle is not a belief must also believe that the principle is neither true nor false. Anyone who claims to believe the principle is either mistaken (because they actually do not believe it) or ignorant.

There are implications for that kind of belief. First, not all instances of P & not-P can be false. If they were, then the principle of non-contradiction would be true. So there is a severe problem. It gets worse, for there is no rational reason to object to any instance of P & not-P. If I claim that the moon is both white and not-white, how could you object apart from claiming the truth of the principle of non-contradiction? All of this demonstrates that if we are to accept the idea that the principle of non-contradiction is neither true nor false, then all of our rational thinking would vanish. Therefore, the principle of non-contradiction must be true. Since the principle is either true or false, one can believe it. Therefore, the second strategy against accepting an example of first philosophy has been refuted.

There is a final strategy available to the naturalist. She could claim that the principle of non-contradiction is a component of something (such as rational thought) that has pragmatic value, or that is not a belief, or is in some way is justified by experience. That possibility is for later.

Naturalism and First Philosophy: Logic & Usefulness

From what I can currently understand, naturalism is dominant among current philosophers. Naturalism excludes any consideration of first philosophy. First philosophy is the philosophy that we engage in prior to any scientific or generally empirical understanding. It is sometimes, perhaps usually, associated with justifying the scientific method or science in general. My first reaction to this is that there is nothing wrong with first philosophy, and it looks to be necessary. A consideration of the logical principle of non-contradiction and it justification by usefulness contributes towards showing that this is true.

Consider the realm of logic. Aside from various formal logics, and the standard treatment of fallacies, there are basic principles of logic. One of these is the principle of non-contradiction: it is not the case that P & not-P. For example, it is not the case that I exist and I do not exist. This principle was first formalized by Aristotle. It is part of first philosophy for two reasons: no empirical evidence supports this, and no empirical evidence can defeat it (contra Quine). Therefore, there is a first philosophy because certain logical principles are a part of it. Since these logical principles are also necessary for any kind of thinking, first philosophy is also necessary.

The naturalist could claim that our belief in logic is justified by its usefulness. Without it, we would be unable to think correctly or behave well. This principle was useful in our survival. Let's suppose that we grant this. We can understand the usefulness claim in two ways. One is a justifiying way: I am justified in believing the principle of non-contradiction because it is justified by my experiences of the world. The other is historical: I came to believe in the principle because of its survival value. The historical reading does not justify my belief. All it does is explain why I have it. So I can still ask what justifies my belief in it. If we use the justifying reading, then we are left with a question: just how are my experiences of the world supposed to justify the principle of non-contradiction?

When I come to the world I do not take any experience as being a possible defeater for the principle of non-contradiction. If went outside and saw that the moon was bright green, I would not conclude that the moon is both white and not-white (green). I would conclude that the appearance of the moon is now green, but was previously white. Those who believe in the doctrines of the Trinity or Incarnation do not believe that there is no sense to be had in the doctrine. They believe that they do not understand all of it, and cannot. Neither case is a violation of the law of non-contradiction. Therefore, as far as I know, there is no experience that either defeats or supports my belief in the principle. I am highly attached to the claim and would give up anything else to preserve it.

Now we move into the territory of Quine. He claimed that our web of beliefs were all revisable in principle - including our logical beliefs. However, we must revise as little as possible, and make the changes as simple as possible in order to preserve coherence. It is fairly easy to point out given Quine's principles of belief revision, the principle of non-contradiction is not revisable. First, the very principles he gives assume that the principle is true. What determines how much revision and how many changes are necessary is found by determining what set of beliefs can be held without contradiction. Second, no possible change could ever be sufficient to alter this principle. Let's suppose that you denied the principle. By doing this, you are adding the contradictory of every belief in your web to your web. You also add every other belief and its contradictory to your web. So now your web of belief contains every possible belief and its contradictory. It is as large as possible. But that violates Quine's first principle - make as little revision as possible. Any other set of beliefs would be smaller, therefore, one should never reject this belief. Therefore, the principle of non-contradiction is not revisable - even in principle - on Quine's system. Since Quine's system is the only one to provide a way to revise our logical beliefs, there are no systems that successfully show that belief in the principle of non-contradiction is revisable by anything at all.

These considerations defeat the naturalist who attempts justify the principle of non-contradiction using its usefulness as the reason. The naturalist does have other options. She could attempt to justify it by rationality, or could deny that the principle is a belief. I will examine these options some other time. Apart from the success of those other options, the naturalist will be unable to reject at least some of the traditional first philosophy.