Goodness as a Comparative Term

I have reached the point at which looking further into the issue of moral boundaries will not progress without a better understanding of normative terms. One of these terms is goodness. Sometimes we use this term in a comparative sense. This may be done without verbally indicating that a comparison is being performed, or with such a comparison. In all cases of comparison, an ideal is being compared with the object.

Some examples are in order. Consider the statement "this is a good piece of meat". What is meant is not that a piece of meat is morally good, but that the piece of meat is reasonably similar to the ideal piece of meat. In context, we may be speaking in terms of health, taste or some combination of those. If we are speaking of taste, then we are simply claiming that the meat tastes the way that we like meat to taste. If we are speaking of health, then we are claiming that the meat is good for our health. Consider a second example: "this construction company is better than the one that built my house". In this case the product or skills of the construction company is being compared with a second company. One is more similar to the ideal construction company than the other, and their products are more similar to the ideal than the other.

In these examples one can understand what is going on. A comparative use of the normative term good takes some act, process or object and claims that it is similar to the ideal act, process of object. This has a few interesting results. The first one is that the concept of goodness is not actually being used in some kind of moral sense. All that it means is similarity. The second one is that much of the work is being done by the ideal object, act or process. This means that every comparative use of goodness only requires the use of similarity and an ideal. What has been applied to goodness can also be applied to badness with the same result. The next step is to investigate the nature of the ideal.

Sentences and Propositions

At this point, clarity on the nature of both sentences and propositions is required. One cannot speak with clarity on matters of belief (direct or otherwise) while the concepts used to explain it are vague!

The first thing to become aware of is the nature of signs. I am using this word generally to refer to any mark, image, sound or other feature perceived through the senses that represents something. So traffic lights, pictures and words are all signs. Morse code, binary digits, bumps on a CD, and smoke signals are also signs. Signs may represent another sensory feature. This occurs in the case of pictures and recordings of various kinds. Signs may also represent a command: street signs and lights. They may also represent ideas. It is these last kind of signs that we are interested in, for they are the ones that are also known as sentences.

Sentences may be in any language, may be in any medium, and may be written, spoken, demonstrated (sign language) and so on. The unifying feature of sentences is that they express thoughts or ideas. But not every idea is one that can be either true or false. Some sentences are questions, others are commands and still others are declarative sentences. Those sentences that can meaningfully be called either true or false are the bearers of propositions.

A propositions is any thought that can meaningfully be called either true or false. Many sentences may express the same proposition. For example "Snow is white" and "La neige est blanche" (French) both express the proposition that snow is white.

These points apply to belief in a very simple way. One believes propositions, and only propositions. One cannot believe sentences, nor can one believe signs in general. These is because the object of belief is a thought, and belief comes down to whether the thought is thought to be either true or false.