An Argument for Determinism
I was reading Jeremy's blog and noticed that he had a post up on arguments for determinism. He had two arguments: one theological and one "scientific". I only wish to deal with the theological argument at this point. The theological argument supposes that God has absolute control over creation. This absolute control is believed to require determinism. The problem is motivating this position. Why should we believe that God has this kind of control? What kind of arguments would we need to show this?
It is worth pointing out that the absolute control conceived of is not merely a strong form of control. One could accept the position of Molinism and believe that God can exercise detailed control over every aspect of the world. If one did that, then one could not believe in determinism at all. So one must believe that God exercises some form of control that is even stronger. Perhaps he could cause the choices of free beings to line up with his will. Since Molinism does not allow this, this would result in a stronger view of control. It is also the only way to have a stronger view of control than Molinism.
So now that we know what kind of control is required, we have to wonder what could convince us that God has this kind of control. Perhaps we could quote a Bible verse. But the Bible does not say anything that requires this form of control to be true. It would have to say that God efficiently caused the free choice of someone to be what he wanted. You cannot find that, or any set of verses that require such a view as that to be true. Perhaps a theology would require this form of control. It is hard to see how it could without being ad hoc. At best, it could claim that God's perfection requires absolute control of creation. I don't find such a claim intuitively appealing. As long as I have strong control, all of my intuitions are satisfied. So why should I believe that God's perfection requires absolute control?
Perhaps we could advance the argument that God is the most powerful being possible. Since a God with absolute control is more powerful than a God with merely strong control, God has absolute control. The response is very simple. Apart from a proof that freedom is compatible with determinism, there is no good reason to believe that absolute control is even possible. In that case, a God with strong control is the most powerful being possible.
All of this has assumed that the person who believes in absolute control also avoids attacking Molinism directly. However, this is an option. He could argue that Molinism is irreparably inconsistent. The intuitions that supported strong control should now support absolute control. So far, this is a good argument. But consider the fact that I also have intuitions and arguments for incompatiblism. Since we both believe in free will, I would have to ask whether the evidence for absolute control really does outweigh that for incompatibilism. I am not sure that it does. An argument for absolute control would have to take this into account and give an appropriate argument.
No matter how one tries to advance determinism theologically, one is required to give an account that shows the superiority of theological arguments for God's stronger control over universe to the philosophical arguments for incompatiblism. One also has to either refute Molinism, or demonstrate that freedom is compatible with determinism. Quite a bit of work for a argument that tries to demonstrate determinism!
It is worth pointing out that the absolute control conceived of is not merely a strong form of control. One could accept the position of Molinism and believe that God can exercise detailed control over every aspect of the world. If one did that, then one could not believe in determinism at all. So one must believe that God exercises some form of control that is even stronger. Perhaps he could cause the choices of free beings to line up with his will. Since Molinism does not allow this, this would result in a stronger view of control. It is also the only way to have a stronger view of control than Molinism.
So now that we know what kind of control is required, we have to wonder what could convince us that God has this kind of control. Perhaps we could quote a Bible verse. But the Bible does not say anything that requires this form of control to be true. It would have to say that God efficiently caused the free choice of someone to be what he wanted. You cannot find that, or any set of verses that require such a view as that to be true. Perhaps a theology would require this form of control. It is hard to see how it could without being ad hoc. At best, it could claim that God's perfection requires absolute control of creation. I don't find such a claim intuitively appealing. As long as I have strong control, all of my intuitions are satisfied. So why should I believe that God's perfection requires absolute control?
Perhaps we could advance the argument that God is the most powerful being possible. Since a God with absolute control is more powerful than a God with merely strong control, God has absolute control. The response is very simple. Apart from a proof that freedom is compatible with determinism, there is no good reason to believe that absolute control is even possible. In that case, a God with strong control is the most powerful being possible.
All of this has assumed that the person who believes in absolute control also avoids attacking Molinism directly. However, this is an option. He could argue that Molinism is irreparably inconsistent. The intuitions that supported strong control should now support absolute control. So far, this is a good argument. But consider the fact that I also have intuitions and arguments for incompatiblism. Since we both believe in free will, I would have to ask whether the evidence for absolute control really does outweigh that for incompatibilism. I am not sure that it does. An argument for absolute control would have to take this into account and give an appropriate argument.
No matter how one tries to advance determinism theologically, one is required to give an account that shows the superiority of theological arguments for God's stronger control over universe to the philosophical arguments for incompatiblism. One also has to either refute Molinism, or demonstrate that freedom is compatible with determinism. Quite a bit of work for a argument that tries to demonstrate determinism!